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Corporate Asbestos Coverup

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Corporate Asbestos Coverup
Period of Concealment 1930s–1970s
Key Corporations Johns-Manville, Raybestos-Manhattan, Owens-Corning, W.R. Grace
Exposed 1977 (Simpson Papers)
Landmark Ruling Borel v. Fibreboard (1973)
Result 800,000+ asbestos-related deaths in the U.S.[1]
Trust Fund Legacy 60+ bankruptcy trusts, $30B+ paid[2]

Executive Summary

For more than four decades, beginning in the early 1930s, major asbestos corporations in the United States systematically concealed scientific evidence that asbestos dust caused fatal lung disease and cancer. Companies including Johns-Manville, Raybestos-Manhattan, and Owens-Corning funded research they controlled, censored studies that revealed health risks, and suppressed warnings that could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives. Internal documents — discovered during litigation in 1977 — revealed that industry executives knowingly chose to prioritize profits over worker safety. The corporate asbestos coverup is considered one of the most consequential public health scandals in American industrial history, leading to an explosion of litigation, dozens of corporate bankruptcies, and the creation of asbestos trust funds that have paid more than $30 billion to victims and their families.[2]

At a Glance

  • Asbestos industry executives possessed internal evidence of health hazards as early as the 1930s[3]
  • Insurance companies denied coverage to asbestos workers as early as 1918 due to known health risks[4]
  • Johns-Manville and Raybestos-Manhattan pressured a Metropolitan Life researcher to censor his 1935 study on asbestos disease[5]
  • Nine asbestos companies funded research at Saranac Laboratory, then ordered all references to cancer deleted from published results[6]
  • Sumner Simpson, president of Raybestos-Manhattan, wrote in 1935: "The less said about asbestos, the better off we are"[3]
  • The landmark 1973 Borel v. Fibreboard ruling established that asbestos manufacturers had a duty to warn workers[7]
  • Discovery of the Simpson Papers in 1977 triggered an avalanche of asbestos litigation — over 730,000 claimants by 2002[2]
  • More than 60 asbestos companies have filed for bankruptcy, establishing trust funds under Section 524(g) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code[2]

Key Facts

Year Event Significance
1918 U.S. insurance companies deny coverage to asbestos workers Earliest documented recognition of industry health risks[4]
1933 Johns-Manville settles first asbestos lawsuits with gag orders Establishes pattern of secret settlements to suppress public awareness[6]
1935 Lanza study censored before publication Critical finding that asbestosis alone could be fatal was deleted[5]
1947 Nine companies unanimously order cancer references deleted from Saranac research Direct suppression of evidence linking asbestos to cancer[6]
1964 Selikoff presents definitive asbestos-cancer link at New York Academy of Sciences Industry can no longer deny the science — but still fights regulation for years[8]
1973 Borel v. Fibreboard establishes duty to warn Opens the floodgates of asbestos product liability litigation[7]
1977 Simpson Papers discovered 6,000 pages of internal documents expose decades of concealment[3]
1982 Johns-Manville files for bankruptcy with 16,500 pending lawsuits Largest industrial bankruptcy in U.S. history at the time[9]

Historical Background: When Industry First Knew (1918–1935)

The asbestos industry's knowledge of health dangers long predated public awareness. In 1918, Frederick Hoffman — a medical statistician for Prudential Life Insurance Company — reported in a U.S. Department of Labor bulletin that American life insurance companies "generally deny coverage to asbestos workers because of the assumed health-injurious conditions of the industry."[4] This is the earliest documented evidence of the insurance industry applying exclusionary policies based on recognized asbestos health risks.

By the late 1920s, medical evidence was accumulating rapidly. In 1927, British researchers published three landmark papers in the British Medical Journal naming the disease "pulmonary asbestosis" for the first time.[10] The 1930 Merewether-Price Report from the British Factory Department found asbestosis in 66% of long-term UK textile workers — a devastating statistic that reached American manufacturers.[11]

In 1929, Johns-Manville and Raybestos-Manhattan hired Dr. Anthony Lanza of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company to survey their plants. By 1932, the survey had examined all 1,140 employees at the Johns-Manville facility in Manville, New Jersey, finding pneumoconiosis (asbestos-related lung scarring) in 29% of the entire workforce.[5] Among textile workers with 15 or more years of exposure, the rate reached 87%.[5]

The first American asbestos personal injury lawsuit, Pirskowski v. Johns-Manville, was settled in 1933 for $30,000 divided among 11 plaintiffs — with a gag order imposed on their attorney, Samuel Greenstone, barring him from bringing further cases.[6] This established the pattern the industry would follow for decades: settle quietly, silence the lawyers, and prevent public disclosure.

Key Suppression Events

The Censored Lanza Study (1934–1935)

When Dr. Lanza prepared his study for publication in the U.S. Public Health Reports in late 1934, Johns-Manville's general counsel Vandiver Brown reviewed the galley proofs and was alarmed. Brown shared the draft with outside counsel George S. Hobart, who wrote back identifying the legal reasoning behind the requested changes: "One of our principal defenses... has been that the scientific and medical knowledge has been insufficient until a very recent period to place upon the owners of plants or factories the burden or duty of taking special precautions."[12]

Brown then forwarded Hobart's marked-up version to Lanza with a carefully worded letter: "All we ask is that all of the favorable aspects of the survey be included and that none of the unfavorable be unintentionally pictured in darker tones than the circumstances justify."[13] The most consequential deletion was the sentence: "It is possible for uncomplicated asbestosis to result fatally" — a finding that established asbestosis alone, without tuberculosis, could kill.[5] Lanza accepted the edits without documented resistance. The censored version was published on January 4, 1935.[5]

That same year, when a plant physician at the Johns-Manville factory in Waukegan, Illinois proposed posting warning signs to inform employees that asbestos dust was hazardous, Lanza objected, writing: "It is difficult.... One of the difficulties and vexations... of pneumoconiosis is that economics as well as production factors, must be balanced against the medical factors."[14]

The Saranac Laboratory Cancer Suppression (1936–1947)

Beginning in 1936, Johns-Manville and eight other asbestos companies funded research at the Saranac Laboratory for Research on Tuberculosis in New York. The research contract gave the companies the right to approve or censor any published report.[6] Dr. LeRoy U. Gardner, the lead researcher, discovered significant changes in guinea pig lungs from asbestos exposure — including evidence linking asbestos to cancer. Gardner died in 1946 before formally reporting his findings.[6]

In January 1947, executives from the nine funding companies held a meeting and unanimously decided: "There would be no publication of the research of experiments without consent" and that published material "would not include any objectionable material... as, for example, any relation between asbestos and cancer."[6] References to cancer and tumors were ordered deleted from the Saranac reports.

The Simpson-Brown Correspondence (1935)

The most frequently quoted documents in asbestos litigation history are the letters exchanged between Sumner Simpson, president of Raybestos-Manhattan, and Vandiver Brown of Johns-Manville in October 1935. A.S. Rossiter, editor of Asbestos magazine, had written to Simpson: "You may see all that we have written to you on several occasions concerning the publishing of information, or discussion of, asbestosis. Always you have requested that for certain obvious reasons we publish nothing, and naturally, your wishes have been respected."[3]

Simpson replied on October 1, 1935: "The less said about asbestos, the better off we are."[3] Vandiver Brown responded two days later: "I quite agree with you that our interests are best served by having asbestosis receive the minimum of publicity."[3]

Continued Concealment (1948–1964)

The suppression continued into the postwar decades. In 1949, Dr. Kenneth Smith — later medical director of Johns-Manville — recommended against informing seven asbestos mill workers whose X-rays showed early asbestosis: "As long as the man is not disabled, it is felt that he should not be told of his condition so that he can live and work in peace, and the company can benefit by his many years of experience."[15]

In 1965, after Dr. Irving Selikoff's landmark research definitively established the asbestos-cancer link at a 1964 New York Academy of Sciences conference, internal industry documents show companies went to great lengths "to find some way of preventing Dr. Selikoff from creating problems and affecting sales."[16]

Major Corporate Actors

Johns-Manville

Johns-Manville Corporation was the world's largest asbestos manufacturer, producing approximately 1,300 products by the 1930s.[17] The company's founder, Henry Ward Johns, died in 1898 at approximately age 40 from "dust phthisis pneumonitis" — now believed to be asbestosis.[17] Under president Lewis Brown and general counsel Vandiver Brown (unrelated), Johns-Manville orchestrated the censorship of the Lanza study, the Saranac Laboratory suppression, and the systematic concealment of worker health data spanning four decades. Johns-Manville filed for bankruptcy in 1982 with 16,500 pending asbestos lawsuits — the largest industrial bankruptcy in American history at the time.[9] Its Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust has since paid more than $5 billion to over one million claimants.[18]

Raybestos-Manhattan

Under president Sumner Simpson, Raybestos-Manhattan coordinated suppression efforts with Johns-Manville and funded the Saranac Laboratory research with publication veto rights. Simpson's 1935 papers — approximately 6,000 pages of internal correspondence discovered in 1977 — became the single most important evidence cache in asbestos litigation history.[3]

Owens-Corning

Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation attempted to suppress Dr. Irving Selikoff's research after his 1964 presentation, and was named as defendant in Barnett v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., the 1978 case where the court found "a conscious effort by the industry in the 1930s to downplay, or arguably suppress, the dissemination of information to employees and the public."[19]

W.R. Grace

W.R. Grace operated a vermiculite mine in Libby, Montana, from 1963 to 1990 that was contaminated with tremolite asbestos. The company concealed the contamination from workers and the community for decades. By the time the EPA declared a public health emergency in 2009 — the first in the agency's history — hundreds of Libby residents had developed asbestos-related diseases, and the town's death toll continues to rise.[1][20]

Borel v. Fibreboard (1973)

The legal reckoning began in earnest with Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. in 1973, when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that asbestos manufacturers had a duty to warn workers of known health hazards.[7] Clarence Borel, an insulation worker who developed mesothelioma and asbestosis after decades of occupational exposure, won one of the first successful asbestos product liability cases. The ruling established strict product liability for failure to warn — opening the door to what became the largest mass tort litigation in American history.

The Simpson Papers and the Litigation Avalanche (1977–1982)

In 1977, attorney Karl Asch obtained a court order during Austin v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. to depose William Simpson — son of the late Sumner Simpson — who revealed a box of approximately 6,000 pages of his father's internal correspondence spanning 1933 to 1943.[3] These documents proved that the industry had actively concealed health risks for decades while publicly claiming ignorance.

Attorney Ron Motley used the newly discovered materials to secure a new trial in a 1978 asbestos case he had previously lost. The Simpson Papers transformed asbestos litigation from disputes about scientific causation to cases of corporate wrongdoing, providing the evidentiary foundation for punitive damages.[6] Ten punitive damage awards were made in 1981 and the first half of 1982 alone, averaging $600,000 per case.[6]

The Bankruptcy Wave

Facing an avalanche of lawsuits, Johns-Manville filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on August 26, 1982, despite being a solvent Fortune 500 company with $1.2 billion in net worth and $2.2 billion in total assets.[9][21] The Harvard Law Review described it as a "healthy and solvent corporation" seeking "refuge from potentially massive but speculative tort liability."[21]

The Manville bankruptcy created the template for asbestos trust funds under Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code. More than 60 asbestos companies have since followed this path, establishing trust funds that have collectively paid over $30 billion in compensation to victims.[2]

Modern Legacy

The consequences of the corporate asbestos coverup continue into the present day. Mesothelioma's latency period of 20 to 50 years means new diagnoses still occur from exposures that happened decades ago.[22] Approximately 3,000 Americans are diagnosed with mesothelioma each year.[23]

Asbestos trust funds continue to process claims and pay compensation, though at significantly reduced rates. The Manville Trust, for example, now pays 5.1% of scheduled values — meaning a mesothelioma claimant with a scheduled value of $350,000 receives approximately $17,850.[18] Victims may file claims with multiple trusts corresponding to multiple manufacturers whose products caused their exposure.

The regulatory framework that eventually emerged — including OSHA workplace standards, EPA regulations, and state-level bans — came decades after industry executives first knew of the dangers. The gap between corporate knowledge (1930s) and meaningful regulation (1970s) represents four decades of preventable exposure and death.

Frequently Asked Questions

When did asbestos companies first know their products were dangerous?

Internal corporate documents show that asbestos manufacturers possessed evidence of health hazards as early as the late 1920s and 1930s. By 1932, a Metropolitan Life survey of Johns-Manville workers found lung disease (pneumoconiosis) in 29% of the entire workforce.[5] Insurance companies had recognized the risks even earlier — by 1918, American life insurance companies were denying coverage to asbestos workers.[4]

How were the coverup documents discovered?

In 1977, during asbestos litigation in New Jersey (Austin v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.), attorney Karl Asch obtained a court order to depose William Simpson, whose late father Sumner Simpson had been president of Raybestos-Manhattan. Simpson revealed a box of approximately 6,000 pages of his father's internal correspondence from 1933 to 1943, including letters coordinating the suppression of health information with Johns-Manville executives.[3]

Can victims still file claims related to the corporate coverup?

Yes. Because mesothelioma has a latency period of 20 to 50 years, new cases continue to be diagnosed from past exposures.[22] Victims and their families may pursue compensation through asbestos bankruptcy trust fund claims, personal injury lawsuits against companies that did not file for bankruptcy, and veterans' benefits for those exposed during military service. More than 60 asbestos trust funds remain active and continue processing claims.[2]

References

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. "Protect Your Family from Exposures to Asbestos." epa.gov, 2024.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 RAND Institute for Civil Justice. Asbestos Litigation Costs and Compensation. RAND Corporation, 2005.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 Sumner Simpson Papers. Revealed during Austin v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. litigation, 1977. Approximately 6,000 pages of internal correspondence spanning 1933–1943.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Hoffman, Frederick. "Mortality from Respiratory Diseases in Dusty Trades." U.S. Department of Labor Bulletin No. 231, 1918.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 Lanza AJ, McConnell WJ, Fehnel JW. "Effects of the Inhalation of Asbestos Dust on the Lungs of Asbestos Workers." U.S. Public Health Reports 50(1):1–12, January 4, 1935.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos Industry on Trial. Pantheon Books, 1985.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
  8. ↑ Greenberg, Morris. "Biological Effects of Asbestos: New York Academy of Sciences 1964." American Journal of Industrial Medicine 43(5):543–552, 2003. PMID: 12704628.
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 9.2 In re Johns-Manville Corp., Nos. 82 B 11,656 to 82 B 11,676 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
  10. ↑ Cooke WE. "Pulmonary Asbestosis." British Medical Journal 2(3491):1024–1025, December 3, 1927.
  11. ↑ Merewether ERA, Price CW. Report on Effects of Asbestos Dust on the Lungs and Dust Suppression in the Asbestos Industry. His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1930.
  12. ↑ Letter from George S. Hobart to Vandiver Brown, approximately December 15, 1934. Revealed in Simpson Papers, 1977.
  13. ↑ Letter from Vandiver Brown to Dr. Anthony J. Lanza, December 1934. Revealed in Simpson Papers, 1977.
  14. ↑ Internal correspondence relayed through Johns-Manville corporate channels, 1933. Revealed in Simpson Papers, 1977.
  15. ↑ Dr. Kenneth Smith memorandum, 1949. Cited in Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos Industry on Trial. Pantheon Books, 1985; and asbestos litigation court records.
  16. ↑ Internal Owens-Corning Fiberglas memorandum, 1965. Cited in Confrontpower.org litigation document analysis.
  17. ↑ 17.0 17.1 "The Seven Ages of Johns-Manville." Fortune magazine, June 1931.
  18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust. Trust Distribution Process, 2026. Current pro rata payment: 5.1% of scheduled values.
  19. ↑ Barnett v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., S.C. Court of Common Pleas, Greenville County, August 23, 1978.
  20. ↑ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. "Libby Asbestos Superfund Site." epa.gov, 2024.
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 Note: The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Proceedings. Harvard Law Review 96(5):1121–1141, 1983.
  22. ↑ 22.0 22.1 Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. Toxicological Profile for Asbestos. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2001.
  23. ↑ National Cancer Institute SEER Program. "Cancer Stat Facts: Mesothelioma." seer.cancer.gov, 2024.
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