Johns Manville Corporate History
Johns-Manville Corporation: From "Mineral of a Thousand Uses" to America's Largest Asbestos Bankruptcy
Executive Summary
Johns-Manville Corporation evolved from a basement manufacturing operation in 1858 to become the world's largest asbestos products manufacturer, with approximately 1,300–1,400 products in its portfolio by 1931.[1] Founded by Henry Ward Johns in New York City and merged in 1901 with the Manville Covering Company of Milwaukee, the consolidated enterprise became known as Johns-Manville Corporation in 1926 and went public on the New York Stock Exchange in 1927. The company's dominance in asbestos products—including roofing, insulation, brake linings, pipe, textiles, and acoustical materials—made it an essential supplier to American manufacturing, construction, shipbuilding, and transportation industries throughout the twentieth century. Added to the Dow Jones Industrial Average on January 29, 1930, Johns-Manville remained a blue-chip equity for fifty-two years until its removal on August 30, 1982, coinciding with its bankruptcy filing. Despite accumulating scientific evidence of asbestos hazards from 1918 onward, the company's leadership systematically suppressed occupational health information, altered published research findings, coordinated with competing manufacturers to minimize public disclosure, and continued producing asbestos products with inadequate warnings until 1964. The landmark Borel v. Fibreboard (1973) decision establishing strict liability for asbestos manufacturers unleashed a litigation flood: from 159 claims in 1976 to 16,500 pending lawsuits by August 1982. The company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on August 26, 1982, as the largest U.S. company to use Chapter 11 at that time. The resulting bankruptcy reorganization created the Johns Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust in 1988—the model for all subsequent asbestos trusts under Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust has distributed approximately $5.26 billion to over 1 million claimants since its consummation in November 1988. The operating company emerged from bankruptcy as Manville Corporation (1988), was renamed Johns Manville in 1997, and was acquired by Berkshire Hathaway in 2001 for $1.96 billion. The trust and operating company remain separate legal entities, with all asbestos claims channeled to the trust via a permanent channeling injunction affirmed in courts through 2021.
Key Facts
| Key Facts: Johns-Manville Corporation History |
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How Did Henry Ward Johns Build America's Largest Asbestos Empire?
The Basement Beginning (1858)
Henry Ward Johns founded his manufacturing business at age twenty-one in the basement of a tenement building in New York City in 1858. Beginning with no machinery or equipment except his wife's clothes wringer and a household tea kettle, Johns developed a process for applying hot tar to cloth, creating roofing shingles.[1][2] His initial factory conditions were primitive—he moved from the basement tenement to a modest facility built on a filled-in swamp in Long Island City, New York, with a windowless office on William Street in lower Manhattan.
The company's operational model in its early years was deeply personal and flexible: when orders arrived, Johns would hire temporary workers; when orders dried up, he would release them. By the time the company was generating significant revenue, this proto-manufacturing system had evolved into a more formalized operation, but the scrappy entrepreneurship that characterized Johns's approach never entirely disappeared from the company culture.
Discovery of Asbestos Applications (1868–1898)
Over four decades of experimentation and market observation, Johns discovered that asbestos fibers could be combined with other materials to create products far superior to traditional roof coverings, insulators, and fireproofing materials. In 1868, he received his first asbestos product patent.[2] Johns devoted himself to exploring what the industry came to call "the mineral of a thousand uses"—asbestos applications in textiles, roofing materials, insulation, pipe coverings, acoustical products, and specialty industrial items.
Henry Ward Johns died in 1898 at approximately age forty from "dust phthisis pneumonitis," a medical term now understood to describe asbestosis.[1] His death preceded by fifty-eight years any public health acknowledgment that asbestos dust caused occupational disease. Whether Johns understood the connection between his asbestos work and his illness remains unknown; what is documented is that the founder of the world's largest asbestos company died of the very disease that his products would inflict on hundreds of thousands of workers over the next century.
The Manville Merger and Path to Market Leadership (1886–1926)
The path from Johns' single-operator business to corporate dominance passed through the Manville Covering Company, founded in 1886 by Charles B. Manville in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.[1] Manville began by mixing cement in the cellar of his home and carrying pails to neighbors to insulate their furnaces—a trade that required knowledge of insulation materials and sales skill to neighborhoods without pre-existing distribution networks. When the Manville Covering Company began selling asbestos insulation products manufactured by Johns's company, a natural commercial relationship developed.
On July 1, 1901, the two companies merged to create the H.W. Johns-Manville Company.[1] Thomas F. (T.F.) Manville, who had taken over operations from his father Charles B. Manville, became the driving force of the combined entity. Fortune magazine described his approach as "a lover-like, impassioned quest for profits."[1] The merger gave Johns's manufacturing capability access to Manville's sales distribution network, a complementarity that accelerated growth.
The company was renamed simply Johns-Manville Corporation in 1926, and on January 1, 1927, it became a public company on the New York Stock Exchange with sales reaching approximately $45 million and profits exceeding $3.3 million.[1] On January 29, 1930, Johns-Manville was added to the Dow Jones Industrial Average, replacing North American. Remaining a DJIA component for fifty-two years until its removal on August 30, 1982, Johns-Manville achieved the status of a pillar of American industrial capitalism.
Product Diversification and Vertical Integration (1920s–1960s)
By 1931, Johns-Manville manufactured approximately 1,300–1,400 products derived from asbestos, magnesia, asphalt, limestone, and diatomaceous earth.[1] The company operated quarries, mines, paper mills, textile mills, brick kilns, and chemical laboratories. Critical product categories included:
- Roofing materials: Asbestos shingles and roofing papers
- Insulation: Asbestos pipe insulation, furnace insulation, spray-applied insulation
- Brake linings: Asbestos-copper friction materials for vehicles and industrial machinery
- Pipe and building products: Asbestos-cement pipe (marketed under the brand name Transite, created in 1929), asbestos-cement board
- Textiles and cloth: Asbestos textiles, cloth, yarns for specialized applications
- Acoustical products: Sound-absorbing asbestos-containing tiles (Sanacoustic brand)
- Specialty products: Gaskets, packings, valve components, rope insulation
In 1928, Johns-Manville acquired the Celite Company of Lompoc, California, expanding into diatomaceous earth products for high-temperature industrial filtration and insulation. In 1929, the company acquired Banner Rock Products Company of Indiana, adding rock wool insulation. The 1958 acquisition of L-O-F Glass Fibers Company in Toledo, Ohio, propelled Johns-Manville into fiberglass insulation manufacturing—a strategic diversification away from asbestos-only products that would become increasingly important in the company's later evolution.
By securing ownership and long-term contracts for major asbestos mines in Quebec (including the Jeffrey Mine, the world's largest) and Arizona, Johns-Manville achieved vertical integration across the entire supply chain: raw fiber extraction, fiber processing, product manufacturing, and distribution. This control over supply ensured 50–75 years' worth of raw material availability and provided significant pricing power relative to competitors.
What Did Johns-Manville Know About Asbestos Dangers?
The Insurance Industry Exclusion (1918)
The first documented recognition of asbestos occupational hazards came not from the medical community or Johns-Manville itself, but from the American life insurance industry. In 1918, Frederick Hoffman, a medical statistician for the Prudential Insurance Company, reported in a U.S. Department of Labor Bulletin that American life insurance companies "generally deny coverage to asbestos workers because of the assumed health-injurious conditions of the industry."[3] This insurance exclusion represented the earliest systematic documentation that occupational asbestos exposure posed identifiable, measurable health risks.
By 1932–1933, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company had conducted occupational health surveys at Johns-Manville's manufacturing facility in Manville, New Jersey. The MetLife doctors discovered that approximately 29% of workers at one major Johns-Manville plant were suffering from asbestosis.[3] Despite this extraordinary disease prevalence, MetLife helped block government inspections at the facility, and Johns-Manville continued operating without implementing worker protection measures.
| "By 1933, it was clear to Johns-Manville and the insurance industry that asbestos exposure represented a severe occupational hazard. Rather than implement engineering controls or provide warnings, the company's response was to prevent government inspectors from documenting the problem. This was not lack of knowledge—it was deliberate concealment." — Paul Danziger, Partner, Danziger & De Llano |
The Simpson-Brown Correspondence (1935)
On October 1, 1935, Sumner Simpson, president of Raybestos-Manhattan Corporation, wrote to Vandiver Brown, an attorney and executive at Johns-Manville: "I think the less said about asbestos, the better off we are."[3] This seventeen-word sentence, preserved in documents that would be discovered four decades later, encapsulated the corporate strategy: explicit acknowledgment of asbestos hazards coupled with a deliberate decision to minimize public disclosure.
Vandiver Brown's response revealed that both men understood the ethical implications of their approach. Brown characterized Simpson's position as demonstrating an "ostrich-like attitude," language that implied disapproval yet did nothing to change Johns-Manville's conduct. The correspondence documented that by 1935, executives at the two largest American asbestos manufacturers had explicitly coordinated on information suppression.
The Lanza Study Alteration (1934–1935)
In 1934–1935, Johns-Manville and Raybestos-Manhattan engaged in collaborative research manipulation. Dr. Anthony Lanza, an occupational health researcher, had completed a study of asbestos workers' health. His original research conclusion stated: "It is possible for uncomplicated asbestosis to result fatally." Johns-Manville and Raybestos officials requested that Lanza alter his published findings to minimize the apparent hazard. The published version, which appeared in 1936 with corporate input, changed the conclusion to claim that asbestosis was "milder than silicosis."[3] The original scientific finding was replaced with a false characterization designed to reduce litigation risk and regulatory pressure.
This alteration represented not a difference of scientific opinion but deliberate falsification of research findings for liability protection. Lanza, who needed continued research funding from the companies, complied with the alteration request.
The Saranac Laboratory Suppression (1936–1947)
From 1936 to 1947, Johns-Manville and nine other asbestos manufacturers jointly funded research at Saranac Laboratory for Research on Tuberculosis (a prestigious research institution in upstate New York).[3] Dr. LeRoy U. Gardner conducted experiments on guinea pigs exposed to asbestos fiber and documented significant lung changes consistent with cancer development.
In January 1947, representatives of the nine funding companies met collectively and unanimously decided that "there would be no publication of the research of experiments without [the group's] consent" and that any publications "would not include any objectionable material… as, for example, any relation between asbestos and cancer." Specific instructions were given to delete all references to cancer and tumors from the Saranac Laboratory report prior to publication.[3] Dr. Gardner died in 1946 before formally reporting his cancer findings in a way that could resist corporate pressure. The report that was eventually published contained no reference to the cancer observations.
| "The Saranac Laboratory suppression represents industrial coordination to eliminate inconvenient scientific findings. When industry funding controls research publication, independent science becomes corporate communications. The deletion of cancer findings wasn't scientific disagreement—it was institutional censorship." — Rod De Llano, Founding Partner, Danziger & De Llano |
The Kenneth Smith Era (1948–1952): Hiding X-Rays
Dr. Kenneth Smith served as Johns-Manville's medical director and had direct access to occupational health data on the company's workers. In 1948–1949, Smith recommended that the company withhold X-ray results from seven workers who showed radiological signs of asbestos-related disease.[3] In 1951–1952, Smith recommended that Johns-Manville implement warning labels on its asbestos products to alert workers to respiratory hazards. The company's management rejected this recommendation, characterizing worker health warnings as a "business decision" rather than a medical necessity.
Dr. Smith's recommendations were documented in internal company memos that would later appear in litigation discovery. His presence on the company payroll and his role in documenting the company's knowledge of asbestos hazards created an internal contradiction: the company employed a physician who could have served as a whistleblower but who instead became part of the suppression apparatus.
The rejection of warning labels in 1951–1952—more than a decade before the 1964 placement of inadequate labels—represented a deliberate choice to allow workers to continue exposure without knowledge of hazards.
How Did Johns-Manville Respond to Scientific Proof of Asbestos Deaths?
Selikoff's Epidemiological Evidence (1963–1964)
In 1963, Dr. Irving J. Selikoff of Mount Sinai Medical Center reported to the American Medical Association landmark findings on the health effects of asbestos on insulation workers. Based on prospective cohort data, Selikoff estimated that approximately 100,000 American workers and their family members would die of asbestos-related diseases (primarily mesothelioma, lung cancer, and asbestosis) during the twentieth century.[3]
This was not tentative epidemiological suggestion—it was definitive population-level evidence of an emerging public health crisis. Selikoff's work established the dose-response relationship between asbestos exposure duration and disease risk, provided latency data (10–50 years between exposure and disease manifestation), and documented that family members of workers (through take-home asbestos dust on clothing) were also at substantial risk.
The Inadequate Warning Label Response (1964)
In 1964, for the first time in its 106-year history, Johns-Manville placed warning labels on its asbestos-containing products. The label text read: "Inhalation of asbestos in excessive quantities over long periods of time may be harmful."[3] This label represented a capitulation to Selikoff's scientific evidence combined with the threat of emerging litigation. However, the label was deliberately inadequate:
- Vague causative language: "may be harmful" rather than direct language about disease causation
- Quantitative qualifier: "excessive quantities" and "long periods" implied that casual or moderate exposure was safe—contrary to scientific evidence
- Passive construction: "inhalation of asbestos" rather than "breathing asbestos dust will cause disease"
- No specific disease mention: The label did not identify mesothelioma, lung cancer, or asbestosis by name
- Failure to specify occupations: The label did not identify which workers faced particular risk (insulation workers, brake mechanics, pipefitters, etc.)
- No take-home hazard warning: Family members were not warned that handling workers' clothing could create disease risk
Courts would later find this warning grossly inadequate. The company's own internal physicians (Kenneth Smith) had recommended more explicit warnings in 1951–1952, which management had rejected. Twelve years of additional knowledge accumulation (1952–1964) meant that by the time Johns-Manville placed its first warning label, the company knew far more about asbestos hazards than the label communicated.
Formation of the Asbestos Information Association (1970)
In October 1970, Johns-Manville's Environmental Health Task Force convened a meeting with representatives from Hill & Knowlton, a major public relations firm with a growing specialty in defending controversial industries against health claims. The purpose was explicit: to address the growing public attention to asbestos health effects and the threat of regulatory action or product bans.
From this meeting, the Asbestos Information Association (AIA) was born. Matthew Swetonic, a graduate of Columbia School of Journalism who had worked in Johns-Manville's PR department in the 1960s, became the AIA's first executive secretary. The AIA's ostensible purpose was to provide "accurate, unbiased information on asbestos and health." However, within months of its formation, the organization's actual function became clear: active defense of the asbestos industry and opposition to health-protective regulations.
Swetonic himself acknowledged the transformation: "the Association has had the wisdom to alter its original limited concept of its proper functions, and now endeavors to assume whatever activities and responsibilities it deems necessary to protect the interests of the asbestos manufacturing industry."[3] The AIA's activities included:
- Counteracting Dr. Selikoff's epidemiological findings with alternative interpretations
- Opposing warning labels and safety regulations
- Funding research designed to exonerate asbestos or identify "safe" levels of exposure
- Recruiting physicians to serve as expert witnesses in litigation defending manufacturers
- Promoting the theory that only crocidolite (blue asbestos) and amosite (brown asbestos) were dangerous, while chrysotile (white asbestos) was relatively safe—despite scientific evidence to the contrary
- Creating an international network of similar organizations (British Asbestos Information Committee, Asbestosis Research Council, and groups in France, Benelux, and Scandinavia)
The AIA operated openly as an industry trade group for two decades (1970–1990s), coordinating public messaging, scientific counter-arguments, and litigation strategy. Its very existence demonstrated that by 1970, Johns-Manville and other manufacturers were no longer in denial about asbestos hazards; they were engaged in active, coordinated denial and suppression.
What Landmark Legal Cases Brought Down Johns-Manville?
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation (1969–1973)
The litigation that fundamentally changed asbestos liability law began with a lawsuit filed on October 20, 1969, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas by attorney Ward Stephenson. Clarence Borel, an insulation worker who had been exposed to asbestos products throughout his career, sued for $1 million in damages. The defendants included Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation, Johns-Manville Products Corporation, and nine other asbestos-insulation manufacturers.
Borel died of diffuse malignant mesothelioma on June 3, 1970, and his widow, Thelma Borel, was substituted as plaintiff. The trial, presided over by Judge Joe Fisher, opened on September 21, 1971, in Beaumont, Texas. On September 29, 1971, a jury found the manufacturers strictly liable for Borel's mesothelioma—meaning the manufacturers could be held responsible for product injuries regardless of whether they had been "negligent" in the traditional sense.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the jury's verdict on September 10, 1973, in language that constituted what legal commentators described as a "scorching indictment of the defendants." The Borel decision established that manufacturers of asbestos-containing products could be held strictly liable for occupational diseases caused by inhalation of asbestos dust, even if the manufacturer had claimed lack of knowledge of hazards.
Remarkably, attorney Ward Stephenson, who had orchestrated the landmark litigation, died on September 7, 1973—three days before the Fifth Circuit's affirmation was published. He did not live to see the litigation triumph that would transform American asbestos law.
The Borel decision "opened the floodgates" of asbestos litigation. What had been scattered individual lawsuits before 1973 became a torrent of filings after the Borel affirmation. Johns-Manville's corporate officers suddenly faced the prospect that tens of thousands of workers and their families could successfully sue for asbestos-related diseases.
Claims Trajectory (1976–1982)
The acceleration of litigation after Borel was nearly exponential:
| Year | Claims/Pending Cases | Key Data |
|---|---|---|
| 1976 | 159 new case filings | JM estimated $16 million insurance coverage depleted within 2 years |
| 1977 | Accelerating filings | Travelers Insurance refused to renew JM's policy; forced self-insurance |
| 1978 | 792 new case filings | Average settlement cost ~$21,000 (plaintiff received ~$15,400) |
| 1979 | ~1,500 pending | McKinney spending 50% of CEO time on litigation; characterized as "almost a separate business" |
| Dec 31, 1981 | ~9,300 suits / ~12,800 individuals | Average settlement cost rising to ~$40,000/case |
| Aug 26, 1982 | ~16,500 pending claims | Consultants estimated 32,000+ additional cases over 20 years; projected total liability: $2 billion (2x company assets) |
Within six years of Borel's appellate affirmation (1973–1979), Johns-Manville faced a transformation from occasional asbestos-related lawsuits to a litigation crisis that consumed the CEO's time and threatened the company's financial viability. The company's estimates suggested that existing settlements plus projected future claims would exceed total corporate assets, forcing insolvency.
How Did Johns-Manville Bankruptcy Create the Asbestos Trust System?
The McKinney Decision and Board Authorization (August 1982)
John A. McKinney became president of Johns-Manville in September 1976 and was promoted to chairman and CEO in May 1977. He had been with the company since 1951, joining as a patent lawyer and rising through legal and business operations. By the late 1970s, McKinney faced a company in financial crisis: asbestos litigation expanding exponentially, insurance carriers withdrawing coverage, and financial projections suggesting bankruptcy was inevitable.
McKinney initially opposed the bankruptcy option. He pursued alternative strategies first: litigation against the U.S. government seeking indemnification for wartime shipyard worker exposure, congressional lobbying for legislative solutions, and attempted settlements within the tort system. However, by mid-1982, McKinney's financial advisors demonstrated that current litigation costs plus projected future claims would exceed the company's capacity to pay. The alternatives were exhausted.
On Wednesday, August 25, 1982, the board of directors of Johns-Manville held a special meeting. The board unanimously voted to authorize filing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. McKinney, having been "emotionally and completely opposed" to bankruptcy, finally acquiesced to the board's collective judgment. The bankruptcy petition was filed on August 26, 1982, in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (Case No. 82 B 11656).
At the time of the filing, Johns-Manville maintained approximately $1.2 billion in shareholders' equity, had 25,000 employees, and was operating profitably: first-through-third quarter 1982 earnings from continuing operations totaled $59 million. The company was not insolvent in the traditional sense; rather, its officers determined that the present value of future asbestos liability exceeded the company's capacity to pay while maintaining operations.
The Reorganization Process (1982–1988)
The bankruptcy reorganization took six years to complete. The initial reorganization plan, proposed on November 21, 1983, was unilateral—meaning the company presented it without agreement from the victims' representatives. That plan failed; negotiations with victims' counsel, insurance carriers, and other creditors continued.
On February 14, 1986, the final reorganization plan was filed. It included a critical innovation: the creation of two trusts to handle asbestos liabilities separately from the operating company. The personal injury trust (later called the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust) would receive approximately $2.5 billion in funding derived from:
- Cash transferred from the company
- Johns-Manville securities (stock and bonds)
- Insurance proceeds and settlements from JM's historical insurance carriers
- Commitments to future payments from the reorganized company
The plan was confirmed by the bankruptcy court in October 1988 and consummated on November 28, 1988. For the first time in American bankruptcy law, a mechanism existed to establish a dedicated fund for compensating asbestos victims while allowing the operating company to continue business operations.
Leon Silverman, a court-appointed attorney representing the interests of unknown future claimants (individuals not yet manifesting disease but who would later develop asbestos-related illness), played a crucial role in orchestrating the final reorganization plan. Silverman's role established a precedent: future asbestos trusts would include legal representation for claimants whose diseases had not yet surfaced—a recognition that mesothelioma's decades-long latency meant that the true scope of disease burden could not be known at the time of bankruptcy.
Section 524(g): Codifying the Manville Model (1994)
The success of the Manville reorganization established a template for managing asbestos bankruptcy cases. In 1994, Congress enacted Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, which formally codified the Manville approach as the framework for all future asbestos-related bankruptcies.
Section 524(g) established several key elements:
- Channeling injunction: All asbestos-related claims are channeled to the trust, preventing plaintiffs from suing the reorganized company directly
- Future Claims Representative (FCR): A court-appointed attorney represents the interests of unknown future claimants
- "Fair and equitable" standard: A court must determine that trust funding and claim procedures are fair to both present and future claimants
- Payment percentage system: Because the fund is typically insufficient to pay all claims in full, a pro rata percentage is determined
- Trust Duration: The trust continues for the life of claim filings, potentially extending decades
As of 2026, more than sixty asbestos trusts have been established under the Section 524(g) framework, managing over $30 billion in total assets and having distributed more than $20 billion to asbestos claimants. The Manville trust served as the prototype for all subsequent trusts.
| "Section 524(g) transformed asbestos liability from individual litigation into a structured compensation system. The Manville trust proved that you could remove 16,500 pending lawsuits from the courts and process them through a trust mechanism. That model now governs every major asbestos bankruptcy in America." — Rod De Llano, Founding Partner, Danziger & De Llano |
What Happened to Johns-Manville After Bankruptcy?
Emergence and Reorganization (1988–1997)
Johns-Manville emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy on November 28, 1988, as Manville Corporation—a new entity legally separate from the asbestos trust but still operating in the same businesses that had generated asbestos liabilities. The company maintained its manufacturing operations, diversified product lines (building materials, forest products, fiberglass insulation), and international presence. The trust received 80% of the emerging company's shares, though the trust was prohibited from voting these shares for the first four years of emergence (a restriction intended to preserve management continuity during the critical reorganization period).
Under CEO W. Thomas Stephens (1986–1996), a manager brought in from the Olinkraft subsidiary to guide the company through reorganization, Manville Corporation underwent extensive restructuring and cost reduction. The company exited the asbestos business entirely by 1985 (having sold its last asbestos manufacturing plant). Non-asbestos operations—fiberglass insulation, building materials, forest products—became the core business.
In 1992, the company took Riverwood International, its paper and packaging subsidiary, public. The financial benefit of this separation helped fund asbestos trust payments.
On January 1, 1996, the company changed its name from Manville Corporation to Schuller Corporation, adopting the name of its board chairman. This name change was intended to distance the company from its asbestos past. However, the market and customers did not recognize "Schuller" as a credible identity. By 1997, CEO Jerry Henry, observing that business contacts would ask him "what this Schuller company was," successfully lobbied to revert the name back to Johns Manville (without hyphen). The company's asbestos history was sufficiently distant that the original name could be reclaimed without triggering public relations damage.
The Berkshire Hathaway Acquisition (2000–2001)
By 1999, the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust held approximately 80% of Johns Manville's shares and sought to divest this position to fund ongoing claim payments. In 2000, financial buyers Hicks, Muse, Tate & Furst and Bear Stearns agreed to acquire Johns Manville for $2.4 billion. However, the deal collapsed in December 2000 due to an economic downturn and declining equity valuations.
In December 2000, Warren Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway offered $1.96 billion for Johns Manville. The offer was accepted, and the acquisition closed in 2001. Berkshire Hathaway became the parent company, and Johns Manville became a wholly owned subsidiary of one of America's largest diversified holding companies.
The Trust received the $1.96 billion in proceeds from the sale, which significantly strengthened the Trust's asset base and improved its capacity to fund claim payments. The channeling injunction—the legal mechanism directing all asbestos claims to the trust rather than the operating company—remained in effect after the Berkshire acquisition. A 2021 court decision reaffirmed that even claims arising from prepetition (pre-1982) asbestos exposure that manifested disease after the bankruptcy petition must be channeled to the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust.
Modern Johns Manville Operations (2001–Present)
Johns Manville today is a major global manufacturer of building and mechanical insulation, roofing materials, fiberglass products, and nonwoven materials. The company:
- Maintains headquarters in Denver, Colorado (moved from Madison Avenue, New York, in 1976)
- Generates annual sales exceeding $4.5 billion
- Employs approximately 8,000 workers worldwide
- Operates 44–46 manufacturing facilities in North America and Europe
- Markets products to aerospace, automotive, HVAC, filtration, waterproofing, and wind energy sectors
- Has manufactured zero asbestos-containing products since its exit from the asbestos business (1985 for manufacturing; prior for procurement)
Despite Johns Manville's modern success as a subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway, the company's legacy asbestos liabilities remain permanently separated: the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust is the sole entity responsible for compensating asbestos-exposed workers and their families.
Where Were Johns-Manville Products Manufactured?
Johns-Manville operated an extensive network of manufacturing, mining, and processing facilities across North America and internationally:
| Location | Products | Operational Period | Status / Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Long Island City, NY | Early roofing, insulation manufacturing | 1858–1920s | Original Johns facility; filled-in swamp foundation; historical landmark |
| New York City (William St) | Corporate office | 1858–early 1900s | Small windowless office in lower Manhattan |
| Manville, NJ | Asbestos textiles, insulation, multiple products | Early 1900s–? | Town named after company; MetLife found 29% asbestosis rate (1933); inspections blocked by company coordination |
| Waukegan, IL | Building supplies, asbestos-containing products | 1928–1998 | 350-acre plant; used asbestos until 1985; EPA Superfund NPL 1983; demolished 2000–2001; ~3 million cubic yards waste |
| Lompoc, CA | Diatomaceous earth (Celite) products | 1928–present | High-temperature insulation, filtering agents; acquired 1928 |
| Stockton, CA | Asbestos-cement pipe (Transite) | ?–1987 | Transite pipe production; ceased asbestos-cement 1987 |
| Denison, TX | Asbestos-cement pipe (Transite) | ?–1988 | Transite pipe production; ceased asbestos-cement 1988; shuttered 30 years; remediation began 2022 |
| Defiance, OH | Fiberglass products | 1958–present | Acquired with Glass Fibers Inc. (1958); 102-day strike 1977; still operating |
| Waterville, OH | Fiberglass products | 1958–present | Acquired with Glass Fibers Inc. (1958); still operating |
| Long Island City, NY | Historical facility | Early period | Original Johns facility on filled-in swamp |
| Quebec, Canada (Jeffrey Mine) | Asbestos mining | Early 1900s–1970s+ | World's largest asbestos mine; vertical integration control; subject of 1949 Asbestos Strike; Quebec threatened nationalization (1977) |
| Arizona | Asbestos mining | Various periods | Strategic mines securing 50–75 year supply of raw material |
| Denver, CO (Ken-Caryl Ranch) | Corporate headquarters | 1976–1990s | Moved from Madison Avenue, NYC; 15 miles from downtown Denver; later downsized |
| Denver, CO (current) | Global headquarters | Current | Executive offices; 8,000 total company employees |
The Waukegan, Illinois facility represents one of Johns-Manville's most significant environmental legacies. Operating from 1928 to 1998, the 350-acre plant manufactured building supplies and asbestos-containing products. The facility was added to the EPA's National Priorities List (Superfund) in 1983. Cleanup efforts have removed over 100,000 cubic yards of contamination and identified nine separate operable units. As of December 2025, the EPA issued an amended cleanup plan for one operable unit located within a nature preserve, indicating ongoing remediation complexity decades after the facility closure.
The Denison, Texas facility, which manufactured Transite asbestos-cement pipe, shut down in 1988 but remained shuttered and unremediated for approximately thirty years. In 2022, remediation efforts finally began, reflecting the prolonged environmental legacy of Johns-Manville's manufacturing operations.
Key Personnel in Johns-Manville History
| Name | Title/Position | Dates Active | Significance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Henry Ward Johns | Founder, H.W. Johns Mfg. Co. | 1858–1898 | Died of asbestosis at age ~40; discovered numerous asbestos applications; created "mineral of a thousand uses" concept |
| Charles B. Manville | Founder, Manville Covering Co. | 1886–1900 | Started insulation business in Milwaukee; created natural distribution partnership with Johns |
| Thomas F. (T.F.) Manville | President (1921–23); Chairman (1924–25) | 1901–1925 | United the two firms through aggressive sales expansion; died Oct 1925 at Plaza Hotel, NYC; estate valued $22.2 million |
| H.E. (Hiram Edward) Manville | President (1924–27); Chairman Exec Committee (1930–39) | 1924–1941 | Sold family control to J.P. Morgan & Co. (1927); last Manville family member in senior officers |
| T.F. Merseles | President | 1927–1929 | Brought from Montgomery Ward by J.P. Morgan; died suddenly, March 6, 1929 |
| Lewis H. Brown | President (1929–1948); Chairman (1946–1951) | 1927–1951 | Youngest-ever JM president (age 35); President of Asbestos Institute; suppressed health data; founder American Enterprise Institute; Medal for Merit (WWII) |
| Vandiver Brown | VP, Secretary, Chief Attorney | ~1930–1950 | Orchestrated Lanza study alteration; Simpson-Brown correspondence; key suppression architect; "ostrich-like attitude" response |
| Dr. Kenneth Smith | Medical Director | 1948–1950s | Recommended hiding X-ray results from workers; warning label recommendation rejected as "business decision" |
| Clinton Brown Burnett | President | 1960–1970 | Led diversification into fiberglass, gypsum; expanded overseas operations |
| W. Richard Goodwin | President | 1970–1976 | Management consultant; moved HQ to Denver; forced to resign by board (1976) |
| John A. McKinney | President (1976); Chairman & CEO (May 1977–1986) | 1951–1986 | Joined as patent lawyer (1951); filed bankruptcy petition (Aug 1982); 35-year JM veteran; initially opposed bankruptcy |
| Leon Silverman | Court-appointed Attorney, Future Claims Representative | 1980s | Represented unknown future asbestos claimants in bankruptcy reorganization; orchestrated final reorganization plan |
| W. Thomas Stephens | President & CEO | 1986–1996 | Led company emergence from bankruptcy; restructured operations; exited asbestos business entirely |
| Jerry Henry | CEO | 1996–2004 | Changed corporate name from Schuller back to Johns Manville (1997) |
Litigation Timeline
| Case/Event | Year | Significance | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| First asbestos disability claims | 1929 | Earliest known legal claims against JM | Settled out of court with secrecy orders |
| Settlement with 11 JM employees | 1933 | First documented group settlement | Settled on condition lawyer would not bring new actions |
| Lanza study alteration | 1934–1935 | Internal suppression of occupational health research | Vandiver Brown altered findings to minimize asbestos danger |
| Simpson-Brown correspondence | October 1, 1935 | Documentary evidence of corporate knowledge and coordination | "The less said about asbestos, the better off we are" |
| Saranac Laboratory suppression | 1936–1947 | Cancer findings suppressed by industry consortium | References to cancer/tumors ordered deleted from published report |
| Kenneth Smith recommendations | 1948–1952 | Company medical director documented hazard knowledge | X-ray hiding; warning label rejection as "business decision" |
| First warning labels on products | 1964 | Response to Selikoff's findings | Inadequate labels: "may be harmful" language |
| Simpson Papers discovery | 1977 | ~6,000 internal documents from Simpson safe | Found in Austin v. Johns-Manville; used in Raymark litigation |
| Borel v. Fibreboard | Fld 1969; Verdict 1971; Affirmed 1973 | Landmark strict liability decision | Fifth Circuit affirmed; JM defendant; opened floodgate of litigation |
| Travelers Insurance refuses renewal | 1977 | JM forced to self-insure | Marked escalation of financial crisis |
| AIA formation | 1970 | Industry trade group with Hill & Knowlton PR firm | JM-driven initiative to defend asbestos industry |
| Claims trajectory | 1976–1982 | Exponential growth in pending litigation | 159 (1976) → 16,500 (Aug 1982) |
| Borel decision effects | 1973+ | Floodgates opening; claims acceleration | Manufacturers held strictly liable regardless of negligence |
| Chapter 11 bankruptcy filed | August 26, 1982 | Largest U.S. company to file Chapter 11 at time | ~16,500 pending claims; board unanimously approved |
| Removed from DJIA | August 30, 1982 | Replaced by American Express | After 52+ years as DJIA component |
| Reorganization plan filed | November 21, 1983 | First unilateral proposal | Rejected; further negotiations required |
| Final reorganization plan | February 14, 1986 | Two trusts proposed | Leon Silverman's future claims representative role |
| Trust consummated | November 28, 1988 | First-ever asbestos bankruptcy trust | Model for all subsequent asbestos trusts |
| Section 524(g) enacted | 1994 | Codified Manville trust-injunction framework | Applied to all subsequent asbestos bankruptcies |
| Trust frozen (no payments) | July 1990 | Funding exhausted by claims acceleration | Court imposed freeze on distributions |
| Trust restructured (TDP) | January 19, 1995 | Pro rata payment system established | 10% initial payment percentage after freeze lifted |
| Berkshire Hathaway acquisition | 2001 | $1.96 billion purchase | Trust received sale proceeds; channeling injunction maintained |
| Manville channeling reaffirmed | 2021 | Prepetition exposure claims must go to Trust | SDNY upheld permanent channeling injunction |
See Also
- Johns Manville Trust
- Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust
- Asbestos History Timeline
- Borel v. Fibreboard Decision
- Simpson Papers and Corporate Suppression
- Section 524(g) Bankruptcy Trusts
- Saranac Laboratory Asbestos Research Suppression
- Selikoff Asbestos Epidemiology
- Asbestos Information Association
- Corporate Asbestos Coverup
- Occupational Exposure Index
- Asbestos Trust Funds
- Raybestos-Manhattan Corporation
- Waukegan Illinois Superfund Site
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 Fortune magazine, "The Seven Ages of Johns-Manville," June 1931
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Johns Manville Corporation, History and Heritage, https://jm.com/en/our-company/HistoryandHeritage/
- ↑ 3.00 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.04 3.05 3.06 3.07 3.08 3.09 Danziger & De Llano, "Johns-Manville Asbestos Exposure and Corporate Knowledge Timeline," https://dandell.com/asbestos-exposure/
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External Links
- Danziger & De Llano: Mesothelioma & Asbestos Claims
- Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust
- Johns Manville Corporation (Operating Company)
- EPA Superfund Program
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- Pages with reference errors
- Asbestos Companies
- Asbestos Manufacturers
- Johns-Manville Corporation
- Corporate History
- Asbestos Litigation
- Bankruptcy Trusts - Asbestos
- Section 524(g) Trusts
- Corporate Asbestos Coverup
- Occupational Exposure
- Industrial Asbestos Products
- Environmental Contamination
- Superfund Sites
- Asbestos Litigation History
- Product Liability
- Mesothelioma Litigation
- Johns Manville Trust
- Industrial History - United States