Jump to content

Asbestos Podcast EP11 Transcript

From WikiMesothelioma — Mesothelioma Knowledge Base


Episode 11: The Corporate Architects

How Johns-Manville Was Built on a Body Count

Podcast: Asbestos: A Conspiracy 4,500 Years in the Making

Episode: 11 of 52

Arc: Arc Three — The Industrial Revolution (Episode 2 of 5)

Publish Date: February 2, 2026

Duration: [Runtime]

Transcript by: Danziger & De Llano, LLP

Episode Overview

Episode 11 documents the corporate architects who built the asbestos industry despite knowing the dangers. The episode traces how evidence was documented — not discovered — by female factory inspectors, parliamentary testimony, insurance actuaries, and medical professionals, yet systematically isolated within regulatory channels rather than disclosed to workers or the public.

The cold open examines Lucy Deane's 1898 government report, coinciding with Henry Ward Johns's death from asbestosis and Dr. Murray's clinical documentation of asbestos-related disease. Johns-Manville was founded in 1901, three years after its namesake died from the occupational hazard the company would manufacture for a century. By 1908, insurance companies had declined asbestos workers entirely. By 1921, government agencies were producing marketing films for manufacturers.

This episode explores how information compartmentalization — not ignorance — enabled the construction and expansion of the asbestos industry through the early 20th century.

Cold Open: Lucy Deane, 1898

[NARRATOR]

The report arrived on the desk of Her Majesty's Stationery Office in 1898. It came from Lucy Deane, one of the first female factory inspectors in British history. She had been inside asbestos factories. She had documented what happened to workers' lungs.

"Evil effects of asbestos dust," she wrote. "Sharp, glass-like jagged nature."

Her Majesty's Stationery Office published it. The government record exists. The warning was official.

Three years later, a man named T.F. Manville created a company. He merged it with the manufacturing operations of Henry Ward Johns. The company would be called Johns-Manville. It would become the world's largest asbestos manufacturer.

One problem: Henry Ward Johns had died three years earlier. He was 40 years old. He died of asbestosis.

The company that bore his name was founded on the exact condition that would define its labor force for the next hundred years.

The Female Factory Inspectors

Lucy Deane's Documentation

Lucy Deane wrote her report in 1898 — the same year that would become pivotal for asbestos occupational health documentation. The British government had recently begun hiring female factory inspectors. Women were employed as inspectors specifically because they could access certain workplace areas and interview women workers.

And women workers in asbestos factories performed the dustiest jobs.

Sifting. Carding. Textile work. Jobs that generated visible clouds of fiber. Jobs where exposure was most intense.

Lucy Deane documented what she saw. Her report described the "evil effects of asbestos dust" in clinical, observed language. She noted the material's "sharp, glass-like jagged nature" — language suggesting acute irritation potential based on direct observation.

The report was distributed through official channels. Government record. Regulatory documentation.

Adelaide Anderson and the Lady Inspectors Program

Adelaide Anderson directed the female factory inspection program. She had studied at Girton College Cambridge. She became the third female factory inspector in 1894. Her role was to systematize and expand the presence of female inspectors in British industry.

Anderson understood what Deane's documentation meant: asbestos was hazardous. Asbestos exposure was occupational. And women workers were experiencing the highest exposures because they performed the most dust-intensive jobs.

In 1902, the British government officially added asbestos to the list of harmful substances. The documentation was complete. The regulatory classification was in place.

What remained was isolation: knowledge confined to regulatory circles, not distributed to workers or public discourse.

The Three Events of 1898

Event One: Lucy Deane's Report

Lucy Deane's government factory inspection report on asbestos dangers, published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office. Official documentation. Regulatory channel.

Event Two: Henry Ward Johns's Death

Henry Ward Johns, founder of the Johns company (which would merge with T.F. Manville's operations to create Johns-Manville), died in 1898 at age 40. The cause: asbestosis.

Johns had been manufacturing asbestos products. He had been exposed to the material. And he developed the occupational disease that would characterize asbestos manufacturing for the next century.

The cause was known. It was recorded. But the knowledge remained confined to the company, the Johns family, and anyone directly involved in the succession.

Event Three: Dr. Murray's Clinical Documentation

Dr. Murray examined a worker at Charing Cross Hospital in London. The patient was a textile worker who had been exposed to asbestos dust. The patient was dying.

Murray performed an autopsy. He found asbestos fibers in the lungs — visible, identifiable, consistent with occupational exposure.

Three independent institutional warnings. Same year. Different channels. No public coordination.

Parliament and Compensation: The 1906 Testimony

Dr. Murray Before Parliament

Dr. Murray testified before a parliamentary committee in 1906. He described a patient he had treated — a textile worker who reported that ten of his coworkers had died by age 30. All from the same occupational exposure.

Murray presented his clinical evidence: autopsy findings showing asbestos fibers in lung tissue. Documentation of mortality clustering among asbestos workers.

Parliament's response: they added six occupational diseases to the list of compensable conditions. The legislative mechanism for occupational disease recognition existed. The evidence was being presented. The committee had the power to include asbestos.

Asbestos was not included.

Why Was Asbestos Excluded?

Dr. Murray believed that the asbestos industry had improved conditions. He had no systematic mechanism to verify this claim. He had clinical cases — patients dying from occupational exposure. But he accepted the industry narrative that conditions had improved.

Parliament made policy based on false expert testimony. The regulatory framework officially excluded asbestos from compensation despite direct testimony about dead workers, autopsy evidence, and mortality clustering.

The consequence: a class of workers with documented occupational disease excluded from compensation mechanisms.

Johns-Manville: The Corporate Merger

The 1901 Founding

T.F. Manville created Johns-Manville in 1901. He merged it with the manufacturing operations previously run by Henry Ward Johns, who had died three years earlier.

The company was named after the founder who had died of the occupational hazard it would now manufacture at unprecedented industrial scale.

The Leadership Gap

Historical records mention "heirs" during the succession period from Johns's death (1898) to the merger (1901). No individual names are given. No personal documentation of the transition appears in available records.

The gap is significant: three years during which the Johns company was managed by unnamed "heirs" while the founder's death was known and the cause — asbestosis — was understood within the company.

Then the merger. Then the creation of the world's largest asbestos manufacturer.

The timing suggests deliberate historical silence around the corporate succession.

The French Corroboration: Denis Auribault's 1906 Investigation

Normandy Factory Mortality

In 1906, Denis Auribault investigated an asbestos factory in Normandy, France. He documented 50 workers dead in five years from asbestos exposure.

His report cited "total non-observance of hygiene rules" — describing the factory's documented disregard for worker protection.

Institutional Suppression

Auribault's report was published. It was documented. It was largely ignored.

French institutional documentation corroborated the British warnings. Multiple national systems, multiple languages, multiple regulatory channels — all documenting the same occupational hazard.

Yet the knowledge remained compartmentalized. French regulatory circles. British government records. Medical literature. Insurance calculations.

No public coordination. No united message to workers.

Insurance Actuaries and Corporate Knowledge

Frederick Hoffman and Prudential Insurance

Frederick Hoffman was a statistician at Prudential Insurance. Between 1908 and 1918, he analyzed actuarial data on occupational mortality.

His finding: insurance companies had figured out what many occupational medicine physicians had not. Asbestos workers were a statistical liability.

The standard practice among insurance companies became: decline asbestos workers. Do not issue life or disability coverage. Classify the occupational group as uninsurable.

Actuarial Knowledge Before Medical Consensus

Insurance actuaries possessed mortality tables. They could calculate risk from statistical data. They preceded occupational medicine by years in recognizing asbestos hazard at a systematic level.

Hoffman documented the practice in Bulletin 231, page 178 — official actuarial literature, available to insurance professionals.

The knowledge remained confined to the insurance industry. Workers didn't have access to actuarial data. Manufacturers didn't publicize that their workers had been classified as uninsurable.

Information Compartmentalization

Each institutional circle possessed pieces of the evidence:

  • Factory inspectors: documented hazards through observation
  • Parliamentary committees: heard testimony about dead workers
  • Medical professionals: documented clinical cases and autopsy findings
  • Insurance actuaries: calculated mortality risk from statistical data
  • Regulatory systems: classified asbestos as harmful substance

But the pieces didn't connect in public discourse. Workers encountered only marketing.

Government Propaganda: The 1921 Silent Film

The U.S. Bureau of Mines Production

In 1921, the U.S. Bureau of Mines produced a 67-minute silent film titled "Story of Asbestos" or similar (exact title varies in historical records). The film was produced by a government agency. It marketed Johns-Manville and the asbestos industry generally.

The film was distributed to schools. To churches. To civic organizations. To community centers. Anywhere that the public trusted government authority.

The Timeline Context

This was 23 years after Lucy Deane documented asbestos dangers in 1898.

This was 23 years after Henry Ward Johns died of asbestosis in 1898.

This was 15 years after Dr. Murray testified before Parliament about dead workers in 1906.

This was 13 years after insurance actuaries began declining asbestos workers in 1908.

The film was made after all this. Not before. Not during the period of documented dangers. After the dangers were thoroughly documented.

Government-Industry Coordination

The film represents institutional coordination between government agencies and manufacturers. A government bureau — the U.S. Bureau of Mines — produced marketing materials for a private corporation.

Public trust in government authority was repurposed for commercial ends. Government agencies positioned themselves as sources of information about asbestos safety while the actual information — documented hazards, dead workers, insurance decline, regulatory classification — circulated only through isolated institutional channels.

Citizens were directed to trust government expertise. The government film assured them that asbestos was safe. Johns-Manville benefited from the public credibility of the government institution.

Global Industry Expansion

Turner Brothers: Rochdale, England

Turner Brothers was founded in Rochdale, England in 1871. By 1926, it employed 5,000 workers. By 1961, Turner Brothers employed 40,000 workers.

The scale of expansion occurred during the period when documented hazards were most abundant:

  • 1898: Lucy Deane's government report; Henry Ward Johns's death; Dr. Murray's clinical documentation
  • 1902: Asbestos officially classified as harmful substance
  • 1906: Parliament testimony about dead workers; Denis Auribault's French investigation
  • 1908-1918: Insurance actuaries declining asbestos workers
  • 1921: Government propaganda films

The industry expanded from 5,000 workers (1926) to 40,000 workers (1961) while occupational hazards were continuously documented and systematically suppressed through institutional compartmentalization.

Johns-Manville Global Operations

Johns-Manville expanded into a multinational corporation during the same period. The company dominated asbestos manufacturing, automotive brake systems, insulation products, and industrial applications globally.

Expansion occurred despite — or because of — the systematic documentation of occupational hazards. The corporate architecture of Johns-Manville was designed to manage information, not to eliminate it from the knowledge base.

Key Facts and Statistics

Female Factory Inspectors
Lucy Deane — one of the first female factory inspectors in British history
Adelaide Anderson — third female factory inspector, director of Lady Inspectors program, educated at Girton College Cambridge (1894)
Women performed the dustiest jobs in asbestos factories: sifting, carding, textile work
Timeline of Documentation
1897 — Viennese physician documents occupational hazards
1898 — Lucy Deane's Her Majesty's Stationery Office report
1898 — Henry Ward Johns dies of asbestosis (age 40)
1898 — Dr. Murray documents asbestos fibers in patient lungs
1901 — Johns-Manville founded (3 years after Johns's death)
1902 — Asbestos officially classified as harmful substance
1906 — Parliament testimony describing 10 dead coworkers (age 30); asbestos excluded from compensation
1906 — Denis Auribault documents 50 deaths in 5 years at Normandy factory
1908-1918 — Insurance actuaries classify asbestos workers as uninsurable
1921 — U.S. Bureau of Mines produces government marketing film
Industry Scale
Turner Brothers: 5,000 employees (1926); 40,000 employees (1961)
Johns-Manville: world's largest asbestos manufacturer (post-1901)
Insurance and Mortality
Frederick Hoffman (Prudential): documented that insurance companies declined all asbestos workers (Bulletin 231, page 178)
Actuarial practice: 1908-1918 standard was to deny coverage to asbestos workers
Actuarial knowledge preceded occupational medicine consensus by years
Government Propaganda
67-minute silent film (1921) distributed to schools, churches, civic organizations
23 years after documented dangers; 15 years after parliamentary testimony; 13 years after insurance declination began
Represents government-industry coordination using channels of public trust

Notable Quotes

[LUCY DEANE, HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE, 1898]

"Evil effects of asbestos dust...sharp, glass-like jagged nature."

[DR. MURRAY, PARLIAMENT TESTIMONY, 1906]

"The patient reported 10 coworkers dead by age 30. Autopsy examination revealed asbestos fibers in the lung tissue."

[INSTITUTIONAL SILENCE, 1901-1921]

(No public statements from Johns-Manville regarding occupational hazards during the period of documented warnings, regulatory classification, parliamentary testimony, and insurance declination. The corporate response was operational: continue expansion, manage information through institutional channels, coordinate with government for marketing purposes.)

Key Themes

Information Compartmentalization

Evidence was documented in separate institutional circles:

  • Regulatory systems (factory inspection reports)
  • Medical literature (clinical cases, autopsies)
  • Parliamentary records (testimony, legislation)
  • Actuarial data (insurance calculations)
  • Government agencies (propaganda films)

No public coordination. No united message. Workers encountered only marketing.

Convergent Warning Signals

1898 brought three independent, institutional warnings: 1. Lucy Deane's government factory inspection report 2. Henry Ward Johns's death from asbestosis 3. Dr. Murray's clinical documentation of asbestos fibers in lung tissue

All three sources point to the same occupational hazard. Yet the corporate response was to found Johns-Manville three years later — with no public acknowledgment of the convergent warnings.

Institutional Authority Deployment

Government institutions (Bureau of Mines) produced marketing materials for private manufacturers (Johns-Manville). Public trust in government authority was repurposed for commercial purposes. Citizens were directed to trust government expertise about asbestos safety while actual documented hazards circulated only through isolated regulatory channels.

Actuarial Knowledge Preceding Medical Action

Insurance actuaries calculated occupational mortality risk years before occupational medicine formally recognized asbestos as a hazard. The knowledge existed (insurance decline was standard practice by 1908-1918). The knowledge was suppressed (confined to actuarial circles, not distributed to workers or public).

Corporate Architecture and Information Management

Johns-Manville was founded in 1901, three years after its namesake died of the occupational hazard the company would manufacture. The founding involved a three-year leadership gap where succession details remain historically obscure. The corporate architecture was designed for information management: expansion occurred despite documented hazards through systematic institutional compartmentalization.

Full Episode Transcript

COLD OPEN - LUCY DEANE AND THE BRITISH REPORT (1898)

HOST 1: It's 1898. Somewhere in England, a woman named Lucy Deane is writing a government report.

HOST 2: A factory inspector.

HOST 1: One of the first female factory inspectors in British history. And she's doing something no one's ever done before. She's documenting what asbestos does to the people who work with it.

HOST 2: A government report. Published.

HOST 1: Published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office. Circulated to policymakers across the British Empire. And here's what she wrote—

HOST 2: Go on.

HOST 1: The evil effects of asbestos dust have also instigated a microscopic examination of the mineral dust by H.M. Medical Inspector. Clearly revealed was the sharp, glass-like jagged nature of the particles.

HOST 2: Sharp. Glass-like. Jagged.

HOST 1: And where they are allowed to rise and to remain suspended in the air of a room, in any quantity, the effects have been found to be injurious, as might have been expected.

HOST 2: As might have been expected.

HOST 1: That's 1898. Three years later, Thomas Manville merges two companies to create the largest asbestos manufacturer in the world.

HOST 2: Knowing this report exists.

HOST 1: Knowing it was available. Whether he read it—we can't prove. That it was public? That we can prove. This is Episode 11: The Corporate Architects.

NAMED ENTITY - LUCY DEANE (FACTORY INSPECTOR):

  • Name: Lucy Deane
  • Title: Factory inspector
  • Historical significance: One of first female factory inspectors in British history
  • Report date: 1898
  • Report title: British Factory Inspectors' Report
  • Report publisher: Her Majesty's Stationery Office
  • Distribution: Published and circulated to policymakers across British Empire
  • Report content: Documentation of asbestos health effects on workers
  • Key findings: Sharp, glass-like, jagged particle nature; injurious effects when suspended in air
  • Scientific observation: Microscopic examination of mineral dust
  • Medical authority: Backed by H.M. Medical Inspector findings
  • Historical impact: First government documentation of asbestos occupational danger; public record

KEY FACTS - LUCY DEANE'S 1898 BRITISH FACTORY INSPECTORS' REPORT:

  • Date: 1898
  • Author: Lucy Deane (factory inspector)
  • Authority: British Factory Inspectors
  • Distribution: Her Majesty's Stationery Office (official government publication)
  • Audience: Policymakers across British Empire (public record)
  • Key quotes: "Evil effects of asbestos dust"; "Sharp, glass-like jagged nature of the particles"; "Effects have been found to be injurious, as might have been expected"
  • Scientific evidence: Microscopic examination by H.M. Medical Inspector
  • Conclusion: Asbestos dust hazard established; suspicion warranted; danger expected
  • Public accessibility: Government report; openly published and distributed
  • Status: Public knowledge

SEGMENT 1: SPONSOR INTRODUCTION

HOST 2: Asbestos: A Conspiracy 4,500 Years in the Making is brought to you by Danziger and De Llano, a nationwide mesothelioma law firm. For over thirty years, they've helped families understand what happened and what comes next. If you or someone you love is facing a mesothelioma diagnosis, visit Dandell dot com. That's D-A-N-D-E-L-L dot com.

SEGMENT 2: LUCY DEANE AND ADELAIDE ANDERSON - FEMALE FACTORY INSPECTORS

HOST 1: Let's stay in 1898 for a minute. Because Lucy Deane wasn't working alone.

HOST 2: There were others?

HOST 1: Adelaide Anderson. Girton College, Cambridge. Third female factory inspector ever appointed—1894. By 1897, she's running the Lady Inspectors. Leading a team of women investigating industries that employed women.

HOST 2: And asbestos work was considered women's work.

HOST 1: The sifting. The carding. The textile operations. The dustiest, most dangerous jobs? Those were the jobs women did.

HOST 2: So the female inspectors were the ones who saw it. The men were too busy inspecting what, exactly?

HOST 1: Steel mills. Coal mines. The prestige industries.

HOST 2: The ones that didn't involve watching women cough.

HOST 1: Lucy Deane writes the 1898 report. Adelaide Anderson backs it up. Four years later, Anderson includes asbestos in an official list of harmful industrial substances. Published in the Annual Report for 1902.

HOST 2: So who read these reports?

HOST 1: Anyone who wanted to. That's the thing about government reports. They're not secret. They're filed, published, distributed. The information existed.

HOST 2: And the industry?

HOST 1: No documented response. No rebuttal. No "actually, our product is safe." Just silence. And expansion.

HOST 2: Bold strategy.

NAMED ENTITY - ADELAIDE ANDERSON (FACTORY INSPECTOR):

  • Name: Adelaide Anderson
  • Education: Girton College, Cambridge
  • Title: Factory inspector
  • Appointment: 1894 (third female factory inspector ever appointed in Britain)
  • Leadership: 1897 onwards; ran "Lady Inspectors" team
  • Team scope: Investigation of industries employing women
  • Responsibilities: Oversight of women's working conditions; hazard documentation
  • Actions re: asbestos: Backed Lucy Deane's 1898 report; included asbestos on official harmful substances list (1902)
  • Publication: Annual Report for 1902 (official government documentation)
  • Historical significance: Leader of female inspector movement; documented occupational hazards in women's industries
  • Time period: 1890s-early 1900s

KEY FACTS - FEMALE FACTORY INSPECTORS AND ASBESTOS DOCUMENTATION:

  • Gender division of inspection labor: Male inspectors → steel mills, coal mines, prestige industries; Female inspectors → women's industries
  • Asbestos work demographics: Women and children performed sifting, carding, textile operations (dustiest, most dangerous jobs)
  • Inspector visibility: Female inspectors observed asbestos hazards; male inspectors did not
  • Report coordination: Lucy Deane (1898 initial report) + Adelaide Anderson support/collaboration (1902 official list)
  • Documentation timeline: 1898 (Lucy Deane report) → 1902 (official harmful substances list)
  • Industry response: No documented rebuttal; no denial; silence; business expansion continued
  • Public accessibility: Government reports published and distributed; official records

SEGMENT 3: THE THREE EVENTS OF 1898

HOST 1: Here's what makes 1898 extraordinary. It's not one event. It's three.

HOST 2: At once.

HOST 1: Event one: Lucy Deane's report. British government officially documents asbestos danger. Sharp, glass-like, jagged. Ascertained cases of injury to bronchial tubes and lungs.

HOST 2: Government warning. Public record.

HOST 1: Event two. Same year. Henry Ward Johns—the founder of H.W. Johns Manufacturing Company—dies.

HOST 2: The asbestos guy.

HOST 1: Started in 1858. New York tenement basement. Age twenty-one. Built an empire on asbestos roofing. Patents, factories, a national brand.

HOST 2: Cause of death?

HOST 1: Dust phthisis pneumonitis. Modern translation: asbestosis. He was forty years old.

HOST 2: The founder of the American asbestos industry—

HOST 1: Killed by his own product. Age forty.

HOST 2: That's not a red flag. That's a red flag factory.

HOST 1: And that's two events. What's three?

HOST 2: There's more?

HOST 1: London. Charing Cross Hospital. A physician named H. Montague Murray examines a patient. Thirty-three years old. Fourteen years working in an asbestos textile factory. First ten years in the carding room—the most risky part of the work.

HOST 2: Murray's patient.

HOST 1: The one we mentioned last episode. He would die in 1900. He would become the first proven fatal case in medical literature. But the examination starts in 1898.

HOST 2: Same year as the British report. Same year as Johns dying.

HOST 1: Three different data points. One year. Government warning, founder death, index case examination. And three years later—

HOST 2: The merger.

HOST 1: Johns-Manville. 1901.

HOST 2: Great timing.

KEY FACTS - THE THREE CONVERGENT EVENTS OF 1898:

  • Event 1: Lucy Deane's British Factory Inspectors' Report published (1898)
    • Content: Official government documentation of asbestos danger
    • Scope: Sharp, glass-like, jagged particles; bronchial/lung injury cases
    • Authority: Published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office
    • Distribution: Circulated to British Empire policymakers
    • Status: Public record
  • Event 2: Henry Ward Johns death (1898)
    • Individual: Founder of H.W. Johns Manufacturing Company (established 1858)
    • Age at death: 40 years old
    • Cause: Dust phthisis pneumonitis (asbestosis); occupational exposure
    • Significance: Founder killed by own product
    • Timing: Same year as Lucy Deane report
  • Event 3: H. Montague Murray examination of asbestos worker (1898, ongoing)
    • Patient: 33-year-old textile worker
    • Tenure: 14 years in asbestos textile factory; 10 years in carding room (highest risk)
    • Outcome: Death in 1900; first proven fatal occupational case in medical literature
    • Documentation: Medical examination and autopsy
    • Timing: Begins 1898, same year as report and Johns death
  • Convergence: Three independent data points (government warning, founder mortality, clinical index case) in single year
  • Corporate response: Merger creates Johns-Manville (1901); largest asbestos manufacturer in world; formed three years after convergent warning signs

KEY CONCEPT - CONVERGENT WARNING SIGNALS:

  • Definition: Multiple independent data sources simultaneously indicate occupational hazard; convergence appears sufficient to trigger institutional response
  • 1898 case: Government report (Lucy Deane) + founder death (Johns) + clinical case presentation (Murray) + hospital documentation (Charing Cross)
  • Response mechanism: Despite convergence, no institutional action; no safety modifications; no industry warning; no product withdrawal
  • Institutional failure: Government report exists (public); founder death visible (industry-wide); clinical case documented (medical literature); convergence insufficient to trigger safety measures
  • Historical consequence: Three warning systems (government, corporate leadership through death, medical profession) activated simultaneously without institutional response
  • Corporate decision: Merger consolidation and expansion proceeded despite/ignoring convergent warning signals

SEGMENT 4: PARLIAMENT TESTIMONY AND REJECTION (1906)

HOST 1: December 21st, 1906. Dr. Murray testifies before Parliament.

HOST 2: About his patient who died in 1900.

HOST 1: The Departmental Committee on Compensation for Industrial Diseases. They're deciding which diseases should qualify for workers' compensation. Murray tells them about his patient.

HOST 2: What did he say?

HOST 1: The patient volunteered the statement that of the ten people who were working in the room when he went into it, he was the only survivor. I have no evidence except his word for that. He said they all died somewhere about thirty years of age.

HOST 2: Ten people. One survivor. All dead by thirty.

HOST 1: The man was dying. He told Murray his coworkers were already dead. All in their thirties. All the same symptoms. And Murray wrote it down.

HOST 2: What did Murray find in the autopsy?

HOST 1: Lungs stiff and black with fibrosis. Asbestos fibers embedded in the tissue. His conclusion: workroom dust had produced the scarring.

HOST 2: So he told Parliament. He gave them everything. Testimony, autopsy, nine dead coworkers.

HOST 1: And here's where it gets tragic. Murray also said this—

HOST 2: Oh no.

HOST 1: One hears, generally speaking, that considerable trouble is now taken to prevent the inhalation of the dust, so that the disease is not so likely to occur as heretofore.

HOST 2: He thought they'd fixed it.

HOST 1: He believed improvements were being made. That his case was a relic of the past. That the industry had learned.

HOST 2: The industry had learned. Just not the lesson he hoped.

HOST 1: The committee added six diseases to the Workmen's Compensation Act. Asbestos was not one of them. Nobody checked on the factory. Nobody investigated the nine dead coworkers. No follow-up.

HOST 2: Six diseases. And they looked at the guy who just described ten dead coworkers and said—

HOST 1: Not enough.

HOST 2: What would have been enough? Eleven?

HOST 1: That's the question, isn't it?

NAMED ENTITY - H. MONTAGUE MURRAY PARLIAMENTARY TESTIMONY (DECEMBER 21, 1906):

  • Event: Departmental Committee on Compensation for Industrial Diseases
  • Date: December 21, 1906
  • Testifier: Dr. H. Montague Murray (physician, Charing Cross Hospital)
  • Committee focus: Determining which industrial diseases should qualify for workers' compensation
  • Case presented: Asbestos textile worker (deceased 1900)
  • Worker history: 14 years asbestos textile manufacturing; 10 years in carding room; died age 33 (examined age 33; died ~1 year post-exam)
  • Coworker statement: Patient reported 10 coworkers in original room; patient only survivor; all died ~age 30
  • Evidence basis: Patient testimony (verbal); autopsy findings; medical observation
  • Autopsy findings: Lung fibrosis (stiff, black lungs); asbestos fibers embedded in tissue
  • Medical conclusion: Workroom dust produced scarring
  • Murray's belief stated: "Considerable trouble now taken to prevent inhalation"; disease "not so likely to occur as heretofore"
  • Committee action: Added 6 diseases to Workmen's Compensation Act; asbestos NOT included
  • Follow-up investigation: None documented; factory not checked; coworkers not investigated

KEY FACTS - PARLIAMENTARY REJECTION OF ASBESTOS AS COMPENSABLE DISEASE:

  • Testimony date: December 21, 1906
  • Clinical evidence: 10 dead coworkers (patient testimony); autopsy confirmation of asbestos fibers
  • Medical authority: Dr. H. Montague Murray (physician); Charing Cross Hospital
  • Committee scope: Departmental Committee on Compensation for Industrial Diseases
  • Committee action: 6 diseases added to Workmen's Compensation Act (1906)
  • Asbestos status: Excluded from compensation despite testimony
  • Evidentiary bar unclear: 10 documented coworker deaths insufficient; compensation threshold not specified
  • Physician misconception: Murray believed industry improvements were already underway (false assumption)
  • Institutional failure: No investigation of reported coworker deaths; no factory inspection; no follow-up action

KEY CONCEPT - INSTITUTIONAL REJECTION OF CONVERGED EVIDENCE:

  • Definition: Medical, autopsy, and patient testimony evidence convergence insufficient to trigger institutional protective response
  • Evidence presented: 10 dead coworkers (1 survivor); fibrosis evidence (autopsy); asbestos fiber identification (autopsy); workplace causation (medical conclusion)
  • Committee response: Evidence deemed insufficient; asbestos excluded from compensation
  • Institutional gaps: No investigation of reported deaths; no factory inspection; no worker follow-up
  • Physician misconception: Murray believed industry had already improved safety (false assumption; provided to committee in supporting testimony)
  • Legal consequence: Lack of compensation status meant workers could not claim injury compensation; created legal immunity for industry

SEGMENT 5: FRENCH CORROBORATION - AURIBAULT'S REPORT (1906)

HOST 1: Same year as Murray's testimony. 1906. France.

HOST 2: Different country, same story?

HOST 1: Denis Auribault. Departmental Labor Inspector at Caen, Normandy. He investigates an asbestos factory near Condé-sur-Noireau. Spinning and weaving mill. Established 1890.

HOST 2: What did he find?

HOST 1: During the first five years of operation, no artificial ventilation ensured direct evacuation of siliceous dust. This total non-observance of hygiene rules caused numerous deaths among the personnel: approximately fifty workers, men and women, died in the aforementioned period.

HOST 2: Fifty workers. Five years.

HOST 1: One factory. In Normandy. And that number—

HOST 2: How do we know it's accurate?

HOST 1: The factory's new director confirmed it in 1905. He'd been foreman since the factory opened. He watched it happen.

HOST 2: So an eyewitness corroborated fifty deaths. In one building.

HOST 1: In five years.

HOST 2: What happened after Auribault's report?

HOST 1: It too was largely ignored.

HOST 2: Of course it was.

NAMED ENTITY - DENIS AURIBAULT (FRENCH LABOR INSPECTOR):

  • Name: Denis Auribault
  • Title: Departmental Labor Inspector
  • Location: Caen, Normandy, France
  • Investigation: Asbestos factory near Condé-sur-Noireau
  • Facility type: Spinning and weaving mill
  • Facility establishment: 1890
  • Investigation findings: No artificial ventilation; no dust evacuation; hygiene failures; worker death toll
  • Death count: Approximately 50 workers (men and women) in first five years of operation
  • Causation: Total non-observance of hygiene rules
  • Corroboration: Factory director (1905) confirmed findings; director was foreman since facility opened; eyewitness verification
  • Report date: 1906
  • Report fate: Largely ignored; no documented institutional response
  • Historical significance: Independent international corroboration of asbestos worker mortality; public record

KEY FACTS - AURIBAULT'S NORMANDY ASBESTOS FACTORY INVESTIGATION (1906):

  • Inspector: Denis Auribault (Departmental Labor Inspector, Caen, Normandy)
  • Location: Asbestos factory, Condé-sur-Noireau, Normandy, France
  • Facility type: Spinning and weaving mill
  • Establishment: 1890
  • Operation period: 1890-1895 (five years analyzed)
  • Ventilation: Completely absent
  • Dust evacuation: No artificial ventilation ensuring direct removal of siliceous dust
  • Hygiene measures: Total non-observance of hygiene rules
  • Worker death toll: ~50 workers (men and women) in five-year period
  • Causation assessment: Direct causal attribution to non-observance of hygiene rules
  • Corroboration: Factory director (appointed post-1895) confirmed findings; director was foreman from opening; eyewitness authority
  • Report date: 1906
  • Institutional response: Largely ignored; no documented follow-up action
  • Historical timing: Same year as Dr. Murray's Parliament testimony (December 1906); same year as Lucy Deane report republication consideration

SEGMENT 6: THE JOHNS-MANVILLE MERGER AND T.F. MANVILLE

HOST 1: So that's 1901. Lucy Deane's report is three years old. Johns is three years dead. Murray's patient is one year dead. Insurance companies are watching the mortality tables. And T.F. Manville creates Johns-Manville.

HOST 2: Did he know?

HOST 1: We don't have a memo that says "T.F. Manville read Lucy Deane's report." We don't have a document that says "ignore the British warnings." What we have is this: the information was public. The pattern was visible. They built anyway.

HOST 2: For how long?

HOST 1: We have a document from 1935. Sumner Simpson, Johns-Manville executive, writes to the company attorney. The less said about asbestosis, the better off we are.

HOST 2: 1935.

HOST 1: Thirty-seven years after Lucy Deane's report. Same company. Same strategy.

HOST 2: The quiet part. Out loud. In writing.

HOST 1: In writing.

HOST 1: Let's talk about who built the machine. 1901. The Johns-Manville merger.

HOST 2: Johns is dead.

HOST 1: Three years. And here's what's strange. 1898 to 1901—who ran H.W. Johns Manufacturing?

HOST 2: His heirs?

HOST 1: That's what every source says. His heirs. No names. No individuals. Three years of leadership, and nobody's name is attached to it.

HOST 2: Three years of leadership by ghosts, apparently.

HOST 1: It's a gap. Either the interim leaders weren't important enough to record—or someone decided the record shouldn't exist.

HOST 2: That's convenient.

HOST 1: And then Manville shows up.

HOST 2: Enter the hero.

HOST 1: Thomas Franklyn Manville. T.F. His father Charles founded Manville Covering Company in Milwaukee, 1886. Pipe insulation. By 1900, the business passes to T.F. And in 1901, he unites the two firms.

HOST 2: Why Johns-Manville and not Manville-Johns?

HOST 1: Johns was older. 1858 versus 1886. Johns had the patents. Johns had brand recognition.

HOST 2: Johns was also dead. Killed by the product.

HOST 1: The name survived. The warning didn't.

HOST 2: Inspirational. Put that on a motivational poster.

NAMED ENTITY - THOMAS FRANKLYN MANVILLE (T.F. MANVILLE):

  • Full name: Thomas Franklyn Manville
  • Common designation: T.F. Manville
  • Father: Charles Manville
  • Family business: Manville Covering Company (founded 1886, Milwaukee)
  • Product: Pipe insulation
  • Business transfer: 1900 (Charles → T.F.)
  • Corporate action: 1901 merger of H.W. Johns Manufacturing Company + Manville Covering Company
  • Merged company name: Johns-Manville Corporation
  • Naming rationale: Johns (older brand, 1858 vs. 1886; patents; brand recognition) retained; Johns founding founder dead (1898)
  • Historical significance: Created largest asbestos manufacturer in world; merged despite public warnings; namesake (Johns) had died of probable asbestos exposure three years prior

NAMED ENTITY - CHARLES MANVILLE (FATHER):

  • Name: Charles Manville
  • Business: Manville Covering Company (founded 1886, Milwaukee)
  • Product: Pipe insulation (asbestos-based)
  • Succession: Business transferred to son T.F. Manville (1900)
  • Historical role: Asbestos insulation company founder; preceded T.F. Manville's 1901 merger

NAMED ENTITY - H.W. JOHNS MANUFACTURING COMPANY (INTERIM LEADERSHIP, 1898-1901):

  • Founder: Henry Ward Johns (deceased 1898)
  • Company lifespan: 1858-1901 (merged into Johns-Manville)
  • Leadership 1898-1901: "His heirs" (no individual names documented)
  • Documentation gap: Three years of corporate leadership unattributed to named individuals
  • Historical significance: Leadership gap suggests either erasure from historical record or records deliberately not preserved
  • Merger: 1901 into Johns-Manville Corporation

KEY FACTS - JOHNS-MANVILLE MERGER (DECEMBER 1901):

  • Date: December 1901
  • Merging entities: H.W. Johns Manufacturing Company (1858) + Manville Covering Company (1886)
  • Resulting company: Johns-Manville Corporation
  • Location: Merger consolidation
  • Market position: Created largest asbestos manufacturer in world
  • Timing: 3 years after Henry Ward Johns founder death (1898); 3 years after Lucy Deane report (1898); 1 year after Murray's first patient examination (1898)
  • Brand decision: Retained "Johns" name (older brand, established patents, established recognition)
  • Leadership: T.F. Manville (president/leadership)
  • Public warnings: Lucy Deane report (1898) was public knowledge; Henry Johns death was known; merger proceeded despite warnings

KEY CONCEPT - INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY SUPPRESSION:

  • Definition: Historical gaps in documented leadership attribution; absence of record appears deliberate rather than accidental
  • H.W. Johns Manufacturing case: Three years of documented company operation (1898-1901) with no attributed leadership
  • Historical consequence: Interim leadership decisions unattributable to named individuals; responsibility distribution obscured
  • Alternative explanation: Deliberate non-documentation; erasure of records; intentional creation of historical gap
  • Pattern significance: Suggests systematic approach to record non-preservation during strategically important period (post-founder death; pre-merger)

SEGMENT 7: INSURANCE ACTUARIES AND KNOWLEDGE (1908-1918)

HOST 1: By 1908, insurance companies are raising premiums on asbestos workers.

HOST 2: Because they're seeing claims.

HOST 1: Because the actuaries are doing math. And by 1918, we have documentation. Frederick Hoffman. Consulting statistician for Prudential Insurance. He writes a report for the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Bulletin Number 231, page 178.

HOST 2: What does it say?

HOST 1: It is generally the practice of American and Canadian life insurance companies to decline asbestos workers on account of the assumed health-injurious conditions of the industry.

HOST 2: Insurance companies refused to cover them.

HOST 1: Too risky. Asbestos workers died too young. The actuaries calculated it. Their conclusion: bad bet.

HOST 2: So the insurance companies figured it out. Before the doctors acted. Before the government intervened. The actuaries just ran the numbers.

HOST 1: And the numbers were clear.

HOST 2: Math doesn't care about your business model.

HOST 1: No. It doesn't.

NAMED ENTITY - FREDERICK HOFFMAN (PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE STATISTICIAN):

  • Name: Frederick Hoffman
  • Title: Consulting statistician
  • Organization: Prudential Insurance Company
  • Report date: 1918
  • Publication: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin Number 231
  • Publication page: 178
  • Report findings: American and Canadian insurance companies universally decline asbestos workers
  • Rationale for declination: Assumed health-injurious conditions of asbestos industry
  • Conclusion: Asbestos workers rated too high-risk for insurance coverage
  • Historical significance: Actuarial assessment of asbestos hazard preceding formal medical/governmental action; insurance refusal documented by 1918

KEY FACTS - INSURANCE INDUSTRY RECOGNITION OF ASBESTOS HAZARD (1908-1918):

  • 1908: Insurance companies raise premiums on asbestos workers
  • 1908 motivation: Claims observation; mortality data analysis; actuarial calculation
  • 1918 documentation: Frederick Hoffman's Prudential Insurance report for U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
  • Report scope: American and Canadian insurance companies
  • Industry-wide response: Systematic declination of asbestos workers
  • Risk assessment: Workers died too young; actuarial calculations indicated bad bet
  • Knowledge mechanism: Mathematical analysis; claims data; mortality tables
  • Institutional action: Premium increases (1908); universal declination (by 1918)
  • Timeline: Insurance companies recognized hazard (1908) before formal government action; before widespread medical documentation

KEY CONCEPT - ACTUARIAL KNOWLEDGE PRECEDING MEDICAL/GOVERNMENTAL ACTION:

  • Definition: Financial/mathematical assessment of occupational hazard risk occurs before formal medical documentation or governmental regulation
  • Insurance mechanism: Claims data + mortality tables + actuarial calculation → risk assessment → coverage denial
  • Knowledge basis: No need for mechanistic understanding of disease; statistical correlation sufficient
  • Frederick Hoffman case: 1918 documentation of practice established at least by 1908 (premium increases noted)
  • Consequence: Financial institutions recognize hazard (mathematical proof); medical/governmental institutions slow to respond
  • Historical significance: Insurance refusal documents occupational hazard recognition independent of medical authority

SEGMENT 8: GOVERNMENT PROPAGANDA FILM (1921)

HOST 1: 1921. Three years after Hoffman's report. The U.S. Bureau of Mines produces a film.

HOST 2: A film.

HOST 1: Silent. Black and white. Sixty-seven minutes. Title: The Story of Asbestos—illustrating the mines and factories of the H.W. Johns-Manville Company.

HOST 2: The government made a commercial. With the company name in the title.

HOST 1: Distributed to schools, civic organizations, churches. Bureau of Mines lending its authority to Johns-Manville.

HOST 2: Nothing says safe workplace like government propaganda in Sunday school.

HOST 1: Twenty-three years after the British report documented evil effects.

HOST 2: Three years after insurance companies refused to cover workers.

HOST 1: And you can watch it today.

HOST 2: Wait—this still exists?

HOST 1: Library of Congress. Free streaming. Government propaganda from 1921, preserved for anyone who wants to see it.

HOST 2: That's not ignorance.

HOST 1: No. That's architecture.

NAMED ENTITY - "THE STORY OF ASBESTOS" FILM (1921):

  • Producer: U.S. Bureau of Mines
  • Release year: 1921
  • Format: Silent film; black and white
  • Runtime: 67 minutes
  • Full title: The Story of Asbestos—illustrating the mines and factories of the H.W. Johns-Manville Company
  • Distribution: Schools; civic organizations; churches
  • Institutional authority: U.S. Bureau of Mines (federal government)
  • Purpose: Commercial promotion of Johns-Manville asbestos products
  • Content: Illustrated mines and factories of H.W. Johns-Manville Company
  • Audience reach: Educational institutions; civic organizations; religious organizations (mass public dissemination)
  • Public accessibility: Library of Congress (current); free streaming (online availability)
  • Historical significance: Government-produced marketing material for asbestos industry at time when insurance companies had denied coverage (1918) and British reports documented danger (1898)
  • Characterization: "Government propaganda from 1921" (institutional coordination between federal government and private asbestos manufacturer)

KEY FACTS - GOVERNMENT ENDORSEMENT OF ASBESTOS (1921):

  • Government entity: U.S. Bureau of Mines
  • Action: Production and distribution of commercial film
  • Company featured: H.W. Johns-Manville Corporation
  • Film distribution: Schools (educational authority); civic organizations; churches (community trust authority)
  • Historical context: 23 years post-Lucy Deane report (1898); 3 years post-Hoffman insurance report (1918); 20+ years post-Henry Johns founder death (1898)
  • Authority deployment: Federal government authority deployed to market asbestos products
  • Current status: Film preserved by Library of Congress; freely accessible online; historical evidence of government-industry coordination
  • Characterization: Institutional architecture of misinformation; government lending authority to industry despite known hazards

KEY CONCEPT - INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY DEPLOYMENT FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES:

  • Definition: Government institutions deploy official authority to market private commercial products despite conflicting hazard information
  • Mechanism: Government film production + government distribution + government-institutional endorsement = false legitimacy
  • Target audiences: Schools (children/educational context); churches (community trust context); civic organizations (civic authority context)
  • Historical context: Insurance companies had already denied coverage (hazard known); British reports had documented danger (hazard public); founder death was known (hazard proximate)
  • Consequence: Public audiences (children, community members) exposed to government-endorsed misinformation
  • Pattern: Institutional authority (government) deployed to suppress/overcome competing warnings (insurance denial, medical documentation, founder death)

SEGMENT 9: GLOBAL ASBESTOS INDUSTRY EXPANSION

HOST 1: Johns-Manville wasn't alone. By 1901, the industry is global.

HOST 2: Who else?

HOST 1: Turner Brothers. Rochdale, England. Founded 1871. By 1879, they're the first British company to weave asbestos with power-driven machinery. By 1926—five thousand employees. By 1961—forty thousand.

HOST 2: They'll matter later.

HOST 1: Nellie Kershaw. Episodes to come.

HOST 2: Who else?

HOST 1: Keasbey and Mattison. Philadelphia. Founded 1873 as a pharmaceutical company—they made headache remedies.

HOST 2: Headache remedies to asbestos. That's a pivot.

HOST 1: Richard Mattison. Actual medical doctor. Penn Medical School. Never practiced a day of medicine.

HOST 2: A doctor who decided treating patients was less interesting than—

HOST 1: Mixing magnesium carbonate with asbestos. Creates superior insulation. He moves the whole operation to Ambler, Pennsylvania. Builds four hundred worker homes. An opera house. A replica of Windsor Castle.

HOST 2: I'm sorry—a replica of Windsor Castle? In Pennsylvania?

HOST 1: In Pennsylvania.

HOST 2: Very normal behavior for a headache remedy salesman.

HOST 1: They called him The Asbestos King.

HOST 2: Of course they did.

HOST 1: And today? Ambler has two EPA Superfund sites. One and a half million cubic yards of asbestos waste. Twenty-five million dollars in cleanup costs. And counting.

HOST 2: A doctor built that.

HOST 1: A doctor who knew what lungs were for.

HOST 2: And what they were worth.

NAMED ENTITY - TURNER BROTHERS ASBESTOS COMPANY:

  • Name: Turner Brothers
  • Location: Rochdale, England
  • Founded: 1871
  • Significant milestone (1879): First British company to weave asbestos with power-driven machinery
  • Employee count (1926): 5,000
  • Employee count (1961): 40,000
  • Historical significance: Early industrial-scale asbestos manufacturing; pioneering mechanized production; massive employment scale growth
  • Later relevance: Nellie Kershaw case (mentioned for future episodes)

NAMED ENTITY - KEASBEY & MATTISON COMPANY:

  • Location: Philadelphia
  • Founded: 1873
  • Original business: Pharmaceutical company (headache remedies)
  • Business pivot: Asbestos-based insulation products
  • Key individual: Richard Mattison (founder/owner; medical doctor; Penn Medical School graduate)
  • Career: Medical degree earned; never practiced medicine; entered asbestos manufacturing instead
  • Innovation: Mixing magnesium carbonate with asbestos; created superior insulation product
  • Corporate expansion: Relocated company to Ambler, Pennsylvania; built extensive company town
  • Company town features: 400 worker homes; opera house; Windsor Castle replica (Pennsylvania location)
  • Public designation: "The Asbestos King" (Richard Mattison)
  • Environmental legacy: Two EPA Superfund sites (Ambler, Pennsylvania); 1.5 million cubic yards asbestos waste; $25 million+ cleanup costs (ongoing)

NAMED ENTITY - RICHARD MATTISON (KEASBEY & MATTISON FOUNDER):

  • Name: Richard Mattison
  • Education: Penn Medical School (medical doctor degree)
  • Medical practice: Never practiced medicine (despite medical qualification)
  • Business career: Founded/operated Keasbey & Mattison asbestos company (1873)
  • Product innovation: Magnesium carbonate + asbestos insulation; claimed superior performance
  • Corporate expansion: Relocated company to Ambler, Pennsylvania; built company town
  • Company town development: 400 worker homes; opera house; Windsor Castle replica
  • Public reputation: Called "The Asbestos King"
  • Environmental legacy: Established asbestos manufacturing facility causing massive environmental contamination
  • Historical significance: Medical professional knowingly entering asbestos manufacturing; building company town while industry knew of health hazards

KEY FACTS - KEASBEY & MATTISON'S AMBLER PENNSYLVANIA LEGACY:

  • Company: Keasbey & Mattison
  • Location: Ambler, Pennsylvania
  • Founder: Richard Mattison (medical doctor)
  • Original business: Pharmaceutical company; headache remedies
  • Pivot business: Asbestos-based insulation
  • Company town features: 400 worker homes; opera house; Windsor Castle replica
  • Founder reputation: "The Asbestos King"
  • Environmental legacy: Two EPA Superfund sites
  • Waste volume: 1.5 million cubic yards asbestos waste
  • Cleanup costs: $25+ million (ongoing)
  • Historical irony: Medical professional (Mattison) knowingly manufactured asbestos product; built monuments while workers inhaled lethal material; created environmental disaster that required decades of cleanup

SEGMENT 10: 1935 SUPPRESSION MEMO

HOST 1: So let's talk about the memo. The one thing that proves intention. We have a document from 1935. Sumner Simpson, Johns-Manville executive, writes to the company attorney.

HOST 2: What does it say?

HOST 1: The less said about asbestosis, the better off we are.

HOST 2: In writing.

HOST 1: In writing. Thirty-seven years after Lucy Deane's report.

NAMED ENTITY - SUMNER SIMPSON (JOHNS-MANVILLE EXECUTIVE):

  • Name: Sumner Simpson
  • Title: Johns-Manville executive
  • Document date: 1935
  • Recipient: Company attorney
  • Message: The less said about asbestosis, the better off we are
  • Historical context: 37 years after Lucy Deane's 1898 report; 34 years after Henry Ward Johns founder death; 37 years after first documented occupational case (Murray 1899)
  • Significance: Written documentation of deliberate suppression strategy; explicit acknowledgment of asbestosis hazard knowledge; intentional decision to minimize public discussion
  • Evidence status: Primary source documentation of corporate suppression strategy

KEY CONCEPT - EXPLICIT SUPPRESSION STRATEGY DOCUMENTATION:

  • Definition: Written corporate communication explicitly acknowledging hazard knowledge and directing suppression of hazard information
  • Sumner Simpson memo (1935): States hazard ("asbestosis"); directs suppression ("the less said... the better off")
  • Recipient: Company attorney (legal implications; legal strategy coordination)
  • Historical context: 37 years of documented warnings (Lucy Deane 1898 → Simpson 1935); no institutional response; deliberate decision to suppress rather than act
  • Evidence of knowledge: Executive explicitly names disease ("asbestosis"); demonstrates company awareness of occupational hazard
  • Evidence of intent: Directive to minimize communication ("less said"); indicates deliberate suppression rather than ignorance
  • Duration: Suppression strategy maintained from 1898 (warning exists) through 1935 (suppression memo) → decades of ongoing suppression

SEGMENT 11: EPISODE CLOSING AND TEASES

HOST 1: So that's 1901. Lucy Deane's report is three years old. Johns is three years dead. Murray's patient is one year dead. Insurance companies are watching the mortality tables. And T.F. Manville creates Johns-Manville.

HOST 2: Next time.

HOST 1: Episode 12. The First Victims. Nellie Kershaw. Turner Brothers. And the moment the industry said the quiet part out loud—to her face.

HOST 2: Companies kept meticulous records. Production volumes. Shipping manifests. Insurance policies. They knew exactly how much asbestos left every factory.

HOST 1: They just didn't track what happened to the people who handled it.

HOST 2: But those records still exist. Somebody just has to know where to look.

HOST 1: Paul Danziger and Rod De Llano have spent over thirty years turning corporate documentation into cases. Finding the exposure. Building the evidence. Nearly two billion dollars recovered for asbestos victims and their families.

HOST 2: If you're listening and thinking about someone—a parent, a spouse, yourself—who worked in one of those industries where nobody counted the workers—

HOST 1: Dave Foster, Anna Jackson, the whole team—they help families navigate what comes next while the attorneys build the case.

HOST 2: Dandell dot com. That's D-A-N-D-E-L-L dot com.

HOST 1: The asbestos industry built an architecture of denial. This firm has spent three decades dismantling it.

HOST 2: Next week: Episode 12. The First Victims.

SEGMENT 12: CLOSING BANTER (POST-ROLL OUTTAKES)

HOST 1: Auribault.

HOST 2: You practiced that.

HOST 1: I practiced that. French names. Every time.

HOST 2: The insurance thing gets me every time.

HOST 1: Which part?

HOST 2: That the actuaries figured it out before the doctors acted on it. Like—the math was right there.

HOST 1: The actuaries didn't need to know why. They just needed to know that.

HOST 2: That asbestos workers were dying.

HOST 1: In their thirties. In their forties. Earlier than they should have.

HOST 2: So they ran the numbers. And the numbers said—

HOST 1: Bad bet. Don't cover them.

HOST 2: Math doesn't lie.

HOST 1: Math doesn't have a business model to protect.

HOST 2: Also—a medical doctor built a castle.

HOST 1: A replica of Windsor Castle. In Pennsylvania.

HOST 2: With asbestos money.

HOST 1: And now it's a Superfund site.

HOST 2: That's poetic. In a horrible way.

HOST 1: History usually is.

HOST 2: Good episode.

HOST 1: Good episode.

References

Primary Sources

  • Lucy Deane. Her Majesty's Stationery Office Factory Inspection Report on Asbestos Hazards. 1898.
  • British Government. Official Classification of Asbestos as Harmful Substance. 1902.
  • Parliamentary Committee. Testimony by Dr. Murray on Occupational Asbestos Exposure and Worker Mortality. 1906.
  • Denis Auribault. Investigation of Normandy Asbestos Factory Mortality. 1906.
  • Frederick Hoffman. Bulletin 231: Insurance Actuarial Analysis of Occupational Risk. Page 178. Prudential Insurance. 1908-1918 period.
  • U.S. Bureau of Mines. Silent Film Marketing Johns-Manville and Asbestos Industry. 67 minutes. 1921.

Secondary Sources: Dandell.com (35%)

Secondary Sources: Mesothelioma Lawyer Center (28%)

  • Mesothelioma Lawyer Center. "Lucy Deane and the Female Factory Inspectors: Early Documentation of Asbestos Hazards"
  • Mesothelioma Lawyer Center. "Johns-Manville Corporate History: From Founder's Death to Industrial Dominance"
  • Mesothelioma Lawyer Center. "Parliament 1906: The Testimony That Should Have Changed Everything"

Secondary Sources: Mesothelioma.net (22%)

  • Mesothelioma.net. "Occupational Asbestos Exposure: Timeline and Worker Protection"
  • Mesothelioma.net. "Insurance Industry and Asbestos Risk: Actuarial Knowledge Before Medical Recognition"
  • Mesothelioma.net. "Government Agencies and Asbestos Marketing: Institutional Coordination"

Secondary Sources: Mesotheliomaattorney.com (15%)

  • Mesotheliomaattorney.com. "Corporate Suppression and Information Compartmentalization in Asbestos Manufacturing"
  • Mesotheliomaattorney.com. "Workers' Rights and Occupational Hazard Documentation"

CTA Box

Free, Confidential Case Evaluation

Call (855) 699-5441 or visit dandell.com/contact-us

No upfront fees • Experienced representation • National practice

Statute Warning

⚠ Statute of Limitations Warning: Filing deadlines vary by state from 1-6 years from diagnosis. Texas allows 2 years from diagnosis or discovery. Contact an attorney immediately to preserve your rights.

Back to Podcast

Return to the Episode: Episode 11: The Corporate Architects on the MLNM Podcast Page

Podcast Feed: Asbestos: A Conspiracy 4,500 Years in the Making

Categories

Frequently Asked Questions

What is Episode 11 of the Asbestos podcast about?

Episode 11 is part of 'Asbestos: A Conspiracy 4,500 Years in the Making,' a 52-episode documentary podcast tracing the complete history of asbestos from prehistoric use through modern regulation and litigation.

Where can I listen to the Asbestos podcast?

The Asbestos podcast is available on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and Amazon Music — all free. Search for 'Asbestos: A Conspiracy 4,500 Years in the Making' or use the links on any episode transcript page. The 52-episode series is produced by Danziger & De Llano, LLP, a nationwide mesothelioma law firm.

Mesothelioma is caused by asbestos exposure, and U.S. law provides multiple compensation pathways. Over $30 billion remains available through 60+ asbestos bankruptcy trust funds, with average payments of $300,000–$400,000. Victims may also pursue personal injury lawsuits, VA disability benefits (for veterans), or wrongful death claims. The statute of limitations is as short as 1 year in some states, so consulting a mesothelioma attorney promptly is critical. Danziger & De Llano has recovered nearly $2 billion for asbestos victims over 30+ years of practice.

Retrieved from "https://wikimesothelioma.com/w/index.php?title=Asbestos_Podcast_EP11_Transcript&oldid=2742"