Raybestos Company History
Raybestos Company History: From Brake Pad Innovation to Bankruptcy and Asbestos Litigation
Executive Summary
Raybestos Company was founded in 1906 in Bridgeport, Connecticut, by inventors Arthur Raymond and Arthur Law to manufacture asbestos-copper brake linings for the emerging automobile industry.[1][2] The company's innovation—thermally stable, friction-resistant asbestos linings—solved a critical engineering problem in early automotive braking and became the standard for American brake manufacturing for nearly a century. However, Raybestos's corporate leadership, particularly president Sumner Simpson (1916–1953) and his son William Simpson (1967–1983), systematically concealed knowledge of asbestos hazards for decades. The infamous October 1, 1935 Simpson-Brown correspondence documented deliberate suppression of occupational health information. The 1929 triple merger creating Raybestos-Manhattan Corporation consolidated vertical control of asbestos supply, manufacturing, and brake product distribution. A 1977 subpoena of the Simpson Papers—approximately 6,000 internal company documents—revealed coordinated industry suppression with Johns-Manville. The company underwent strategic corporate restructuring in 1982–1989 (Raymark Industries, then Raytech Corporation) to shield profitable operations from asbestos liability. The company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 1989, and the Raytech Corporation Asbestos Personal Injury Settlement Trust was established in 2001 with $131.9 million in initial assets. As of 2024, the trust has paid 54,185 claims while operations ceased decades ago. Raybestos's Stratford, Connecticut facility became one of Connecticut's most contaminated Superfund sites, with elevated childhood mesothelioma rates and ongoing EPA remediation.
Key Facts
| Key Facts: Raybestos Company History |
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How Was Raybestos Founded?
The Raybestos Company emerged from a critical technological problem in early automotive engineering. In the first decade of the twentieth century, automobiles transitioned from stationary wooden brake blocks to mechanical drum brakes that required materials capable of withstanding repeated frictional heat without degradation.[1] Existing lining materials—cotton soaked in oil, leather, and even camel hair—all failed under the thermal stress of high-speed braking. Louis Renault had invented the mechanical drum brake in 1902, but the challenge of finding suitable friction materials remained unsolved.
In 1906, two entrepreneurs in Bridgeport, Connecticut—Arthur Raymond and Arthur Law—patented a revolutionary brake lining composition: a woven mesh of asbestos fibers combined with copper wire.[1] The asbestos-copper matrix provided extraordinary thermal stability, maintaining friction properties at temperatures up to 450°C, far exceeding the performance of competing organic materials.[1] The invention solved the engineering crisis of brake fade and enabled the rapid scaling of automobile manufacturing. The company was named Raybestos—a contraction of co-founder Arthur Raymond's name and the material that made the product possible: asbestos.[2]
Arthur Raymond died unexpectedly in 1909 at age 30 from a brain abscess, unrelated to occupational disease.[1] Arthur Law gradually faded from company records. By 1916, the company was led by Sumner Simpson, a manager who would define Raybestos for the next thirty-seven years.
Who Led the Company During Its Cover-Up?
Sumner Simpson's presidency of Raybestos (1916–1953) coincided with the period when asbestos hazards became scientifically documented yet deliberately suppressed. Simpson inherited a company experiencing explosive growth due to Henry Ford's Model T, but he inherited it at the precise moment when evidence of asbestos's occupational toxicity began accumulating in the scientific and insurance literature.
Sumner Simpson and the "Less Said" Philosophy
On October 1, 1935, Sumner Simpson wrote to Vandiver Brown, an attorney at Johns-Manville Corporation: "I think the less said about asbestos, the better off we are."[1] This sentence—preserved in the Simpson Papers and confirmed in litigation discovery—captured an industry-wide consensus on information suppression. Brown's response was equally damning: he characterized Simpson's position as an "ostrich-like attitude," demonstrating that both men understood exactly what they were doing.[1][3]
By 1935, asbestos hazards were not new information. The Prudential Insurance Company's Frederick Hoffman had documented in 1918 (Bulletin Number 231) that insurance companies refused coverage for asbestos workers.[1] British researcher E.R.A. Merewether had identified brake work as a specific occupational cause of asbestosis in the early 1930s.[1] The Simpson-Brown correspondence reveals not the discovery of hazards, but the deliberate decision to remain silent about known hazards.
Coordinated Industry Suppression
The Simpson-Brown correspondence was part of a broader coordination between Raybestos and Johns-Manville. In 1936, both companies conspired with occupational health researcher Dr. Anthony Lanza to alter his published findings. Lanza's original research conclusion stated: "It is possible for uncomplicated asbestosis to result fatally." The published version—appearing in 1936 with industry input—minimized the hazard by claiming asbestosis was "milder than silicosis."[1] Science was being rewritten to serve corporate liability defense.
The suppression extended beyond academic research to trade journalism. In 1939, the editor of Asbestos magazine—yes, an industry publication specifically focused on asbestos—wrote to Simpson with assurance: "We understand that all this information on asbestos is to be kept confidential."[1] The industry had created a sealed information environment where even trade professionals were prevented from accessing hazard data.
William Simpson's Inheritance of the Cover-Up
William Simpson, Sumner's son, was born in 1916 (the year his father became Raybestos president) and spent his entire career at the company. He became General Manager by 1947, President and CEO from 1967 to 1980, and Chairman until 1983.[4] William Simpson inherited not just a company, but a systematic cover-up spanning three decades.
The documentary evidence of this inheritance is explicit. Before 1969, the Simpson Papers—approximately 6,000 internal documents dating back to the 1930s—sat in a company vault with restricted access.[1] When Sumner Simpson died in 1953, William transferred the box to his personal office closet, where it remained for five years (1969–1974). In 1974, he transferred the papers to John Marsh, Raybestos's Director of Environmental Affairs.[4] Marsh informed William Simpson that the documents were "relevant to asbestos disease."[4]
Despite this notification in 1974—nearly forty years after his father's "less said" letter—William Simpson retained custody of the papers for three additional years. Only in 1977, when confronted with a subpoena in New Jersey asbestos litigation, did Raybestos produce the Simpson Papers.[1] The three-year gap between learning of the documents' health relevance and voluntarily disclosing them represents either profound denial or deliberate retention.[4]
How Did Raybestos Expand Through Mergers?
The 1929 Triple Merger: Creating Raybestos-Manhattan Corporation
On July 5, 1929, three companies merged to create the Raybestos-Manhattan Corporation: the original Raybestos Company of Bridgeport, Connecticut; Manhattan Rubber Manufacturing of Passaic, New Jersey; and U.S. Asbestos Company of Pennsylvania.[1] This vertical integration consolidated control across the entire supply chain—from raw asbestos sourcing through fiber processing, rubber manufacturing, and finished brake product production.
The 1929 merger position Raybestos-Manhattan as the largest integrated asbestos brake lining manufacturer in America. Sumner Simpson presided over this expanded empire, with enhanced market power and resource control. Vertically integrated companies face fewer constraints on information flow and have greater ability to manage occupational health surveillance internally, without external scrutiny.
The Hi-Shear Merger and Raymark Reorganization (1982)
In September 1980, Hi-Shear Industries (North Hills, Long Island)—an aerospace supplier—began acquiring Raybestos shares, eventually acquiring over 30% ownership.[4] By early February 1982, the merger agreement was finalized, creating Raymark Corporation.[4] Frederick J. Ross, formerly CEO of Carborundum Company (MIT chemical engineering background), became President and CEO of the merged Raymark entity. David A. Wingate, previously chairman and president of Hi-Shear Industries, succeeded William Simpson as chairman of Raymark.[4]
The 1982 name change from Raybestos-Manhattan to Raymark was an explicit distancing strategy. The term "Raybestos" had become toxic—associated with asbestos hazards, occupational disease, and litigation. Raymark was a new corporate entity with a new name, designed to create psychological distance from the original company's liabilities.[5] However, the legal liability remained attached to the entity, regardless of its name.
What Products Did Raybestos Manufacture?
Raybestos's product line centered on automotive friction materials, with asbestos as the core component:
- Automotive brake linings: Asbestos-copper mesh brake blocks for passenger vehicles, trucks, and commercial fleets
- Clutch facings and components: Friction materials for automotive clutch assemblies
- Transmission band linings: Materials for transmission brakes in automatic transmissions
- Gaskets and valve components: Asbestos-containing gaskets for industrial and automotive applications
- Friction products for specialized applications: Rope insulation, cloth products, and custom friction components
The Model T Ford became the primary driver of Raybestos's growth. Ford's assembly line mass production, combined with the Model T's affordable pricing (dropping from $800 in 1908 to $310 by 1921), placed the vehicle within reach of working families.[1] By 1929, there were 23 million vehicles on American roads.[1] Every single one required brake maintenance, and many required multiple brake lining replacements over their operational lifetime. This distribution system created an enormous occupational asbestos exposure population, largely invisible in Raybestos's own health surveillance systems because the exposed workers (mechanics, service technicians) were not company employees.
How Did Raybestos Attempt to Avoid Liability?
Strategic Corporate Restructuring (1982–1989)
As asbestos litigation accelerated in the 1980s, Raybestos pursued a deliberate corporate restructuring designed to isolate profitable business assets from asbestos liability. The strategy involved creating multiple corporate entities and then claiming that liabilities belonged to one entity while profits flowed to another.
In 1978, the company name was shortened from Raybestos-Manhattan to simply Raybestos, a minor change reflecting the fact that Manhattan Rubber operations were no longer geographically relevant.[5] The significant restructuring began in 1982 with the Raymark merger. By 1985, Echlin, an automotive aftermarket supplier, acquired the Raybestos brand and created Brake Parts Inc., continuing brake lining production under the "Raybestos" name—but as a separate legal entity no longer connected to the asbestos liability chain.[5]
In 1986, a new president created Raytech Corporation in Shelton, Connecticut, as a holding company for non-asbestos business assets (specifically, the Raybestos Friction Materials Company subsidiary, which manufactured brake linings but was positioned as a separate entity).[5] In 1987, Raytech assumed control of Raybestos's non-asbestos operations, with an explicit agreement that Raymark would release Raytech from asbestos liability.[5] This separation attempt failed. Despite the corporate veil of separate entities, courts held Raytech responsible for Raybestos's asbestos liabilities.
In 1988–1989, Raymark was "strategically bankrupted"—not because it lacked assets or was unable to pay debts, but because leadership decided that bankruptcy was preferable to liability.[5] Raytech itself filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Connecticut in 1989, the same year operations ceased at the Stratford facility.[5][2] The bankruptcy court proceedings took eleven years; Raytech did not emerge from bankruptcy until 2001, when the Raytech Corporation Asbestos Personal Injury Settlement Trust was established.
The Simpson Papers as Legal Catastrophe
The discovery of the Simpson Papers in 1977 proved that corporate restructuring could not erase liability. The 6,000-page document collection documented the company's knowledge of asbestos hazards dating back to the 1930s, the deliberate coordination with competitors (Johns-Manville) on information suppression, and the falsification of occupational health research.[3] In litigation, these documents transformed the legal liability landscape.
Evidence of corporate knowledge triggers multiple legal doctrines: (1) failure to warn (knowing of hazards but not communicating them to workers or consumers); (2) conspiracy (coordinated suppression with competitors like Johns-Manville); (3) fraud (research manipulation, like the Lanza study); and (4) punitive damages (knowing misconduct intended to escape liability).[3] The Simpson Papers established all of these elements, making it nearly impossible for Raybestos to win jury trials.
The papers had an additional impact: they provided the "common thread" for class action certification. Historically, asbestos cases were litigated individually, requiring each plaintiff to prove exposure, causation, and damages separately. The Simpson Papers demonstrated a company-wide pattern and practice of hazard concealment, making class action treatment appropriate and dramatically increasing the total liability exposure.[3]
What Happened to the Simpson Papers?
Discovery and Historical Significance
In 1977, attorney Karl Asch obtained a court order in Austin v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. to depose the head of Raybestos, leading to the discovery of the Simpson Papers.[3] The papers had been locked in a company vault for decades, accessible only to Sumner Simpson, William Simpson, two secretaries, and security personnel. When Sumner died in 1953, the papers passed to William Simpson, who kept them in his personal office closet from 1969 to 1974 and then transferred them to John Marsh, the Director of Environmental Affairs, in 1974.
The approximately 6,000 pages consisted of scientific reports, internal correspondence, and business records documenting Raybestos's—and Johns-Manville's—efforts "to find out about the hazards of asbestos, develop strategies to deal with them, and—most important—to keep that knowledge from the public and workers."[3] The papers "described in great detail the efforts of Raybestos, Johns-Manville, and other manufacturers to find out about the hazards of asbestos, develop strategies to deal with them, and—most important—to keep that knowledge from the public and workers."[3]
Legal Impact and Precedent
The Simpson Papers fundamentally altered asbestos litigation in six critical ways:
1. Evidence of Knowledge: The papers provided direct proof that manufacturers knew of health risks decades before public warnings, establishing knowing concealment and deliberate failure to warn 2. Statute of Limitations Extension: Courts in some jurisdictions ruled that active concealment constituted grounds for tolling (pausing) the statute of limitations, allowing claims decades after exposure in cases where the company actively suppressed knowledge 3. Class Action Certification: The papers provided a "common thread" of company-wide misconduct linking numerous individual claims, facilitating class action certification and dramatically amplifying aggregate liability 4. Multiplicative Damages: The papers justified jury awards of punitive damages (beyond compensatory damages) for knowing misconduct, increasing individual case values dramatically 5. Corporate Bankruptcy Causation: The papers dramatically accelerated asbestos-related bankruptcies by increasing jury awards and encouraging settlement demand escalation. Johns-Manville filed for bankruptcy in 1982 (partially due to asbestos litigation fueled by Simpson Paper evidence), and Raybestos followed in 1989 6. Precedent for Corporate Responsibility: Court rulings citing the Simpson Papers established ongoing standards for manufacturer accountability and information disclosure, affecting all subsequent asbestos litigation
The Cimino v. Raymark Case
The most significant Simpson Paper litigation was Cimino v. Raymark, which began as a class action in 1990.[3] The case involved approximately 2,000 refinery and chemical workers who had been exposed to Raybestos brake linings and asbestos products in industrial settings. In 2018, a three-judge arbitration panel in Beaumont, Texas awarded $140 million to the class, plus a previous $38 million settlement, totaling over $178 million in liability attributable to the case.[3] The Simpson Papers provided the documentary foundation for proving both knowledge and deliberate concealment.
Where Did Raybestos Operate?
Raybestos operated multiple manufacturing facilities across the United States and Canada, each with its own occupational exposure legacy and environmental contamination:
| Location | Products/Operations | Operational Period | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bridgeport, CT | Original headquarters; asbestos brake linings manufacturing | 1906–1980s | Historical facility; original location |
| Stratford, CT (75 East Main St) | Asbestos brake linings, clutches, friction products; primary manufacturing facility | 1919–1989 | EPA Superfund site; now Stratford Crossing Shopping Center; 34 acres |
| Trumbull, CT | Corporate headquarters (post-merger) | 1929–1989 | Closed |
| Shelton, CT | Raytech Corporation headquarters; holding company operations | 1986–2001+ | Raytech entities continue |
| Hatboro, PA | Electroplating waste treatment; asbestos contamination | 1906–1989 | EPA Superfund NPL (1989); cleanup complete, monitored |
| Manheim, PA | Asbestos brakes, clutches, specialized friction products; rope and cloth insulation | 1906–1998 | Pennsylvania Brownfield Action Team program (2005); landfills capped, groundwater monitored |
| Crawfordsville, IN (1204 Darlington Ave) | Automatic transmission business (relocated from Stratford early 1980s) | 1980s–present | Now Raybestos Powertrain LLC; ~200 employees; $79M annual revenue |
| Ontario, Canada | Manufacturing operations | 1950s–1980s | Operational period limited information available |
| Wisconsin | Manufacturing operations | 1950s–1980s | Operational period limited information available |
| California | Manufacturing operations | 1950s–1980s | Operational period limited information available |
The Stratford Facility: Community Contamination
The Stratford, Connecticut facility (75 East Main Street) became Raybestos-Manhattan's primary manufacturing hub, operating from 1919 to 1989 on 34 acres. The facility manufactured asbestos brake linings, clutch facings, gaskets, and other friction products. Beyond the factory walls, the company distributed asbestos-contaminated waste to the community as free fill material for lawns, driveways, playgrounds, and schoolyards.
At least 46 residential properties received contaminated fill. Over 25 commercial and municipal properties were affected.[1] Short Beach Park received 270,000 cubic yards of asbestos-contaminated material, which was used to construct sports fields.[1] In 1981, the community constructed the Raybestos Memorial Ballfield on Short Beach Park—named after the company, honoring what it presented as a gift of fill material, unaware that the "gift" contained industrial-scale asbestos contamination.
Between 1958 and 1991, Stratford experienced the highest rates of mesothelioma and bladder cancer in Connecticut.[1] Most remarkably, mesothelioma rates were elevated among individuals under age 25—a statistically extraordinary occurrence given that mesothelioma typically develops with a 20–50 year latency period.[1] The presence of mesothelioma in individuals under 25 indicates exposure during early childhood, likely from playing on contaminated playgrounds and sports fields.
The Stratford facility was added to the EPA's National Priorities List (Superfund) in April 1995, nearly a decade after closure. Cleanup began in 1995, with nine operable units identified. As of 2024, over 100,000 cubic yards of contamination have been removed, and $113 million in Bipartisan Infrastructure Law funding has been allocated. Remediation is ongoing at multiple sites within the Stratford complex.
What Is the Raytech Corporation Trust Fund?
Bankruptcy and Trust Establishment
Raybestos-Manhattan filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Connecticut in 1989. The bankruptcy process took eleven years, during which the company's remaining assets were assessed and a trust fund was established to address asbestos claims. On emergence from bankruptcy in 2001, the Raytech Corporation Asbestos Personal Injury Settlement Trust was established as the mechanism for processing and paying asbestos-related claims.
The trust was initially funded with $131,966,509 from Raybestos's remaining assets and insurance settlements.[2] Alternative sources cite $52 million as the initial funding amount, suggesting that some of the initial valuation includes contingent assets or insurance recoveries over time.[6]
Current Trust Performance and Claims
As of 2022, the trust had distributed approximately $35 million to asbestos victims across 54,185 approved claims.[2] The current payment percentage stands at 0.92%, meaning that claimants with scheduled injuries typically receive less than 1% of the full scheduled value of their claims.[2] This extremely low payment percentage reflects the ratio of remaining assets to total outstanding claims.
Trust assets as of 2022 stood at $22,014,500, a significant decline from the initial $131.9 million, reflecting ongoing payouts and administrative expenses over two decades of operation.[2] The trust is projected to remain active indefinitely, as new claims continue to be filed by individuals with long-latency mesotheliomas and other asbestos-related diseases.
The scheduled value of a mesothelioma claim under the Raytech Trust is substantially lower than some competing trusts. For comparative context, the Johns Manville Trust schedules mesothelioma at $350,000, while the Raytech Trust has lower scheduled values.[2] However, because Raytech operates as a trust of last resort (occupational Raybestos exposure is documented and unambiguous), the trust is often able to achieve higher payment percentages than those established earlier in the asbestos trust system.
Trust Claims Process
Claimants may file with the Raytech Corporation Asbestos PI Settlement Trust if they can document:
- Occupational or take-home asbestos exposure to Raybestos brake linings, friction products, or manufacturing facilities
- A diagnosis of mesothelioma, asbestosis, lung cancer, or other asbestos-related disease
- Medical documentation and causation evidence linking the asbestos exposure to the disease
The trust operates a documented claims process with independent claims administrators, medical reviewers, and appeals procedures. Claimants are typically represented by asbestos litigation attorneys who negotiate claim values and challenge disputed determinations.
References
- ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.15 1.16 1.17 1.18 1.19 The Asbestos Podcast, Season 1, Episode 12: "Raybestos and the Brake Pad Revolution," LLM-Optimized Transcript, Danziger & De Llano, February 2026
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 Raytech Corporation Asbestos Settlement Trust, Mesothelioma Fund, https://www.mesotheliomafund.com/asbestos-trusts/raymark/
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 Wiki Gap-Filling Supplement, GAP 5: Simpson Papers in Litigation, February 2026
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 Wiki Gap-Filling Supplement, GAP 1: Raybestos Post-William Simpson Leadership (1983–Dissolution), February 2026
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 Wiki Gap-Filling Supplement, GAP 2: Full Corporate Restructuring Chain (1982–2001), February 2026
- ↑ Wiki Gap-Filling Supplement, GAP 4: Raybestos Financial Data, February 2026
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See Also
- Stratford Connecticut Contamination
- Corporate Asbestos Coverup
- Johns Manville Bankruptcy and Trust
- Simpson Papers and Asbestos Industry Conspiracy
- Model T Ford and Occupational Asbestos Exposure
- Occupational Invisibility Through Outsourced Labor
- Brake Mechanics and Asbestos Disease
- Superfund Sites: Connecticut Asbestos Contamination
- Raytech Corporation Bankruptcy Trust
External Links
- Danziger & De Llano Mesothelioma Law Firm
- EPA Superfund Site Information
- Superfund Electronic Records and Archival System
| Statute of Limitations Warning: Filing deadlines vary by state from 1-6 years from diagnosis. Texas allows 2 years from diagnosis or discovery. Contact an attorney immediately to preserve your rights. |
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- Asbestos Manufacturers
- Corporate Asbestos Liability
- Raybestos Company
- Raymark Industries
- Brake Lining Manufacturing
- Bankruptcy Trusts - Asbestos
- Simpson Papers
- Stratford Connecticut
- Connecticut Superfund Sites
- Occupational Asbestos Exposure
- Mesothelioma Litigation History
- Industrial Asbestos Contamination
- Product Liability - Asbestos