Asbestos Podcast EP12 Transcript

Episode 12: Raybestos and the Brake Pad Revolution

Full transcript from Asbestos: A Conspiracy 4,500 Years in the Making — a 52-episode documentary podcast produced by Danziger & De Llano, LLP.

Episode Information
Series	Asbestos: A Conspiracy 4,500 Years in the Making
Season	1
Episode	12
Title	Raybestos and the Brake Pad Revolution
Arc	Arc 3 — The Industrial Revolution (Episode 3 of 5)
Episode Number in Arc	3
Produced by	Charles Fletcher
Research and writing	Charles Fletcher with Claude AI
Publish Date	February 9, 2026
Listen	Apple Podcasts · Spotify · Amazon Music
MLNM Episode Page	Episode 12 Landing Page

Episode Summary

Episode 12 traces how asbestos solved the industrial braking problem — and how that solution created an occupational invisibility trap affecting 900,000+ workers by 1975. The episode opens with a mathematical fact: 15 million Model T automobiles were manufactured between 1908 and 1927. Each vehicle required multiple brake replacements over its service lifetime. Conservative estimates place total brake servicing events in the tens of millions. Yet the workers performing this maintenance — in independent repair shops, automotive dealerships, and home garages — were never included in corporate health studies, never offered screening, and never informed of hazards.

The technical narrative is straightforward: before asbestos, brake linings failed catastrophically. Wood blocks, cotton soaked in oil, leather, and camel hair all degraded under sustained frictional heat. When Louis Renault invented the drum brake in 1902, the engineering problem shifted but remained: how to maintain friction when temperatures exceeded 400°C (750°F)? Asbestos provided the solution. Thermal stability to 450°C, exceptional friction coefficient, fire resistance, and critically: it was inexpensive to manufacture. In 1906, Arthur Raymond and Arthur Law patented their woven asbestos-copper wire mesh brake lining design in Bridgeport, Connecticut. The company name combined their surname with their material: Raybestos. Within a decade, Raybestos dominated the American brake lining market.

The occupational story reveals institutional suppression. Sumner Simpson, a Johns-Manville executive, assumed control of Raybestos in 1916 and ran the company for 37 years. In October 1935, Simpson wrote to Johns-Manville attorney Vandiver Brown: "I think the less said about asbestos, the better off we are." Simpson and Brown then convinced Dr. Anthony Lanza to alter his occupational health study findings. Lanza's original conclusion: "asbestosis can result fatally." The revised version: "milder than silicosis." A 1939 Asbestos magazine editorial confirmed: "all this information is to be kept confidential."

Meanwhile, the Raymark facility in Stratford, Connecticut, established in 1919, disposed of dried asbestos waste by distributing it freely to residents as fill material. Over 46 residential and 2+ dozen commercial properties became contaminated. Short Beach Park received 270,000 cubic yards of asbestos-contaminated material. In 1981, the Raybestos Memorial Ballfield was constructed on this toxic fill. Between 1958 and 1991, Stratford, Connecticut, experienced the highest mesothelioma rates in the state, including cases among individuals under age 25 — indicating childhood playground exposure. The EPA designated the site a Superfund priority in 1995. Cleanup costs have exceeded $113 million and remain ongoing.

Full Episode Transcript

COLD OPEN - THE EXPOSURE CASCADE

HOST 1: Fifteen million.

HOST 2: That's the Model T number.

HOST 1: Fifteen million cars, built between 1908 and 1927. And here's the thing about cars—

HOST 2: They need brakes.

HOST 1: They need brakes. And brakes wear out. The average Model T owner replaced their brake linings multiple times over the life of the vehicle. So we're not talking about fifteen million exposure events. We're talking about tens of millions. Maybe a hundred million brake jobs, each one releasing clouds of asbestos dust into some mechanic's lungs.

HOST 2: And the companies knew this was dangerous?

HOST 1: By 1935, the president of the largest brake lining company in America wrote to his counterpart at Johns-Manville with a very specific piece of advice. "I think the less said about asbestos, the better off we are."

HOST 2: Less said.

HOST 1: Less said. His name was Sumner Simpson. And today, we're going to talk about how Simpson and his colleagues created the largest unmonitored occupational health disaster in American history—and then kept it quiet for fifty years. This is Episode 12: Raybestos and the Brake Pad Revolution.

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SEGMENT 1: SPONSOR INTRODUCTION

HOST 2: This episode is brought to you by Danziger and De Llano. Thirty years of turning corporate records into family justice. Dandell dot com.

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SEGMENT 2: THE BRAKING PROBLEM - FROM WOOD TO ASBESTOS

HOST 1: Let's start with why asbestos brake linings existed at all. Because they weren't just convenient. They were revolutionary.

HOST 2: What were they using before?

HOST 1: Wooden blocks. Pressed against steel rims.

HOST 2: Wooden blocks.

HOST 1: Worked fine below ten, twenty miles an hour. But once rubber tires came along—

HOST 2: The wood slipped.

HOST 1: Then you get early drum brakes. 1902. Louis Renault builds the first mechanical drum brake. And the lining materials are... not great. Cotton soaked in oil. Leather. At one point, camel hair.

HOST 2: Camel hair.

HOST 1: Camel hair. And all of these materials have the same problem—

HOST 2: Heat.

HOST 1: Heat. You're converting the energy of a moving vehicle into thermal energy. These materials char. They melt. They fail. And when your brakes fail at thirty miles an hour—

HOST 2: Which was fast, in 1905.

HOST 1: That was very fast in 1905. So the industry has a genuine problem to solve. And then someone discovers that asbestos doesn't burn.

HOST 2: The perfect solution.

HOST 1: Thermal stability to four hundred fifty degrees Celsius. High friction coefficient. Fire resistant. In 1906, two men in Bridgeport, Connecticut patent a woven asbestos-copper wire mesh for brake linings. Arthur Raymond and Arthur Law. They name the company after the product: Raybestos. Raymond plus asbestos.

HOST 2: Subtle.

HOST 1: Raymond dies in 1909. Thirty years old. Brain abscess—not respiratory disease.

HOST 2: So we can't draw the H.W. Johns parallel.

HOST 1: We can't. Different cause of death entirely. But his partner fades from the record, and by 1916, a new man is running the show. Sumner Simpson. And Simpson will run Raybestos for the next thirty-seven years.

HOST 2: Nearly four decades.

HOST 1: Long enough to build a company. Long enough to build an empire. And long enough to build a cover-up.

NAMED ENTITY - RAYBESTOS COMPANY:

• Company name: Raybestos Company
• Founding location: Bridgeport, Connecticut
• Founding year: 1906
• Founders: Arthur Raymond and Arthur Law
• Company name origin: Contraction of "Raymond" + "asbestos"
• Primary product: Woven asbestos-copper wire mesh for brake linings
• Founding innovation: Patent for asbestos brake lining material
• Key technical achievement: Thermal stability to 450°C; high friction coefficient; fire resistance
• Leadership transition: Arthur Raymond (died 1909); Arthur Law (faded from record); Sumner Simpson (1916 onwards)

NAMED ENTITY - SUMNER SIMPSON:

• Full name: Sumner Simpson
• Birth: c. 1875
• Death: 1953
• Career: President of Raybestos (1916-1948); Chairman (1948-1953)
• Tenure: 37 years (1916-1953)
• Notable action: Authored "less said about asbestos" quote (October 1, 1935)
• Correspondence: Letter to Vandiver Brown (Johns-Manville attorney)
• Legacy: Presided over manufacture and cover-up of asbestos exposure; box of correspondence held in company vault and office closet

KEY FACTS - RAYBESTOS FOUNDING AND EARLY HISTORY:

• Patent year: 1906
• Patent description: Woven asbestos-copper wire mesh for brake linings
• Inventors: Arthur Raymond (co-founder); Arthur Law (co-founder)
• Company name: Named after co-founder Arthur Raymond + product material asbestos
• Product advantage: Thermal stability, friction properties, fire resistance
• Technical performance: 450°C thermal stability; solved brake fade problem; addressed heat-related failures in cotton, leather, camel hair linings
• Founder death: Arthur Raymond died 1909, age 30, cause brain abscess (not respiratory disease)
• Leadership succession: Sumner Simpson became president 1916 (7 years after Raymond's death)
• Tenure duration: Simpson led company for 37 years (1916-1953)

KEY CONCEPT - THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTION TRAP:

• Definition: Adoption of a genuinely superior technological solution to a real engineering problem, while concealing known hazards of the solution
• Historical context: Brake lining materials (wood, cotton, leather, camel hair) genuinely failed at higher speeds and temperatures
• Problem solved: Asbestos provided genuine thermal stability and friction properties without heat-induced failure
• Knowledge gap: Industry accepted asbestos as superior solution without consumer knowledge of occupational hazards
• Timeline: 1906-1918 = asbestos adopted for superior technical properties; 1918 onwards = insurance industry knew hazard; adoption continued despite knowledge
• Consequence: Technological necessity became marketing justification for continued use despite concealed hazards

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SEGMENT 3: THE FORD MODEL T AND THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

HOST 1: Here's the thing about the Model T. It wasn't just a car. It was a distribution system for asbestos exposure.

HOST 2: Go on.

HOST 1: Ford makes the price drop from eight hundred dollars in 1908 to three hundred ten dollars by 1921. Suddenly working families can afford cars. By 1929, there are twenty-three million vehicles on American roads.

HOST 2: So the same efficiency that made car ownership possible—

HOST 1: Made asbestos exposure universal. The factory that gave American workers affordable transportation also gave them lung disease. They just didn't know it yet. Now, we should note—technical records suggest Ford initially used Raybestos transmission band linings in 1908, then switched to cotton around 1910. Likely for cost or noise reasons.

HOST 2: The irony being—

HOST 1: Ford had the fireproof solution. Rejected it for cheaper materials. Then eventually came back to asbestos as speeds and heat demands increased.

HOST 2: Of course they did.

HOST 1: And here's where the conspiracy starts. Not with what they knew—but with who they didn't count.

NAMED ENTITY - HENRY FORD AND FORD MOTOR COMPANY:

• Company name: Ford Motor Company
• Founder/CEO: Henry Ford
• Production vehicle: Model T ("Tin Lizzie")
• Production period: 1908-1927
• Total production: 15 million vehicles
• Price point 1908: $800
• Price point 1921: $310
• Price reduction factor: 61% reduction over 13 years
• Market impact: Made automobile ownership accessible to working-class families
• Brake system evolution: Transmission band linings 1908 (Raybestos asbestos); cotton 1910-1920s (cost/noise optimization); reversion to asbestos as speeds increased
• Production scale: 15 million vehicles = tens of millions of brake servicing events over vehicle lifespan

KEY FACTS - FORD MODEL T PRODUCTION AND ASBESTOS EXPOSURE CASCADE:

• Production span: 1908-1927 (19 years)
• Total vehicles manufactured: 15 million
• Price accessibility: Initial $800 (luxury item) → $310 (working-family affordability)
• Market adoption: 23 million vehicles on American roads by 1929
• Brake servicing per vehicle: Multiple brake lining replacements over vehicle lifespan (average 10-15 years)
• Total exposure events: Conservative estimate 50+ million brake servicing events (15M vehicles × 3.3 average replacements)
• Mechanic population: Hundreds of thousands to millions (independent mechanics, dealership service bays, home mechanics)
• Occupational category: Mechanics not employed by Raybestos; not tracked in company health surveillance
• Geographic scope: Nationwide distribution; exposure occurred in every U.S. town with automobile service infrastructure

KEY CONCEPT - OCCUPATIONAL INVISIBILITY THROUGH OUTSOURCED LABOR:

• Definition: Hazardous exposure occurring outside direct employment relationship; workers not counted in company health statistics or occupational health regulatory frameworks
• Exposure source: Raybestos brake linings (asbestos-containing products)
• User population: Mechanics employed by third-party organizations (dealerships, independent garages) or self-employed (home mechanics)
• Company responsibility claim: Raybestos manufactured product but not responsible for end-user exposure (mechanics)
• Regulatory gap: Occupational health monitoring applied only to factory workers; mechanics not considered occupational asbestos workers
• Counting mechanism: Factory workers appear in Raybestos health records; mechanics do not; absence of data = absence of accountability

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SEGMENT 4: THE INVISIBLE WORKFORCE

HOST 2: The mechanics.

HOST 1: Factory workers at Raybestos? Hundreds. Auto plant assembly workers? Thousands. Independent mechanics? Hundreds of thousands. Home mechanics changing their own brakes in the driveway? Millions.

HOST 2: But the mechanics weren't Raybestos employees.

HOST 1: They weren't covered by Raybestos worker's comp. They didn't show up in Raybestos medical surveys. They worked in independent garages, dealership service bays, their own driveways. And when they got sick—

HOST 2: Nobody connected it to the brake dust.

HOST 1: By 1975, approximately nine hundred thousand Americans worked in brake servicing. Nine hundred thousand. And not one of them appeared in a corporate health study for fifty years.

HOST 2: Fifty years.

HOST 1: Remember Frederick Hoffman from last episode? Prudential statistician. The man who documented in 1918 that insurance companies refused to cover asbestos workers.

HOST 2: The actuaries figured it out before the doctors did.

HOST 1: Bulletin Number 231. "Mortality From Respiratory Diseases in Dusty Trades." Covers mining, textile manufacturing. The established dusty trades.

HOST 2: What doesn't it cover?

HOST 1: Brake workers. Friction materials. Automotive industry. Garage mechanics.

HOST 2: Because in 1918—

HOST 1: The automotive industry was still in its infancy. Hoffman studied trades with documented mortality patterns. Brake mechanics weren't considered asbestos workers. They weren't considered anything. They fell into a category that didn't exist yet.

HOST 2: So they didn't count them.

HOST 1: Nobody counted them. And by the time anyone thought to create that category—fifty years had passed. The gap between when British researcher E.R.A. Merewether first identified brake work as a cause of asbestosis—early 1930s—and the first successful lawsuit against a brake manufacturer? 1985. Forty-seven years.

HOST 2: Forty-seven years.

HOST 1: An eighty-one-year-old retired mechanic finally won a two-million-dollar verdict. Half a century after the danger was documented.

NAMED ENTITY - BRAKE WORKERS AND MECHANIC POPULATION:

• Total brake servicing workers (1975): ~900,000
• Worker distribution: Factory workers (Raybestos, Manhattan Rubber, other manufacturers), auto assembly line workers, independent mechanics, dealership service technicians, home mechanics
• Employment relationship: Majority not employed by asbestos product manufacturers
• Occupational category: Not classified as "asbestos workers" until post-1975 epidemiology
• Health surveillance: Excluded from occupational health studies; not counted in company medical surveys
• Exposure pathway: Direct contact with asbestos brake linings during installation, adjustment, replacement, and machining
• Exposure duration: Decades of repeated exposure (career-long occupational exposure)

NAMED ENTITY - E.R.A. MEREWETHER:

• Full name: E.R.A. Merewether
• Nationality: British
• Profession: Medical researcher; occupational health specialist
• Notable research: Early identification of brake work as occupational cause of asbestosis
• Research period: Early 1930s (exact date range not specified, likely 1930-1935)
• Key finding: Brake/clutch work associated with asbestosis development
• Impact: First documented medical evidence linking brake manufacturing/servicing to asbestos disease
• Regulatory influence: Formed basis for later occupational health concern; not immediately acted upon by industry or regulators
• Publication: Merewether-Price Report (date of original report early 1930s; subsequent corrections documented later in scientific literature)

KEY FACTS - 47-YEAR GAP BETWEEN MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY:

• E.R.A. Merewether identification of brake work hazard: Early 1930s
• First successful lawsuit against brake manufacturer: 1985
• Time gap: 47 years
• Plaintiff: 81-year-old retired mechanic
• Verdict amount: $2 million
• Case significance: First successful legal acknowledgment of occupational exposure liability
• Historical context: 47 years after medical evidence documented; 77 years after Raybestos founding (1906)

KEY FACTS - 1918 HOFFMAN REPORT AND OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY GAP:

• Report name: "Mortality From Respiratory Diseases in Dusty Trades" (Bulletin Number 231)
• Author: Frederick Hoffman (Prudential Insurance actuary)
• Year published: 1918
• Content scope: Mining, textile manufacturing (established dusty trades with documented mortality)
• Occupational categories excluded: Brake workers, friction materials workers, automotive industry workers, garage mechanics
• Reason for exclusion: Automotive industry in infancy; brake mechanics not yet classified as occupational asbestos workers
• Consequence: Absence of brake workers from actuarial death records became evidence of occupational invisibility
• Timeline context: 1918 = insurance companies flagged asbestos hazard for known workers; brake mechanics not yet in "known worker" category

KEY FACTS - 1975 BRAKE WORKER POPULATION:

• Total brake servicing workers: ~900,000
• Occupational designation: Not officially classified as "asbestos workers" despite asbestos exposure
• Corporate health surveillance: Excluded from manufacturer health studies
• Regulatory oversight: Not covered by asbestos workplace standards until OSHA post-1970
• Exposure documentation: No mandatory exposure monitoring; no health registry
• Occupational health data: No baseline epidemiological statistics comparing to general population

KEY CONCEPT - OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY AS REGULATORY MECHANISM:

• Definition: Recognition of occupational category determines application of workplace safety standards, health monitoring, and legal liability
• Asbestos workers pre-1970: "Asbestos worker" category limited to factory workers in textile, mining, and product manufacturing
• Occupational expansion post-1970: OSHA and medical community expanded "asbestos worker" category to include mechanics, insulators, construction workers
• Temporal gap: Workers exposed decades before occupational category recognition
• Regulatory consequence: Workers exposed before occupational category created cannot claim occupational exposure history (no official record); burden of proof falls on individual to establish work-related exposure
• Legal consequence: Difficulty establishing causation; inability to access workers' compensation; requirement for tort litigation

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SEGMENT 5: THE SIMPSON PAPERS - COORDINATION AND COVER-UP

HOST 1: July 5th, 1929. A triple merger creates Raybestos-Manhattan.

HOST 2: What merged?

HOST 1: Raybestos Company—that's the Bridgeport brand. Manhattan Rubber Manufacturing from Passaic, New Jersey—rubber expertise. And U.S. Asbestos Company from Pennsylvania—raw materials. Vertical integration. They control the supply chain from asbestos yarn to finished brake shoe.

HOST 2: And Simpson runs it.

HOST 1: Simpson runs it. And on October 1st, 1935, Simpson writes to Vandiver Brown, an attorney at Johns-Manville. "I think the less said about asbestos, the better off we are."

HOST 2: That's the quote.

HOST 1: Brown's reply is almost more damning. He calls it their "ostrich-like attitude." He knows they're burying their heads in the sand. He's documenting that he knows. And he keeps doing it anyway.

HOST 2: So this isn't negligence.

HOST 1: This is coordination. Simpson at Raybestos. Brown at Johns-Manville. Competitors agreeing to keep everyone else in the dark. And it works. Remember Dr. Anthony Lanza from last episode? The study manipulation?

HOST 2: "Milder than silicosis."

HOST 1: Same playbook. Simpson and Brown convince Lanza to alter his findings. Original conclusion: "It is possible for uncomplicated asbestosis to result fatally." Published version, 1936: asbestosis was "milder than silicosis." Science for sale. And then they went after the trade press.

HOST 2: The what?

HOST 1: 1939. The editor of Asbestos magazine—yes, there was a magazine called Asbestos—writes to Simpson. "We understand that all this information on asbestos is to be kept confidential." They weren't just suppressing research. They were suppressing trade journalism.

NAMED ENTITY - RAYBESTOS-MANHATTAN MERGER:

• Merger date: July 5, 1929
• Merging companies:

 1. Raybestos Company (Bridgeport, Connecticut) - brake linings; established 1906
 2. Manhattan Rubber Manufacturing (Passaic, New Jersey) - rubber products expertise
 3. U.S. Asbestos Company (Pennsylvania) - raw asbestos materials

• Merger type: Vertical integration
• Supply chain control: Asbestos sourcing → fiber processing → product manufacturing → finished brake shoe
• Corporate structure: New entity "Raybestos-Manhattan Corporation"
• Leadership: Sumner Simpson (President)
• Market position: Vertical integration creates competitive advantage in cost, supply security, and quality control

NAMED ENTITY - VANDIVER BROWN:

• Full name: Vandiver Brown
• Employer: Johns-Manville Corporation
• Position: Attorney
• Professional role: Legal counsel for Johns-Manville; corresponded with Sumner Simpson (Raybestos)
• Notable correspondence: October 1, 1935 letter from Simpson; response characterizing Simpson's position as "ostrich-like attitude"
• Significance: Documented awareness of asbestos hazards; conscious decision to suppress information despite knowledge
• Knowledge status: Brown's reply demonstrates understanding that Simpson was advocating deliberate suppression of asbestos hazard information

KEY FACTS - THE SIMPSON-BROWN CORRESPONDENCE (OCTOBER 1, 1935):

• Date: October 1, 1935
• Sender: Sumner Simpson (President, Raybestos-Manhattan)
• Recipient: Vandiver Brown (Attorney, Johns-Manville Corporation)
• Quoted text: "I think the less said about asbestos, the better off we are."
• Response characterization: Brown called Simpson's position an "ostrich-like attitude"
• Meaning: Simpson advocated for public silence about asbestos hazards
• Brown's understanding: Brown recognized Simpson's statement as deliberate head-burying; avoidance of accountability
• Coordination: Correspondence between competitors indicates industry-wide coordination on information suppression
• Legal significance: Documented contemporaneous knowledge of hazards; deliberate choice to suppress information
• Time context: 1935 = 17 years after Prudential Insurance flagged asbestos hazard (1918); 5 years after E.R.A. Merewether identified brake work as cause of asbestosis (early 1930s)

KEY FACTS - SIMPSON-BROWN-LANZA COORDINATION (1936):

• Key figure: Dr. Anthony Lanza (occupational health researcher)
• Original research finding: "It is possible for uncomplicated asbestosis to result fatally."
• Published version (1936): "Asbestosis was milder than silicosis"
• Study manipulation: Original conclusion altered before publication
• Parties involved: Simpson (Raybestos-Manhattan), Brown (Johns-Manville), Lanza (researcher)
• Mechanism: Industry coordination to modify published medical findings
• Scientific consequence: False conclusion published; minimized hazard perception; masked true severity of asbestos disease

KEY FACTS - ASBESTOS MAGAZINE AND TRADE PRESS SUPPRESSION (1939):

• Publication: "Asbestos magazine" (industry trade journal)
• Date of communication: 1939
• Sender: Editor of Asbestos magazine
• Recipient: Sumner Simpson (Raybestos-Manhattan)
• Message: "We understand that all this information on asbestos is to be kept confidential."
• Suppression scope: Not limited to academic research; extended to trade journalism and industry communication
• Consequence: Industry professionals prevented from accessing hazard information through normal trade channels
• Communication mechanism: Coordination between industry leadership and trade publication editorial board

KEY CONCEPT - MULTI-LEVEL INFORMATION SUPPRESSION:

• Definition: Systematic exclusion of hazard information across multiple channels: academic research, industry trade press, occupational health literature, consumer marketing
• Level 1 - Academic suppression: Modification of peer-reviewed research findings (Lanza study); prevention of publication of hazard data
• Level 2 - Trade press suppression: Control of industry journalism and trade magazine content; confidentiality agreements with editorial staff
• Level 3 - Regulatory suppression: Limitation of information provided to government agencies; withholding of internal health study data
• Level 4 - Consumer suppression: Marketing campaigns emphasizing product benefits while omitting hazard information (next episode focus)
• Coordination mechanism: Correspondence between competitors (Simpson-Brown) coordinating joint suppression strategy
• Knowledge status: All parties understood they were suppressing information about known hazards
• Legal implication: Deliberate, coordinated, sustained effort to conceal known hazards from public, workers, consumers, and regulators

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SEGMENT 6: THE SIMPSON DYNASTY AND DOCUMENT PRESERVATION

HOST 1: Sumner Simpson runs Raybestos from 1916 to 1948. Chairman until his death in 1953. Thirty-seven years.

HOST 2: And then?

HOST 1: His son. William Simpson. Born 1916. Spent his entire career at Raybestos-Manhattan. General manager by 1947. President and CEO from 1967 to 1980. Chairman until 1983.

HOST 2: Two generations.

HOST 1: Two generations presiding over manufacture, cover-up, and eventual exposure. And here's the detail that matters. Pre-1969, about six thousand documents sit in the company vault. Combination lock access. Only Sumner Simpson, William Simpson, two secretaries, and security guards have the combination.

HOST 2: And when Sumner dies?

HOST 1: The box stays in the vault. 1969—William moves the box to his personal office closet.

HOST 2: His office closet.

HOST 1: For five years, he keeps his father's correspondence in his closet. Then in 1974, he gives the box to John Marsh, the Director of Environmental Affairs. And between 1974 and 1977, Marsh tells William—these papers are relevant to asbestos disease.

HOST 2: And William keeps them for three more years.

HOST 1: Until the subpoena. 1977. New Jersey asbestos litigation. Papers produced.

HOST 2: What was he thinking for those three years?

HOST 1: We don't know. We don't know if he read the letters. We don't know if he understood what "the less said, the better" meant for the hundreds of thousands of mechanics who'd been exposed. What we know is—he kept the box. And when the lawyers came asking, he gave it to them.

NAMED ENTITY - WILLIAM S. SIMPSON:

• Full name: William S. Simpson (or William Simpson)
• Birth year: 1916 (same year Sumner Simpson became Raybestos president)
• Father: Sumner Simpson (Raybestos president 1916-1948)
• Career: Entire career at Raybestos-Manhattan Corporation
• Career progression: General manager (by 1947); President and CEO (1967-1980); Chairman (1980-1983)
• Tenure span: 1960s-1983 (approximately 23+ years in senior positions)
• Notable responsibility: Custodian of Simpson Papers (father Sumner's correspondence and company records)
• Document custody timeline: 1969-1977 (8 years of personal custody)
• Office location of documents: Personal office closet (1969-1974, 5 years)
• Transfer to Director of Environmental Affairs: 1974 (John Marsh)
• Legal production: 1977 (subpoena in New Jersey asbestos litigation)

NAMED ENTITY - SIMPSON PAPERS (RAYBESTOS COMPANY VAULT ARCHIVES):

• Document count: Approximately 6,000 documents
• Storage location: Company vault (pre-1969)
• Security: Combination lock access
• Access restricted to: Sumner Simpson, William Simpson, two secretaries, security guards
• Content: Corporate correspondence; internal memos; business records; particularly "less said about asbestos" letter and related communications
• Transfer history:
  • Pre-1969: Vault storage
  • 1969: Moved to William Simpson's personal office closet
  • 1974: Transferred to John Marsh (Director of Environmental Affairs)
  • 1977: Produced via subpoena (New Jersey asbestos litigation)
• Historical significance: Documentary evidence of industry knowledge of asbestos hazards; proof of deliberate information suppression

NAMED ENTITY - JOHN MARSH:

• Employer: Raybestos-Manhattan Corporation
• Position: Director of Environmental Affairs
• Timeline: Custodian of Simpson Papers 1974-1977
• Notable action: Informed William Simpson that documents were "relevant to asbestos disease"
• Knowledge transfer: Marsh communicated to Simpson that the inherited correspondence concerned asbestos health implications
• Document status: Held the papers for 3 years (1974-1977) after learning of their relevance

KEY FACTS - SIMPSON PAPERS DOCUMENT CUSTODY AND DELAY (1969-1977):

• Document creation period: 1930s-1950s (correspondence between Sumner Simpson and industry contacts)
• Vault storage period: Before 1969 (duration unclear; restricted access)
• Office closet custody: 1969-1974 (5 years by William Simpson)
• Director of Environmental Affairs custody: 1974-1977 (3 years by John Marsh)
• Total custody by William Simpson/Raybestos: 8 years (1969-1977)
• Knowledge transfer point: 1974 (Marsh informed Simpson documents were relevant to asbestos disease)
• Additional delay after knowledge: 3 years (1974-1977) between learning of relevance and legal production
• Legal compulsion: Subpoena in New Jersey asbestos litigation forced production in 1977
• Legal implication: Voluntary disclosure not made despite knowledge of relevance; documents retained in personal custody despite understanding of health implications

KEY FACTS - SIMPSON DYNASTY SPAN:

• Sumner Simpson tenure: 1916-1953 (37 years)
• William Simpson tenure in senior roles: 1967-1983 (16 years as President/CEO/Chairman)
• Combined family tenure: 1916-1983 (67 years, with overlap 1967-1953 = 36 years Sumner; 1953-1983 = 30 years William after Sumner's death)
• Periods of responsibility:
  • Sumner (1916-1953): Founding and establishing cover-up protocols; coordination with Johns-Manville (Brown); suppression of Lanza study
  • William (1953-1983): Inheriting cover-up; managing document retention; eventual forced disclosure
• Document custody during William's tenure: 8 years (1969-1977) of custody after learning of health relevance

KEY CONCEPT - INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY AND INHERITED COVER-UP:

• Definition: Multi-generational continuation of information suppression; younger generation inherits cover-up obligations from predecessor without re-evaluating ethical/legal implications
• Succession mechanism: Father-to-son transfer of company leadership; transfer of knowledge of suppression strategy; implicit understanding of "don't talk about asbestos"
• Inherited knowledge: William Simpson inherited understanding that asbestos hazards existed and were intentionally suppressed
• Additional knowledge: By 1974, William Simpson learned (via Marsh) that documents in his custody were relevant to asbestos disease
• Behavior pattern: Despite learning of health relevance in 1974, Simpson retained documents for 3 additional years until forced by subpoena
• Decision point failure: 1974-1977 period represented opportunity to voluntarily disclose documents; opportunity not taken
• Psychological mechanism: Uncovering inherited cover-up requires admission of father's culpability and personal complicity; retention of documents postpones reckoning

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SEGMENT 7: STRATFORD, CONNECTICUT - COMMUNITY CONTAMINATION

HOST 1: Stratford, Connecticut. 1919. Raymark establishes a facility at 75 East Main Street. Thirty-four acres. Decades of manufacturing asbestos brake linings.

HOST 2: What happened to the waste?

HOST 1: Community service.

HOST 2: Community service.

HOST 1: Raymark's gift to the town: dried asbestos waste, given away as free fill material. Used for lawns. Driveways. Playgrounds. Schoolyards. At least forty-six residential properties received contaminated fill. Over two dozen commercial and municipal properties. Short Beach Park—two hundred seventy thousand cubic yards of contaminated material. The town built sports fields on it in 1981.

HOST 2: Sports fields.

HOST 1: Raybestos Memorial Ballfield—named after the company—became one of the most contaminated sites.

HOST 2: And the children?

HOST 1: Between 1958 and 1991, Stratford had the highest rates of mesothelioma and bladder cancer in Connecticut. And here's the data point that stops you cold—mesothelioma rates were particularly high for individuals under the age of twenty-five.

HOST 2: Under twenty-five.

HOST 1: You have to understand—mesothelioma almost never appears in young people. The latency period is typically twenty to fifty years. So when you see elevated rates in people under twenty-five—

HOST 2: They were exposed as children.

HOST 1: Playing on playgrounds. Running on ball fields. In schoolyards that the company had helpfully paved with its own industrial waste. April 1995—EPA adds the site to Superfund. Over a hundred thousand cubic yards of contamination removed as of 2024. A hundred thirteen million dollars allocated from the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law. Cleanup is ongoing.

NAMED ENTITY - RAYMARK INDUSTRIES / STRATFORD FACILITY:

• Parent company: Raybestos-Manhattan Corporation
• Operating name/subsidiary: Raymark Industries
• Facility location: 75 East Main Street, Stratford, Connecticut
• Facility size: 34 acres
• Establishment year: 1919
• Primary product: Asbestos brake linings (manufacturing and processing)
• Operating period: 1919 onwards (decades of manufacturing)
• Waste byproduct: Dried asbestos-containing waste material
• Waste disposal method: Free giveaway to community as fill material
• Waste recipients: 46+ residential properties; 2+ dozen commercial/municipal properties
• Major contamination site: Short Beach Park (270,000 cubic yards of contaminated material)

NAMED ENTITY - STRATFORD, CONNECTICUT:

• Location: Connecticut
• Geographic significance: Manufacturing hub; asbestos industry presence (Raymark facility)
• Public health legacy: Highest mesothelioma and bladder cancer rates in Connecticut (1958-1991)
• Environmental contamination: Widespread residential, commercial, and municipal contamination from Raymark waste fill material
• Childhood exposure: Elevated mesothelioma rates in individuals under age 25 (indicating childhood exposure)
• Sports facility contamination: Raybestos Memorial Ballfield built on contaminated Short Beach Park fill
• Superfund designation: Added to EPA Superfund list April 1995
• Cleanup status: Ongoing as of 2024 (approximately 30+ years post-designation)

NAMED ENTITY - SHORT BEACH PARK, STRATFORD, CONNECTICUT:

• Location: Stratford, Connecticut
• Primary contaminant: Asbestos (from Raymark Industries waste fill)
• Contamination volume: 270,000 cubic yards of asbestos-contaminated material
• Waste source: Raymark Industries (free fill material distribution to community)
• Historical use: Site used for sports field construction in 1981
• Named facility: Raybestos Memorial Ballfield (built on contaminated fill)
• Superfund status: Designated April 1995
• Cleanup scope: Over 100,000 cubic yards of contamination removed (as of 2024)
• Cleanup funding: $113 million allocated from Bipartisan Infrastructure Law
• Cleanup timeline: Ongoing (1995-2024, 29+ years post-designation)
• Exposure population: Children and recreational users (1980s-1990s)

KEY FACTS - RAYMARK WASTE DISTRIBUTION IN STRATFORD (1919-1980s):

• Waste type: Dried asbestos processing waste
• Distribution method: Free giveaway to community
• Intended use: Fill material for lawns, driveways, playgrounds, schoolyards
• Recipient properties residential: 46+ residential properties
• Recipient properties commercial/municipal: 2+ dozen (25+)
• Contamination extent: Widespread throughout community
• Waste volume (Short Beach Park): 270,000 cubic yards
• Knowledge of hazard at time of distribution: Raymark/Raybestos-Manhattan knew asbestos hazards; did not disclose to community recipients
• Community awareness at time: Not informed of asbestos content or hazards

KEY FACTS - STRATFORD MESOTHELIOMA EPIDEMIOLOGY (1958-1991):

• Geographic scope: Stratford, Connecticut
• Study period: 1958-1991 (33-year period)
• Key finding: Highest rates of mesothelioma and bladder cancer in Connecticut during study period
• Notable subgroup: Elevated mesothelioma rates in individuals under age 25
• Latency period context: Mesothelioma typical latency 20-50 years; under-25 diagnosis indicates exposure at age <5 (infancy/early childhood)
• Exposure source: Playing on contaminated playgrounds, ball fields, schoolyards with asbestos fill material
• Exposure duration: Repeated contact during childhood (1960s-1970s)
• Health outcome timeline: Childhood exposure (1960s-1970s) → adult diagnosis (1980s-2000s)
• Epidemiologic significance: Under-25 mesothelioma rates extremely rare in general population; elevated rates in Stratford indicate community-wide childhood exposure event

KEY FACTS - RAYBESTOS MEMORIAL BALLFIELD AND SUPERFUND DESIGNATION:

• Facility name: Raybestos Memorial Ballfield
• Naming: Named after Raybestos/Raymark company (memorial/honorary naming)
• Location: Short Beach Park, Stratford, Connecticut
• Construction year: 1981
• Contamination source: Built on asbestos-contaminated fill material from Raymark waste distribution
• Construction timing: 1981 = 47 years after 1934 when Simpson wrote "less said" letter; 22 years after 1959 when Merewether research published
• Superfund listing: April 1995
• Cleanup commencement: 1995 (14 years after ballfield construction)
• Contamination removed: 100,000+ cubic yards (as of 2024)
• Cleanup funding: $113 million from Bipartisan Infrastructure Law
• Estimated cleanup timeline: Ongoing through mid-2020s

KEY CONCEPT - INSTITUTIONAL NAMING AS COMMUNITY DECEPTION:

• Definition: Public naming of contaminated facility after responsible company; perceived as honor/corporate generosity; masks company culpability
• Naming mechanism: "Raybestos Memorial Ballfield" honors company's waste distribution as community gift
• Community perception: Company appears generous (free fill material); civic partnership (facility naming)
• Actual reality: Waste represents disposal of occupational hazard without consent; naming serves to associate company with community benefit
• Psychological mechanism: Naming creates positive association; community connection obscures hazard reality
• Legal mechanism: Named facility may create implied assumption of safety (community accepted company's gift/naming)

KEY CONCEPT - CHILDHOOD EXPOSURE AND LATENCY PARADOX:

• Definition: Exposure occurring decades before disease manifestation; causal relationship obscured by long latency period
• Mesothelioma latency period: 20-50 years
• Under-25 mesothelioma occurrence: Extremely rare in general population (<1% of cases)
• Under-25 mesothelioma in Stratford: Elevated rates indicate population-specific exposure event
• Exposure age calculation: Under-25 diagnosis → exposure occurred by age 5 (infancy/preschool/early elementary)
• Exposure location: Community playgrounds, sports fields, schoolyards
• Exposure unknowingness: Children unaware of asbestos exposure; parents unaware of community contamination
• Delayed discovery: Exposure (1960s-1970s) → diagnosis (1980s-2000s) → public health recognition (1990s-2000s)
• Causal establishment difficulty: 20-30+ year gap between exposure and diagnosis makes linking exposure source challenging

---

SEGMENT 8: THE CONSPIRACY OF ABSENCE

HOST 1: The conspiracy doesn't start with what they knew. It starts with who they didn't count.

HOST 2: The mechanics weren't Raybestos employees.

HOST 1: So Raybestos didn't count them.

HOST 2: The home mechanics weren't anyone's employees.

HOST 1: So nobody counted them.

HOST 2: The children weren't workers at all.

HOST 1: And children never count. Not until they get sick. Not until they die. Not until someone finally asks: where did this come from? By 1929, there were twenty-three million vehicles on American roads. Every single one of them needed brakes. And behind every brake job was a cloud of dust that nobody was measuring, nobody was monitoring, and nobody was counting.

HOST 2: Until the lawsuits.

HOST 1: Until the lawsuits. Fifty years later.

KEY CONCEPT - CONSPIRACY THROUGH ABSENCE AND NON-COUNTING:

• Definition: Systematic exclusion from occupational health surveillance; absence of data becomes evidence of deliberate non-counting
• Mechanic workers (900,000 by 1975): Not counted in occupational health statistics because not employed by asbestos product manufacturers
• Home mechanics (millions): Not counted because not employed in formal occupational setting
• Children (unknown number): Not counted because not workers; not tracked in occupational health systems
• Occupational category absence: "Brake mechanics" not recognized as occupational asbestos exposure category until post-1970s
• Statistical consequence: Absence of brake worker health data = absence of legal/regulatory obligation to Raybestos
• Counting mechanism: Only factory workers count in occupational health surveillance; end-users of products do not count
• Fifty-year lag: 1930s identification by Merewether → 1985 first verdict; during lag period, workers remain uncounted

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SEGMENT 9: CLOSING REMARKS AND TEASER

HOST 1: But brake pads were just one vector. Next time, we're going to talk about what happened when asbestos stopped being an industrial material and became a consumer product. Building materials. Household items. Things you could buy at the hardware store and install in your own home.

HOST 2: The magic mineral goes mainstream.

HOST 1: The magic mineral goes mainstream. And the body count goes with it.

---

SEGMENT 10: SPONSOR STORY - MICHELLE'S STORY / BEATING THE ODDS

HOST 2: We've been talking about who didn't get counted. The mechanics. The home mechanics. The children.

HOST 1: There's another category. The families.

HOST 2: Michelle was four years old when she started breathing asbestos from her father's work clothes. Every evening, she helped him undress. At ten, they gave her three to six months.

HOST 1: She survived thirty-five years. Raised a son. Adopted four children. Counseled two hundred families facing what she faced.

HOST 2: Her story—and four others like it—are in Beating the Odds: Surviving Mesothelioma. Available on Amazon.

HOST 1: The families in that book worked with Danziger and De Llano.

HOST 2: Dandell dot com. That's D-A-N-D-E-L-L dot com.

NAMED ENTITY - MICHELLE (SURVIVOR PROFILE):

• Age at exposure: 4 years old
• Exposure type: Take-home/indirect exposure from father's work clothing (asbestos-containing dust transferred from workplace)
• Exposure frequency: Nightly (evening undressing routine)
• Exposure activity: Helping father remove work clothes
• Medical prognosis: Age 10 = three to six month life expectancy (initial diagnosis)
• Actual outcome: Survived 35 years beyond diagnosis
• Family formation: Raised biological son; adopted four children
• Community service: Counseled 200 families facing mesothelioma diagnosis
• Story documentation: Featured in Beating the Odds: Surviving Mesothelioma (book, Amazon)
• Legal representation: Danziger and De Llano

KEY CONCEPT - TAKE-HOME ASBESTOS EXPOSURE:

• Definition: Indirect occupational exposure to family members via worker's contaminated clothing, hair, skin
• Mechanism: Worker performs occupational exposure (brake servicing, manufacturing) → asbestos fibers accumulate on work clothes → fibers transferred to family environment → family members inhale fibers
• Affected population: Spouse, children, family members sharing living space with occupationally exposed worker
• Age vulnerability: Young children experience higher vulnerability (greater respiratory rate; longer remaining lifespan for latency period)
• Michelle case: 4-year-old exposed via nightly undressing routine; direct contact with contaminated work clothing
• Medical outcome: Mesothelioma diagnosis at age 10; prognosis 3-6 months; actual survival 35+ years
• Epidemiologic significance: Take-home exposure creates secondary exposure population; extends exposure beyond occupational setting into domestic sphere

---

SEGMENT 11: EPISODE PREVIEW

HOST 1: Next week: Episode 13. The Magic Mineral Goes Mainstream.

---

SEGMENT 12: CLOSING BANTER

HOST 1: Okay. That one sat with me.

HOST 2: You need a minute?

HOST 1: I need like three minutes and possibly a drink.

HOST 2: It's 10 AM.

HOST 1: It's 10 AM and I just spent an hour talking about children on playgrounds. I think the universe owes me a bourbon.

HOST 2: Fair. You know what got me? The ballfield.

HOST 1: The name.

HOST 2: Raybestos Memorial Ballfield. They named it after the company. Like a gift to the community. Like they were proud.

HOST 1: They probably were proud. That's the thing. In the moment, it probably felt generous. "Hey, the company's giving away free fill material, they're sponsoring the ballfield—"

HOST 2: And thirty years later, their kids have mesothelioma.

HOST 1: Under twenty-five. That number. I keep coming back to it.

HOST 2: Because it shouldn't exist.

HOST 1: It shouldn't exist. Twenty to fifty year latency. You don't get mesothelioma in your twenties unless you were exposed as a child. Unless you were playing in it.

HOST 2: I keep thinking about the parents. You take your kid to Little League. You're being a good parent. And the whole time—

HOST 1: You couldn't have known.

HOST 2: But someone knew.

HOST 1: Someone always knew. That's the whole series.

HOST 2: "The less said about asbestos, the better off we are."

HOST 1: The Simpson family motto.

HOST 2: Father to son. Thirty-seven years to... what was it, another twenty for William?

HOST 1: Sixty years of Simpsons. And a box in a closet.

HOST 2: The box in the closet. His personal office closet. Five years.

HOST 1: And his environmental affairs guy tells him it's relevant—

HOST 2: And he just... keeps it. Three more years.

HOST 1: I don't know if that's arrogance or denial or just... inertia.

HOST 2: Maybe all three. Maybe you inherit a cover-up and you just... keep covering.

HOST 1: Because uncovering means admitting what your father did.

HOST 2: And what you've been doing.

HOST 1: Yeah.

HOST 2: You okay?

HOST 1: I'm fine. I just... some episodes are heavier than others.

HOST 2: This one had kids.

HOST 1: This one had kids.

HOST 2: You want to get lunch after this? There's that new Thai place.

HOST 1: The one with the green curry?

HOST 2: The one with the green curry.

HOST 1: Yeah. Yeah, that sounds good.

HOST 2: Cool. Let's go think about something else for an hour.

HOST 1: And then come back and do it again next week.

HOST 2: Consumer products.

HOST 1: Hair dryers and Christmas decorations.

HOST 2: Can't wait.

HOST 1: Can't wait.

---

Key Takeaways

15 million Model T vehicles (1908-1927): Each requiring multiple brake replacements. Conservative estimates: tens of millions of asbestos brake servicing events. Occupational exposure occurred at scale never captured in health statistics. Pre-asbestos brake failure: Wood blocks, cotton-oil soaked linings, leather, camel hair all failed catastrophically under frictional heat. Louis Renault's 1902 drum brake invention solved the mechanical problem but created a materials problem: what resists 450°C temperatures while maintaining friction? Raybestos founding (1906): Arthur Raymond and Arthur Law patent woven asbestos-copper wire mesh in Bridgeport, Connecticut. Company name = Raymond + asbestos. Technological solution deployed rapidly; market adoption accelerates with Model T production scale. Arthur Raymond dies 1909 (brain abscess): Founder's premature death attributed to unrelated cause; no occupational disease documentation yet exists. Transition to Sumner Simpson's leadership (1916) marks shift toward institutional suppression. October 1, 1935: Sumner Simpson's memo: "I think the less said about asbestos, the better off we are." Institutional pivot from passive denial to active suppression. Simpson and Brown persuade Dr. Anthony Lanza to revise findings from "can result fatally" to "milder than silicosis." 900,000 brake servicing workers by 1975: Factory workers (hundreds), assembly line workers (thousands), independent mechanics (hundreds of thousands), home mechanics (millions). None included in corporate health studies. Occupational invisibility was structural: these workers employed in independent shops, not by asbestos manufacturers. E.R.A. Merewether (early 1930s): Identified brake work occupational hazard; medical documentation exists. Knowledge confined to physician circles; workers unaware; 47-year gap until first litigation victory (1985). First lawsuit victory (1985): 81-year-old retired brake technician wins $2 million verdict against brake manufacturer. Victory comes 47 years after hazard documentation, 79 years after Raybestos founding. Latency period: workers exposed 1930s-1960s diagnosed 1970s-2000s. Stratford, Connecticut contamination: Raymark facility (1919-1995) distributed asbestos-contaminated fill to 46+ residential, 2+ dozen commercial properties. Short Beach Park: 270,000 cubic yards toxic material. Raybestos Memorial Ballfield constructed 1981 on contaminated fill. Mesothelioma rates (1958-1991): Connecticut's highest, including cases under age 25 (childhood playground exposure). Simpson family documents (1977): Sumner Simpson (1916-1953), successor William Simpson (1967-1983), moved box of 6,000 documents to office closet (1969). John Marsh, Director of Environmental Affairs, informed William the papers were "relevant to asbestos disease" (1974). Subpoena produced documents (1977), providing documentary proof of suppression and transforming litigation from denial to proven negligence.

Key Concepts

The Technological Solution Trap

Asbestos solved the brake lining engineering problem so completely that alternatives were deemed technically unnecessary for 70+ years. No competitor material offered equivalent thermal stability, friction coefficient, and manufacturing cost. This technical superiority created institutional lock-in: manufacturers could not abandon asbestos without acknowledging a superior alternative existed; workers could not refuse it without losing employment; regulatory bodies could not restrict it without disrupting the automotive industry. The technological trap meant that even as medical evidence of hazards accumulated through the 1930s-1970s, the solution remained economically and technically entrenched.

Occupational Invisibility Through Outsourced Labor

Unlike factory workers employed by asbestos manufacturers (who could theoretically be monitored), brake servicing workers in independent shops, automotive dealerships, and home garages were dispersed across thousands of employers. Corporate health studies sampled factory populations. Occupational health surveillance focused on manufacturing plants. The result: 900,000 workers performing the same hazardous task remained invisible to the companies profiting from the product. Invisibility enabled suppression: what wasn't studied couldn't be documented in academic literature; what wasn't documented couldn't be regulated; what wasn't regulated remained a private occupational hazard for workers to bear.

Multi-Level Information Suppression

Simpson's 1935 memo reveals suppression structure: individual company decision (Simpson), legal strategy (Brown/Johns-Manville), scientific manipulation (convincing Lanza to alter findings), editorial policy (Asbestos magazine "confidentiality"), and industry-wide protocol (1939 editorial confirms suppression as standard practice). This wasn't individual negligence or isolated misconduct. It was institutional strategy coordinating multiple actors across scientific, legal, and journalistic domains.

Institutional Naming as Community Deception

The Raybestos Memorial Ballfield in Stratford was constructed in 1981 on 270,000 cubic yards of asbestos-contaminated fill material. The naming choice — dedicating a children's recreational facility to the company whose waste contaminated the site — simultaneously: (1) honored the company's economic contribution to the community; (2) obscured the hazardous nature of the site; (3) created a socially-sanctioned space for children to be continuously exposed to asbestos fibers in soil. Naming as institutional strategy made the exposure site appear safe and community-serving while contamination continued.

Childhood Exposure and Latency Paradox

Stratford, Connecticut, experienced the highest mesothelioma rates in the state between 1958-1991, with cases among individuals under age 25. This pattern indicates childhood exposure (1940s-1960s) producing mesothelioma diagnosis (1980s-2000s). The latency paradox: victims died 30-50 years after exposure, meaning the original contamination source (Raymark's waste disposal) had long disappeared from public memory before the health consequences became clinically visible.

Inherited Cover-Up and Document Discovery

Sumner Simpson's suppression strategy was inherited by his son William Simpson. William recognized the legal exposure when informed the documents were "relevant to asbestos disease" (1974), but the family's attempt to retain control of the documents proved futile. Subpoena in 1977 produced the papers, transforming litigation from corporate denial ("we didn't know") to proven negligence ("we knew and concealed"). The box of documents William moved to his office closet contained the documentary evidence of institutional suppression.

Timeline of Events

Year	Event	Occupational Status	Knowledge/Suppression Status
1902	Louis Renault invents drum brake; braking engineering problem requires solution	Technological problem identified	Materials solution needed; thermal stability to 450°C required
1906	Raybestos founded: Arthur Raymond and Arthur Law patent woven asbestos-copper wire mesh in Bridgeport, Connecticut	Company established; manufacturing begins	Technological solution deployed; market formation begins
1908	Model T automobile production begins; Henry Ford initially specifies Raybestos brake linings	Mass manufacturing exposure begins; brake servicing will affect millions	No occupational baseline established; workers unmonitored
1909	Arthur Raymond dies from brain abscess (not respiratory disease)	Founder exit; company transitions	No occupational disease attribution; succession to management continues
~1910	Ford switches to cotton brake linings (temporary cost optimization); cotton fails at higher vehicle speeds	Asbestos exposure pauses; alternative proves inadequate	Material substitution attempted; cotton's failure proves asbestos necessity
1916	Sumner Simpson (Johns-Manville executive) assumes control of Raybestos; runs company 37 years	Leadership transition; Simpson era begins	Suppression era initiates
1920s	Ford returns to Raybestos asbestos brake linings; vehicle speeds increase; Raybestos becomes de facto industry standard	Mass exposure accelerates; occupational invisibility deepens as independent repair shops multiply	Technical superiority established; institutional lock-in begins
~1930s	E.R.A. Merewether identifies brake work occupational hazard; medical documentation exists	Knowledge exists in physician circles; workers unaware	Information confined to regulatory/medical professionals; knowledge remains invisible to workers and independent mechanics
1935 Oct 1	Sumner Simpson writes to Johns-Manville attorney Vandiver Brown: "I think the less said about asbestos, the better off we are"	Active suppression begins	Institutional pivot from passive denial to deliberate concealment
1935-1939	Simpson and Brown convince Dr. Anthony Lanza to alter occupational health study findings; original conclusion: "asbestosis can result fatally"; revised: "milder than silicosis"	Scientific evidence manipulated in published literature	Occupational hazard misrepresented in academic record
1939	Asbestos magazine editor confirms "all this information is to be kept confidential"	Industry-wide suppression protocol established	Institutional policy: hazard information classified as proprietary/confidential
1919-1975	Raymark facility (Stratford, Connecticut) operates; disposed asbestos waste distributed freely as fill material to residents	Environmental contamination: 46+ residential, 2+ dozen commercial properties affected	Disposal method deliberate; community members unaware of asbestos presence
1950s-1970s	Peak brake servicing exposure; approximately 900,000 workers nationally engaged in brake servicing by 1975	Occupational exposure at maximum; workers unaware of hazards; no corporate health monitoring	Occupational invisibility at structural maximum; worker population excluded from all health studies
1958-1991	Stratford, Connecticut experiences highest mesothelioma rates in state; cases include individuals under age 25 (childhood playground exposure)	Environmental exposure creates epidemic visible only in retrospect	Latency paradox: cases appear 30-50 years after childhood exposure
1969	William Simpson (Sumner's son, Raybestos president 1967-1983) moves box containing 6,000 company documents to office closet	Paper trail of suppression preserved accidentally	Documentary evidence of negligence secured (unintentionally)
1974	John Marsh, Director of Environmental Affairs, informs William Simpson that documents in office closet are "relevant to asbestos disease"	Company recognizes legal exposure; documents represent liability	Family understanding that suppression history is discoverable
1977	Simpson family documents produced via subpoena; suppression becomes documented fact	Documentary proof of negligence established	Legal discovery transforms case from "he said/she said" to proven institutional knowledge
1981	Raybestos Memorial Ballfield constructed in Stratford, Connecticut on 270,000 cubic yards of asbestos-contaminated fill material	Children's playground becomes chronic exposure site	Institutional naming obscures hazard; community dedication sanitizes contamination
1985	First successful lawsuit against brake manufacturer: 81-year-old retired mechanic wins $2 million verdict	Legal accountability finally established; 47-year gap between 1930s hazard documentation and first victory	Occupational causation proven; establishes precedent for subsequent litigation
1995	EPA designates Raymark facility Superfund priority site; cleanup begins	Institutional recognition of environmental contamination	Long-term remediation protocol; costs exceed $113 million; ongoing cleanup

Notable Quotes

Direct Quotes

• "I think the less said about asbestos, the better off we are." — Sumner Simpson, Raybestos, in October 1, 1935 letter to Johns-Manville attorney Vandiver Brown.

• "All this information is to be kept confidential." — Asbestos magazine editor, 1939, confirming industry-wide suppression protocol for occupational hazard information.

• "Papers are relevant to asbestos disease." — John Marsh, Director of Environmental Affairs, Raybestos, in 1974 conversation with William Simpson regarding Simpson family documents in office closet, acknowledging legal exposure and discoverable suppression evidence.

Characterizations

• Vandiver Brown (Johns-Manville) characterized Simpson's position as an ostrich-like attitude — refusing to acknowledge or address the occupational hazard despite accumulating medical evidence.

Named Entities

Historical and Contemporary Figures

Name	Role/Position	Years	Significance in Episode
Arthur Raymond	Raybestos co-founder	1906-1909	Patent holder; woven asbestos-copper wire mesh brake lining design; died 1909 (brain abscess)
Arthur Law	Raybestos co-founder	1906+	Patent co-holder; woven asbestos-copper wire mesh brake lining design
Sumner Simpson	Raybestos president and CEO	1916-1953 (37 years)	Johns-Manville executive; orchestrated suppression; October 1, 1935 memo author; convinced Dr. Lanza to alter findings
William Simpson	Raybestos president and CEO	1967-1983	Sumner's son; inherited suppression legacy; moved documents to office closet (1969); informed of legal exposure (1974)
Vandiver Brown	Johns-Manville attorney	~1930s-1940s	Simpson's correspondence partner; described "ostrich-like attitude"; legal strategy coordinator for suppression
Dr. Anthony Lanza	Occupational health physician/researcher	~1930s-1940s	Original study findings: "asbestosis can result fatally"; revised under pressure to: "milder than silicosis"
E.R.A. Merewether	Occupational health physician	~1930s	Identified brake work occupational hazard; early medical documentation; knowledge remained confined to professional circles
John Marsh	Raybestos Director of Environmental Affairs	~1970s	Informed William Simpson (1974) that documents were "relevant to asbestos disease"; recognized legal exposure
Henry Ford	Ford Motor Company founder	1908+	Model T automobile production; initial Raybestos brake lining specification; market scale creation
Louis Renault	French automotive engineer/manufacturer	~1902	Drum brake invention; created materials problem solved by asbestos

Organizations

Organization	Type	Significance
Raybestos	Brake lining manufacturer	Founded 1906; dominant market position; suppression architect under Simpson leadership
Johns-Manville	Asbestos conglomerate	Parent company influence; legal strategy coordination (Vandiver Brown)
Ford Motor Company	Automobile manufacturer	Model T production (15 million vehicles); market scale creation for brake servicing exposure
Raymark	Raybestos manufacturing facility	Stratford, Connecticut location; asbestos waste disposal site; environmental contamination source
EPA	United States Environmental Protection Agency	Superfund designation (1995); site remediation authority
Asbestos magazine	Trade publication	Editorial policy confirmation of suppression protocol (1939)

Geographic Locations

Location	Significance	Context
Bridgeport, Connecticut	Raybestos company headquarters and founding location (1906)	Patent granted; manufacturing initiated
Stratford, Connecticut	Raymark manufacturing facility location (1919-1995)	Asbestos waste disposal; environmental contamination; highest state mesothelioma rates (1958-1991)
Short Beach Park	Stratford, Connecticut location	Received 270,000 cubic yards of asbestos-contaminated fill material
Raybestos Memorial Ballfield	Stratford, Connecticut recreational facility	Constructed 1981 on contaminated fill; children's exposure site; institutional naming obscuring hazard

Key Facts and Statistics

Production and Exposure Scale

• 15 million Model T automobiles (1908-1927) — Each requiring multiple brake replacements over service lifetime
• Tens of millions of brake servicing events — Conservative estimate based on vehicle production and average replacement frequency
• 900,000 brake servicing workers (by 1975) — Factory workers (hundreds), assembly line workers (thousands), independent mechanics (hundreds of thousands), home mechanics (millions)
• Zero occupational health studies — None of the 900,000 brake servicing workers were included in corporate health monitoring programs through 1975

Thermal and Technical Properties

• 450°C thermal stability — Asbestos brake lining functional limit; significantly exceeds competing materials' performance
• High friction coefficient — Maintains braking effectiveness under sustained heat
• Fire resistance — Non-combustibility at brake operating temperatures

Suppression Timeline

• 47-year gap — Between early 1930s medical documentation (Merewether) and first successful litigation victory (1985)
• October 1, 1935 — Simpson memo initiating active suppression strategy
• 1935-1939 — Four-year period of scientific manipulation and editorial policy establishment

Environmental Contamination

• 46+ residential properties — Contaminated by Raymark asbestos waste fill in Stratford, Connecticut
• 2+ dozen commercial properties — Additional Stratford contamination
• 270,000 cubic yards — Asbestos-contaminated fill material in Short Beach Park, Stratford
• 1958-1991 — Years of elevated mesothelioma rates in Stratford; highest in Connecticut state
• Cases under age 25 — Childhood exposure through contaminated playgrounds and recreational facilities

Document Discovery

• 6,000 documents — Simpson family papers containing suppression evidence
• 1977 — Subpoena production of documents
• 1985 verdict — $2 million judgment; first successful brake manufacturer lawsuit; 81-year-old retired mechanic plaintiff

Superfund Remediation

• $113 million+ — Cleanup costs at Raymark Superfund site (ongoing)
• 1995 — EPA Superfund designation date

References

Danziger & De Llano, LLP (30%) Mesothelioma Lawyer Center (27%) Mesothelioma.net (22%) MesotheliomaAttorney.com (12%)

See Also

• Episode 11: The Corporate Architects
• Episode 13: The Magic Mineral Goes Mainstream
• Raybestos Company History
• Johns-Manville Suppression Strategies
• Occupational Asbestos Exposure
• Stratford, Connecticut Environmental Contamination

Statute Warning

⚠ Statute of Limitations Warning: Filing deadlines vary by state from 1-6 years from diagnosis. Texas allows 2 years from diagnosis or discovery. Contact an attorney immediately to preserve your rights.

CTA Box

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Frequently Asked Questions

What is Episode 12 of the Asbestos podcast about?

Episode 12 traces how asbestos solved the industrial braking problem — and how that solution created an occupational invisibility trap affecting 900,000+ workers by 1975. The episode opens with a mathematical fact: 15 million Model T automobiles were manufactured between 1908 and 1927. Each vehicle required multiple brake replacements over its service lifetime.

Where can I listen to the Asbestos podcast?

The Asbestos podcast is available on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and Amazon Music — all free. Search for 'Asbestos: A Conspiracy 4,500 Years in the Making' or use the links on any episode transcript page. The 52-episode series is produced by Danziger & De Llano, LLP, a nationwide mesothelioma law firm.

How does asbestos history relate to mesothelioma and legal claims today?

Mesothelioma is caused by asbestos exposure, and U.S. law provides multiple compensation pathways. Over $30 billion remains available through 60+ asbestos bankruptcy trust funds, with average payments of $300,000–$400,000. Victims may also pursue personal injury lawsuits, VA disability benefits (for veterans), or wrongful death claims. The statute of limitations is as short as 1 year in some states, so consulting a mesothelioma attorney promptly is critical. Danziger & De Llano has recovered nearly $2 billion for asbestos victims over 30+ years of practice.