Episode 14: The Workers Nobody Counted

Full transcript from Asbestos: A Conspiracy 4,500 Years in the Making — a 52-episode documentary podcast produced by Danziger & De Llano, LLP.

Episode Information
Series	Asbestos: A Conspiracy 4,500 Years in the Making
Season	1
Episode	14
Title	The Workers Nobody Counted
Arc	Arc 3 — The Industrial Revolution (Episode 5 of 5, Arc Finale)
Produced by	Charles Fletcher
Listen	Apple Podcasts · Spotify · Amazon Music

Episode Summary

Episode 14 examines the systematic erasure of asbestos-caused worker deaths through the absence of documentation requirements. The episode opens with Quebec's 1919 annual mining report: 135,861 tons of asbestos extracted with meticulous precision; 8,930 workers employed; 12 fatal accidents documented; zero disease deaths recorded. This structural absence—the legal requirement to document accidents but not occupational illness—created institutional plausible deniability. The episode then traces the few names that penetrated the void: Dr. Murray's patient (age 33, one of nine claimed dead in 1899); Nellie Kershaw (age 12-33, first named British asbestos death, 1924); fifty unnamed workers in France's "Valley of Death" (Auribault, 1906). Against meager documented deaths (fewer than ten named victims before 1920), the episode contrasts Britain's coal mining industry, which documented 164,000+ individual deaths using identical workplace mortality rates to asbestos mining (1.67 per thousand workers). The episode emphasizes that this was not accidental but designed: someone deliberately chose not to implement health tracking equivalent to accident tracking. The episode then shifts to the knowledge asymmetry: Frederick Hoffman's 1918 insurance memo documented that American and Canadian insurers were already declining asbestos worker coverage based on private mortality data, while workers remained uninformed. The 1929 Metropolitan Life-Johns-Manville study found 87% asbestosis rates in 15+ year workers; Johns-Manville edited the study and deleted the sentence "It is possible for uncomplicated asbestosis to result fatally" before publication. Dr. Lanza refused to recommend warning signs in 1933, citing "the legal situation." Corporate memos from Raybestos-Manhattan articulated the silencing strategy: "The less said about asbestos, the better off we are." The episode concludes by noting Lucy Deane's 1898 warning about asbestos fibers' "sharp glass-like jagged nature" and the 33-year gap until the first UK regulations in 1931—decades during which estimated 1,000-3,500 workers died, roughly 100-350 times more deaths than appeared in official records.

Full Episode Transcript

COLD OPEN

HOST 1: Nineteen nineteen. Quebec Bureau of Mines publishes its annual report. Page after page of numbers.

HOST 2: What kind of numbers?

HOST 1: Precise ones. One hundred thirty-five thousand, eight hundred sixty-one tons of asbestos shipped. Recovery rate: one hundred point eight pounds of fiber per ton of rock. They measured that to the tenth of a pound.

HOST 2: That's meticulous.

HOST 1: Total employment: eight thousand, nine hundred thirty workers. Man-years worked: seven thousand, one hundred sixty-one. Wages paid: seven million, three hundred thirty-eight thousand dollars. Twelve fatal accidents. Each one documented with a name, an age, a cause of death.

HOST 2: Each one.

HOST 1: Joseph St-Pierre. Mat Czek. Alphonse Leclerc. Real names. Real people. Real paperwork. Now guess how many deaths from lung disease they recorded.

HOST 2: How many?

HOST 1: Zero.

HOST 2: Zero.

HOST 1: A hundred thirty-five thousand tons of asbestos. Eight thousand nine hundred workers. Seven thousand man-years of labor. And not a single person tracked for what breathing it did to their lungs.

HOST 2: But workers were dying.

HOST 1: Of course workers were dying. They'd been dying for decades. But nobody's job was to write it down. The conspiracy doesn't start with what they knew. It starts with who they didn't bother to count. This is Episode 14. The Workers Nobody Counted.

COLD OPEN SPONSORSHIP

HOST 2: Asbestos: A Conspiracy 4,500 Years in the Making is brought to you by Danziger & De Llano, a nationwide mesothelioma law firm with over thirty years of experience and nearly two billion dollars recovered for asbestos victims. If you or someone you love has been diagnosed with mesothelioma, they offer free consultations and only get paid if you win. Visit Dan Dell dot com, that's D-A-N-D-E-L-L dot com.

SEGMENT 1: THE LEGAL ARCHITECTURE OF INVISIBILITY

HOST 1: So here's the thing that kept me up last night. Quebec's Article 2163 required mining companies to report fatal accidents with full documentation. They were legally obligated to record names.

HOST 2: But not illness.

HOST 1: Not illness. Crushed by rock? Documented. Fell down a shaft? Documented. Lungs slowly destroyed by breathing the product you were mining? Not their problem.

HOST 2: So who was supposed to track that?

HOST 1: Nobody. That's the point. There was no system. No requirement. No mechanism. And this wasn't accidental—it was structural. The absence of data was built into how the industry operated from day one.

HOST 2: Convenient.

HOST 1: Very convenient. Because here's what that absence bought them: plausible deniability. No records means no pattern. No pattern means no proof. No proof means no liability.

KEY CONCEPT - THE STRUCTURAL VOID:

Definition: Built-in absence of data collection systems that creates legal plausibility of ignorance
Origin: Quebec Article 2163 required accident reporting but had no requirement for occupational disease tracking
Mechanism: Mining companies could simultaneously be meticulous about accident documentation while ignoring illness surveillance
Legal consequence: Absence of records becomes defense against liability claims
Distinction: Not concealment of existing records, but architecture that prevents records from being created
Implementation: Applied across asbestos industry globally; became industry standard
Effect: Transformed institutional neglect into apparent legal compliance

KEY FACTS - QUEBEC 1919 PRODUCTION DATA:

Location: Quebec, Canada
Year: 1919
Asbestos shipped: 135,861 tons
Recovery rate precision: 100.8 pounds per ton (measured to tenth of a pound)
Total workers employed: 8,930
Man-years of labor: 7,161
Total wages paid: $7,338,000
Fatal accidents documented: 12
Deaths from lung disease recorded: 0
Legal documentation requirement: Quebec Article 2163 (fatal accidents only)
Health surveillance requirement: None

NAMED ENTITY - QUEBEC BUREAU OF MINES:

Official name: Quebec Bureau of Mines
Location: Quebec, Canada
Function: Government agency responsible for mining industry records and reporting
Publication: Annual Reports (standardized documentation)
Year referenced: 1919
Report contents: Production statistics, employment figures, wages, accident records
Documentary precision: Measurements to tenth of pound; names of deceased workers; accident details
Health surveillance mandate: None documented
Legacy significance: Exemplified precision in physical production metrics while maintaining total absence of health tracking

NAMED ENTITY - QUEBEC ARTICLE 2163:

Type: Legal statute
Jurisdiction: Quebec, Canada
Subject matter: Mining industry accident reporting
Requirement: Documentation of fatal accidents
Documentation mandate: Names, ages, causes of death
Health surveillance scope: Excluded occupational disease and long-term illness
Enforcement: Reported to regulatory authority
Historical significance: Established legal precedent that tracking workplace death could be mandatory while tracking workplace illness could be voluntary

SEGMENT 2: THE COBBING ROOM GIRLS AND PROMOTIONAL PHOTOGRAPHY

HOST 1: You mentioned photographs earlier. In the research.

HOST 2: The cobbing room girls. This is fascinating in the worst possible way. The Bureau of Mines took promotional photographs—bright, healthy-looking French-Canadian women wearing floral patterns, swinging hammers to break apart asbestos rock.

HOST 2: Promotional.

HOST 1: For brochures. For investors. For customers. Here are the happy workers in our modern, efficient operation. Look how clean everything is. Look how cheerful they seem.

HOST 2: And medically tracked?

HOST 1: Never. Not once. Photographed for marketing materials. Invisible for health surveillance. The same company that measured recovery rates to the tenth of a pound couldn't be bothered to check if the cobbing room girls could still breathe five years later.

HOST 2: They tracked the rocks but not the people breathing the dust from those rocks.

HOST 1: They knew how much asbestos was in every ton of ore. They had no idea how much asbestos was in every pair of lungs.

KEY CONCEPT - SELECTIVE VISIBILITY:

Definition: Strategic documentation of favorable metrics while maintaining systematic invisibility of unfavorable ones
Application: Photographed worker productivity and facility conditions; ignored worker health status
Purpose: Marketing advantage (investor confidence) without liability consequence (no health records)
Mechanism: Photography for external consumption; health invisibility maintained internally
Visual strategy: Women in floral patterns implied innocence, femininity, safety—visual counter-narrative to occupational hazard
Occupational context: "Cobbing room" work involved striking asbestos-bearing rock with hammers; dust-intensive labor
Historical irony: Same precision used to measure ore quality applied zero resources to measuring biological impact

NAMED ENTITY - QUEBEC ASBESTOS MINING COBBING ROOMS:

Function: Industrial processing facility where raw asbestos ore was broken into usable fiber
Labor force: Primarily women (described as "cobbing room girls")
Demographics: French-Canadian workers
Work process: Manual striking of ore with hammers to separate asbestos fiber
Dust exposure: Extreme (ore striking generated abundant particulate)
Work attire: Floral pattern clothing (as documented in promotional photographs)
Marketing use: Bureau of Mines used photographs for promotional/investor materials
Health surveillance: None documented

SEGMENT 3: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON - THE COAL MINING CONTRAST

HOST 1: Coal mining. Britain. 1850. The Coal Mines Inspection Act passes Parliament. Mandatory death reporting. Seventy years before asbestos had any health regulations at all.

HOST 2: Seventy years.

HOST 1: And it wasn't just the law. It was the infrastructure. Britain built an entire system for tracking coal mining deaths. Inspectors. Reports. A centralized database. By 1920, they had documented over 164,000 individual mining accidents.

HOST 2: With names?

HOST 1: With names. With dates. With causes of death. With the mine where it happened. A hundred sixty-four thousand, three hundred fifty-six records. Each one a person.

HOST 2: And asbestos had...

HOST 1: Zero disease deaths on record. Despite identical workplace mortality rates.

HOST 2: Wait. Identical?

HOST 1: The fatal accident rate in Quebec asbestos mines in 1919? 1.67 deaths per thousand workers per year. The fatal accident rate in British coal mines at the same time? 1.67 deaths per thousand workers.

HOST 2: The exact same rate.

HOST 1: The exact same rate. Both industries were equally dangerous for accidents. Both industries had the same risk of crushing deaths and falls. But coal miners who got sick from breathing coal dust? Counted. Asbestos workers who got sick from breathing asbestos dust? Didn't exist. Statistically speaking.

HOST 2: Coal got 164,000 names.

HOST 1: Asbestos got a void.

HOST 2: That's not ignorance. That's not "different standards."

HOST 1: That's architecture. Someone designed it this way. Someone looked at what coal was doing and decided: we're not going to do that.

KEY FACTS - COMPARATIVE WORKPLACE MORTALITY:

Quebec asbestos mines (1919): 1.67 deaths per thousand workers per year (fatal accidents only)
British coal mines (1920): 1.67 deaths per thousand workers per year (both accidents and disease)
Rate equality: Accident mortality identical across industries
Documentation difference: Coal industry tracked both accidents and disease; asbestos industry tracked accidents only
British coal mining records: 164,000+ documented individual mining accidents by 1920
Asbestos disease deaths recorded: 0 (despite comparable workforce and hazard duration)
Time gap: Coal Mines Inspection Act (Britain, 1850) preceded asbestos health regulations by 70+ years
Regulatory structure: Coal mining had mandatory inspectors, centralized database, standardized reporting; asbestos had no equivalent

TIMELINE - INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR WORKPLACE DEATH TRACKING:

| Year | Location | Industry | Legislative Action | Documentation System | Coverage | |------|----------|----------|-------------------|----------------------|----------| | 1850 | Britain | Coal mining | Coal Mines Inspection Act passes Parliament | Mandatory death reporting; inspectors appointed | Accidents AND disease | | 1919 | Quebec | Asbestos mining | Quebec Article 2163 in effect | Accident reporting only | Accidents only | | 1920 | Britain | Coal mining | System mature | 164,000+ records accumulated | 70 years of data | | 1920 | Quebec | Asbestos mining | System mature | Accident records only; health data absent | 40+ years of production; zero disease records |

NAMED ENTITY - COAL MINES INSPECTION ACT (BRITAIN, 1850):

Legislative body: British Parliament
Year enacted: 1850
Subject: Coal mining safety and worker mortality
Key mandate: Mandatory death reporting
Enforcement mechanism: Government inspectors
Documentation requirement: Centralized database of individual accidents
Coverage scope: Fatal accidents (injuries) and occupational disease
Time period tracked (by 1920): 70 years of systematic records
Total documented deaths: 164,000+ individual records
Impact: Established precedent for mandatory occupational mortality tracking

NAMED ENTITY - BRITISH COAL MINING DEATH RECORDS (BY 1920):

Total documented records: 164,000+ individual mining accidents/deaths
Specificity: Names, dates, causes of death, location (mine name)
Time span: 70 years (1850-1920)
Geographic coverage: British coal mining industry
Methodology: Government inspector reports; centralized database
Record precision: Individual-level data for each documented fatality
Comparison point: Asbestos industry's 0 disease death records despite comparable workplace conditions and mortality rates

SEGMENT 4: THE MISSING NINE - DR. H. MONTAGUE MURRAY'S PATIENT

HOST 1: So we have this massive documentary black hole. Decades of industrial asbestos production. Thousands of workers. And almost no health records. But there are a few names that slipped through. And they're the exceptions that prove the rule.

HOST 2: Give me one.

HOST 1: 1899. A young man—thirty-three years old—shows up for a post-mortem examination by Dr. H. Montague Murray at Charing Cross Hospital in London. He's dying. His lungs are destroyed. And he works in an asbestos textile factory.

HOST 2: First documented case?

HOST 1: First documented British case. And here's what he told Dr. Murray during the examination: he was the only survivor of ten workers in his carding room.

HOST 2: Wait. Nine of his coworkers were already dead?

HOST 1: That's what he claimed. Nine people he worked with. All dead. And Dr. Murray's response—this is in the parliamentary testimony from 1906—"I have no evidence except his word for that."

HOST 2: No evidence.

HOST 1: Nobody investigated. Nobody went to the factory. Nobody checked employment records. Nobody knocked on doors. Nobody asked: where are the other nine? A man tells a doctor—while dying—that nine people he worked with are already dead from the same thing killing him. And the response is essentially... we'll just have to take your word for it.

HOST 2: "I have no evidence except his word."

HOST 1: That sentence is the whole episode. A hundred thirty-five thousand tons measured to the tenth of a pound. Nine dead workers? We only have his word.

HOST 2: Did anyone ever find them? The missing nine?

HOST 1: Still missing. Over a century later. The records were never created. Or never kept. Or destroyed. We don't know which. What we know is: nothing was done. No one went looking.

HOST 2: That's convenient.

KEY FACTS - DR. MURRAY'S PATIENT AND THE MISSING NINE:

Patient age: 33 years old
Patient status: Dying; post-mortem examination ongoing
Examination location: Charing Cross Hospital, London
Examining physician: Dr. H. Montague Murray
Year: 1899 (examination) / 1906 (parliamentary testimony)
Occupational setting: Asbestos textile factory
Work type: Carding room labor
Workers in carding room: 10 total
Deaths claimed by patient: 9 of 10 coworkers already dead
Patient survival status: Only survivor of his carding room cohort
Cause of death (patient): Same disease as deceased coworkers (asbestos-related lung disease)
Murray's investigative response: Zero investigation; no factory visit; no employment record check; no follow-up with coworkers' families
Murray's testimony language: "I have no evidence except his word for that"
Historical status: Names of nine deceased workers never documented; identities lost; records never created or preserved
Time since: Over 120 years; still unidentified

NAMED ENTITY - DR. H. MONTAGUE MURRAY:

Title: Doctor / Physician
Specialty: Pathology (post-mortem examination)
Institutional affiliation: Charing Cross Hospital, London
Time period: Late 1890s-1906
Notable case: Examined dying asbestos textile factory worker (age 33) in 1899
Patient's claim: Nine of ten carding room coworkers already dead from asbestos exposure
Murray's testimony: Submitted to Parliament in 1906
Investigative action: Declined to investigate missing nine workers; accepted patient's verbal account without verification
Evidentiary stance: Acknowledged lack of independent confirmation ("I have no evidence except his word")
Historical significance: One of first documented British cases of asbestos disease; patient's account of multiple deaths established pattern of cluster deaths in single workplace

TIMELINE - THE MISSING NINE CASE (1899-1906+):

| Date | Event | Details | Documentation | |------|-------|---------|-----------------| | 1899 | Patient examination | 33-year-old asbestos textile worker examined by Dr. Murray; claims 9 coworkers dead | Verbal testimony only | | 1899 | Missing nine status | Nine workers reportedly deceased from same disease | No records created; no investigation initiated | | c.1899-1906 | Investigation period | No factory visits; no employment records checked; no door-to-door inquiry; no follow-up | None documented | | 1906 | Parliamentary testimony | Dr. Murray provides testimony about case; states "I have no evidence except his word" | Official parliamentary record | | Post-1906 | Historical status | Names of nine workers remain unknown; identities never established; records never located | No archival record | | 2026 | Present day | 120+ years later; workers still unidentified; case unsolved | Still classified as missing evidence |

KEY CONCEPT - THE INVESTIGATIVE FAILURE:

Definition: Failure to pursue credible eyewitness account of occupational cluster deaths
Trigger: Dying worker claims nine colleagues dead from occupational exposure
Standard procedure (absent): Factory inspection; employment record review; mortality verification; interview of relatives; epidemiological followup
Actual response: Acceptance of account as unverified anecdote; no investigation; no documentation
Justification: Lack of "independent evidence" (despite having eyewitness on deathbed)
Consequence: Nine deaths disappeared from historical record; names lost; cluster unconfirmed
Pattern: Replicated throughout asbestos industry; failure to investigate cluster deaths became institutional norm

SEGMENT 5: NELLIE KERSHAW - THE FIRST NAMED ASBESTOS DEATH

HOST 1: Then there's Nellie Kershaw.

HOST 2: I've heard that name.

HOST 1: You should have. She's the first named asbestos death in Britain. Official. Documented. Inquest and everything. Started work at Turner Brothers in Rochdale at age twelve.

HOST 2: Twelve years old.

HOST 1: 1891. Twelve years old. Working in a textile mill carding asbestos fibers. Do you know what carding involves?

HOST 2: Tell me.

HOST 1: You take raw asbestos fiber and you brush it. You comb it. You separate it. By hand. In a room full of other people doing the same thing. The air is thick with fiber. You breathe it in all day, every day, for years.

HOST 2: And she did this for...

HOST 1: Over two decades. And by her early thirties, she couldn't breathe. Couldn't work. Applied for compensation from Turner Brothers—the company she'd given her lungs to since she was a child.

HOST 2: What did they say?

HOST 1: The company's official response—and I'm quoting directly from the legal record—"We repudiate the term 'Asbestos Poisoning.' Asbestos is not poisonous."

HOST 2: While she was dying.

HOST 1: While she was dying. She couldn't afford a doctor. She couldn't afford food. She was trying to get money from the company that had employed her since childhood, and their legal position was: the thing destroying your lungs doesn't exist.

HOST 2: "Asbestos is not poisonous."

HOST 1: She died March 14, 1924. Age thirty-three. Same age as Dr. Murray's patient twenty-five years earlier. The coroner ruled it asbestosis—first time that word appeared in an official British death record. Turner Brothers never paid a single penny. Her grave went unmarked.

HOST 2: They knew it was killing her. They called it not poisonous. And then they didn't even mark her grave.

NAMED ENTITY - NELLIE KERSHAW:

Birth: Approximately 1891
Death: March 14, 1924 (age 33)
Occupation: Textile worker; asbestos fiber carding
Employer: Turner Brothers Asbestos, Rochdale
Employment start: Age 12 (1891)
Years of exposure: Approximately 33 years (1891-1924)
Work location: Rochdale, Lancashire, England
Work description: Carding asbestos fibers; manual brushing, combing, separation
Health decline: Could not breathe; could not work (early 1920s)
Compensation claim: Applied to Turner Brothers Asbestos for disability/compensation
Company response: Formal legal denial; "We repudiate the term 'Asbestos Poisoning.' Asbestos is not poisonous."
Cause of death: Fibrosis of the lungs due to inhalation of mineral particles (death certificate language)
Death declaration: Coroner ruled asbestosis; first time term appeared in official British death record
Company settlement: Zero compensation paid
Grave: Unmarked
Historical significance: First named asbestos death in Britain; established both medical and legal documentation of asbestos-caused death; triggered company's "repudiate" strategy
Referenced in: Episode 14 and Episode 16 ("The Doctors Who Knew")
Featured in: Landmark coroner's inquest and subsequent medical publications (Dr. William Edmund Cooke)

KEY FACTS - NELLIE KERSHAW'S EMPLOYMENT AND EXPOSURE:

Employment dates: 1891-early 1920s (approximately 33 years)
Starting age: 12 years old
Child labor context: In 1891 England, legal minimum working age was approximately 10-12 for textile work
Work process: Manual asbestos fiber carding
Carding process details: Brush, comb, separate raw asbestos fiber by hand
Workplace condition: Room full of workers performing identical tasks; air thick with fiber
Daily exposure: Continuous inhalation of asbestos fiber throughout working hours
Exposure duration: Over two decades of continuous exposure
Health impact timeline: Lung function decline by early 1930s (roughly 30+ years post-exposure-start)
Symptom severity: Could not breathe; unable to continue work
Financial desperation: Could not afford medical care; could not afford food; dependent on worker compensation

NAMED ENTITY - TURNER BROTHERS ASBESTOS:

Location: Rochdale, Lancashire, England
Industry: Asbestos textile fiber processing
Workers: Employed asbestos fiber carding workers (mixed gender; significant female workforce)
Employment practices: Child labor (employing workers age 12+); long-duration contracts
Notable employee: Nellie Kershaw (1891-1924)
Compensation policy: Formal denial of asbestos disease causation; "We repudiate the term 'Asbestos Poisoning'"
Legal strategy: Company position that asbestos causation does not exist; therefore no liability
Response to death: Paid zero compensation to Kershaw or her family; dispute continued through inquest
Inquest representation: Legal team sent to contest diagnosis and evade liability
Historical significance: First company to face formal coroner's inquest for asbestos-caused death; established template for industry denial strategy

TIMELINE - NELLIE KERSHAW'S LIFE AND DEATH (1891-1924):

| Date | Event | Details | |------|-------|---------| | c.1891 | Birth | Nellie Kershaw born (age ~12 in 1891) | | 1891 | Employment begins | Starts work at Turner Brothers Asbestos, Rochdale, age 12 | | 1891-1920s | Continuous exposure | Over 33 years of asbestos fiber inhalation during carding work | | Early 1920s | Health decline | Develops breathing difficulty; cannot continue work | | 1922 | Medical evaluation | Diagnosed by local physician (Dr. Walter Scott Joss) with "asbestos poisoning"; advised to leave employment | | 1922 | Compensation claim | Applies for worker compensation to Turner Brothers Asbestos | | 1922-1924 | Claim dispute | Company denies causation; legal position: "Asbestos is not poisonous" | | 1924 | Final illness | Unable to afford medical care or food during terminal decline | | March 14, 1924 | Death | Dies at age 33 | | April 2, 1924 | Death certificate | Cause listed as "Fibrosis of the lungs due to the inhalation of mineral particles" | | 1924 | Coroner's inquest | Official inquest held; coroner rules asbestosis; first time term appears in official British death record | | 1924 | Company settlement | Turner Brothers Asbestos pays zero compensation | | Post-1924 | Burial | Grave left unmarked | | 1924+ | Medical publications | Case becomes subject of Dr. William Edmund Cooke's pathological studies and BMJ publications |

SEGMENT 6: THE FRENCH UNNAMED FIFTY - AURIBAULT'S REPORT

HOST 1: Then there's France. 1906. Denis Auribault, a factory inspector in Condé-sur-Noireau, files a report on a local asbestos textile plant. He documents fifty deaths.

HOST 2: Fifty.

HOST 1: Fifty workers. Dead. The locals had a name for the factory: the Valley of Death. "Vallée de la Mort." And you want to know how many of those fifty workers are named in the official record?

HOST 2: Zero.

HOST 1: Zero. Fifty anonymous corpses. The factory got a grim nickname that survives to this day. The workers got nothing. Not even their names.

HOST 2: So we have—what? Dr. Murray's patient. Nellie Kershaw. And fifty unnamed people in France.

HOST 1: That's basically it. Before 1920, fewer than ten named asbestos victims in the entire historical record. Worldwide. Four decades of industrial production. And we have fewer names than fingers on two hands.

HOST 2: And the actual deaths?

HOST 1: Conservative estimates—based on retrospective epidemiological modeling—somewhere between one thousand and thirty-five hundred workers died from asbestos exposure between 1880 and 1920.

HOST 2: For every one counted...

HOST 1: A hundred to three hundred fifty went uncounted. That ratio is the conspiracy.

NAMED ENTITY - DENIS AURIBAULT:

Title: Factory inspector
Location: Condé-sur-Noireau, France
Role: Government inspection of industrial facilities; occupational health documentation
Year of report: 1906
Subject of inspection: Local asbestos textile plant
Finding: 50 documented worker deaths
Documentation method: Factory inspection records; mortality documentation
Publication: Filed report (official government record)
Worker identification: None (workers documented as group; no names recorded)
Local knowledge: Factory earned nickname "Vallée de la Mort" (Valley of Death) among local residents
Regulatory response: Unknown (report filed; no documented regulatory action)
Historical significance: One of few documented evidence of worker death cluster; early factory inspection report on asbestos hazard; established pattern of group deaths without individual identification

NAMED ENTITY - ASBESTOS TEXTILE PLANT, CONDÉ-SUR-NOIREAU, FRANCE:

Location: Condé-sur-Noireau, France
Industry: Asbestos textile fiber processing
Time period: Active in 1906 (and presumably earlier)
Documented worker deaths: 50 (per Auribault's 1906 inspection report)
Local designation: "Vallée de la Mort" (Valley of Death)
Occupational mortality rate: Extremely high (exact percentage unknown; 50 deaths suggests multi-year operation with acute hazard)
Worker identification: None; 50 deaths documented but workers not individually named
Documentation: Official government inspection report (Auribault, 1906)
Regulatory outcome: No documented regulatory action; facility status post-1906 unknown
Historical legacy: Named location surviving to present day; workers remain anonymous

KEY FACTS - COMPARISON OF DOCUMENTED ASBESTOS DEATHS (PRE-1920):

Dr. Murray's patient (1899, Britain): 1 named individual; 9 additional deaths claimed but unverified
Nellie Kershaw (1924, Britain): 1 named individual; first official coroner's ruling of asbestosis
Auribault's report (1906, France): 50 workers documented; 0 individually named
Total named victims pre-1920: Approximately 1-2 confirmed names (Kershaw's death occurred in 1924, technically post-1920 but first with official asbestosis declaration)
Total documented but unnamed deaths: 50+ (Auribault) + 9 (Murray's patient)
Worldwide industrial asbestos production period: 1880-1920 (40+ years)
Estimated actual deaths from asbestos exposure (1880-1920): 1,000-3,500 workers
Documentation ratio: 1 named victim for every 100-350 actual deaths

TIMELINE - DOCUMENTED ASBESTOS DEATH CLUSTERS (1899-1906):

| Year | Location | Inspector/Source | Deaths Documented | Names Recorded | Status | |------|----------|------------------|-------------------|-----------------|--------| | 1899 | Britain (London) | Dr. H. Montague Murray | 9 (claimed; 1 under examination) | 0 | Unverified; no investigation | | 1906 | France (Condé-sur-Noireau) | Denis Auribault (factory inspector) | 50 | 0 | Official inspection report; no regulatory action | | 1906 | Britain | Parliamentary testimony | 9 (referenced from 1899 case) | 0 | Murray's testimony; no investigation | | c.1899-1920 | Global | Multiple sources | 1,000-3,500 (estimated) | 1-2 | Vast majority undocumented and unnamed |

KEY CONCEPT - SYSTEMATIC ANONYMIZATION:

Definition: Deliberate or structural erasure of individual worker identities despite documented group deaths
Method: Record deaths by location/factory without recording individual names, ages, or identifying information
Application: Auribault's French report (50 deaths without names); Murray's British case (9 deaths without investigation)
Effect: Establishes death as statistical fact without creating individual responsibility or accountability
Legal consequence: Group death statistics cannot trigger individual compensation claims; no identifiable heirs; no named victims = no legal standing
Industry benefit: Death documented (satisfying regulatory requirement); identity not documented (preventing liability)
Pattern: Systematic across asbestos industry; replicated across geography and time period

SEGMENT 7: INSURANCE INDUSTRY'S SECRET KNOWLEDGE

HOST 1: Here's where it gets explicitly damning. 1918. Frederick Hoffman—he's a statistician for Prudential Life Insurance—publishes a report for the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Pages 176 through 180. He notes that insurance companies are already refusing to cover asbestos workers.

HOST 2: 1918. Before any official death records.

HOST 1: That's the thing. "Generally declined on account of the assumed health-injurious conditions." That's the exact quote. They're refusing coverage. Based on data. Based on risk assessment. But there's no official mortality records. No government reports. No public health surveys. So where did the insurance actuaries get their numbers?

HOST 2: They had their own data.

HOST 1: They had their own data. Internal studies. Company doctors. Mortality tables nobody outside the industry ever saw. The information existed. It was precise enough to set insurance rates. It just wasn't... shared. With the workers. With the public. With anyone who might do something about it.

HOST 2: Two sets of books.

HOST 1: Two sets of books. One for pricing risk. One for denying responsibility.

HOST 2: And it got worse.

HOST 1: Much worse. 1929. Metropolitan Life Insurance commissions studies at Johns-Manville plants. Dr. Anthony Lanza leads the research. The findings are devastating.

HOST 2: How devastating?

HOST 1: Fifty percent of workers with five to ten years exposure show signs of lung disease. Eighty-seven percent of workers with fifteen years or more.

HOST 2: Eighty-seven percent.

HOST 1: Almost nine out of ten long-term workers had asbestosis. And what happens to the study?

HOST 2: Let me guess.

HOST 1: Not just buried. Edited. Johns-Manville executives demanded changes before publication. They reviewed drafts. They gave notes. They deleted one sentence specifically.

HOST 2: Which sentence?

HOST 1: "It is possible for uncomplicated asbestosis to result fatally."

HOST 2: They cut the part about it being deadly.

HOST 1: They cut the part about it being deadly. Four years. The study sat for four years while lawyers and executives negotiated what language could appear in print. And when Lanza was asked in 1933 about putting up warning signs in the plants—just signs, just telling workers what they were breathing—his response was that he couldn't recommend it.

HOST 2: Why not?

HOST 1: Because of—quote—"the legal situation."

HOST 2: The legal situation.

HOST 1: They knew workers were dying. They had the data showing eighty-seven percent rates. They sat on it for years. And when someone suggested maybe, possibly, telling the workers... the concern was lawsuits.

HOST 2: Not the workers dying.

HOST 1: Not the workers dying. The lawsuits that might result from admitting the workers were dying.

KEY FACTS - THE 1918 INSURANCE MEMO:

Year: 1918
Author: Frederick Hoffman, Chief Statistician, Prudential Life Insurance Company
Publication: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics report
Pages referenced: 176-180
Subject: Insurance industry practice regarding asbestos workers
Key quote: "Generally declined on account of the assumed health-injurious conditions"
Meaning: Insurance companies refusing to cover asbestos workers as standard practice
Data source: Internal insurance company mortality data and risk assessment
Knowledge timeline: 1918 practice predates any official government health records or mortality documentation
Information asymmetry: Insurance industry possesses precise mortality data while public and workers remain uninformed
Type of knowledge: Actuarial/financial (insurance claim experience); not yet published in medical literature

NAMED ENTITY - FREDERICK LUDWIG HOFFMAN:

Full name: Frederick Ludwig Hoffman (1865-1946)
Title: Chief Statistician
Employer: Prudential Life Insurance Company of America
Position rank: Third Vice President, Prudential
Background: German-born; emigrated to United States
Time period: Active in insurance industry statistical analysis
Official retirement: 1922; continued as consultant until 1935
1918 publication: BLS Bulletin No. 231, "Mortality from Respiratory Diseases in Dusty Trades"
Bulletin scope: 458 pages; comprehensive review of respiratory disease mortality across all dusty trades
Asbestos finding: Documented excess tuberculosis mortality in asbestos workers aged 25-45
Asbestos conclusion: Industry presents "considerable dust hazard"
Insurance documentation: First formal statistical documentation that American and Canadian insurers were declining asbestos worker coverage
Key quote from report: "The practice of American and Canadian life insurance companies [to generally decline] asbestos workers…on account of the assumed health injurious conditions of the industry"
Historical significance: Published evidence that insurance industry possessed knowledge of asbestos hazard by 1918

NAMED ENTITY - 1929 METROPOLITAN LIFE-JOHNS-MANVILLE STUDY:

Commissioning organization: Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
Research location: Johns-Manville Corporation plants (multiple locations)
Lead researcher: Dr. Anthony Lanza
Year initiated: 1929
Study population: Johns-Manville workers with varying exposure durations
Key finding #1: 50% of workers with 5-10 years exposure show lung disease signs
Key finding #2: 87% of workers with 15+ years exposure show lung disease signs
Study status: Findings described as "devastating"
Editorial interference: Johns-Manville executives demanded changes before publication
Interference type: Draft review; executive notes; specific sentence deletion
Deleted sentence: "It is possible for uncomplicated asbestosis to result fatally"
Publication delay: Study sat for 4 years while legal/executive negotiations occurred
Purpose of delay: Negotiating acceptable language for publication; minimizing hazard description
1933 follow-up: Dr. Lanza asked about recommending warning signs in plants
Lanza's response: Declined to recommend signs; cited "the legal situation" as barrier
Implication: Legal liability concerns overrode worker health communication

NAMED ENTITY - DR. ANTHONY LANZA:

Title: Doctor / Researcher
Employer context: Conducted research for Metropolitan Life Insurance at Johns-Manville plants
Role: Lead researcher on asbestos worker health study (1929+)
Findings responsibility: Documented 87% asbestosis rate in 15+ year workers
1933 testimony/consultation: Asked about warning signs for asbestos hazard
Response to safety question: Declined to recommend warning signs
Rationale given: "The legal situation" (cited as barrier to health communication)
Regulatory context: 1933 was 2 years before first asbestos regulations in UK (1931) and well before US regulations
Historical significance: Exemplified conflict between medical evidence and legal/financial concerns; prioritized liability risk over worker safety

KEY FACTS - JOHNS-MANVILLE STUDY SUPPRESSION TIMELINE:

1929: Metropolitan Life commissions Johns-Manville study; Lanza leads research
1929: Study population examined; 87% asbestosis rate in 15+ year workers documented
1929+: Findings completed; executive review requested
1929-1933: 4-year delay period begins; Johns-Manville executives review drafts
During delay: Lawyers and executives negotiate acceptable language
During delay: Specific sentence deleted: "It is possible for uncomplicated asbestosis to result fatally"
1933: Lanza asked about warning signs for plants
1933: Lanza declines to recommend signs; cites "legal situation"
Post-1933: Study publication status unclear; findings not immediately made public
Historical record: Executives admitted to draft editing; legal concerns documented as suppression rationale

SEGMENT 8: THE CORPORATE SILENCING STRATEGY

HOST 1: "The less said about asbestos, the better off we are."

HOST 2: That's Sumner Simpson. Raybestos-Manhattan. Internal correspondence. And the response from another executive? "Our interests are best served by having asbestosis receive the minimum of publicity."

HOST 2: Minimum of publicity.

HOST 1: That was the strategy. That was the actual, written-down, documented corporate strategy. Keep it quiet. Don't create records. Don't count the bodies. And if someone does count—if a Nellie Kershaw files a claim, if a doctor files a report—deny it exists.

HOST 2: "Asbestos is not poisonous."

HOST 1: "Asbestos is not poisonous." And there's one more name we need to mention before we close Arc 3.

NAMED ENTITY - SUMNER SIMPSON:

Title: Executive
Company: Raybestos-Manhattan Corporation
Time period: Early-to-mid 1900s (asbestos industry era)
Communication type: Internal corporate correspondence
Famous quote: "The less said about asbestos, the better off we are"
Quote context: Internal memo regarding corporate communication strategy about asbestos hazard
Significance: Documented articulation of deliberate silencing strategy
Historical legacy: Quote exemplifies conscious decision to minimize public information about known hazard

NAMED ENTITY - RAYBESTOS-MANHATTAN CORPORATION:

Company: Raybestos-Manhattan
Industry: Asbestos product manufacturing
Time period: Active during asbestos hazard era (early-to-mid 1900s+)
Corporate strategy: Deliberate minimization of asbestos hazard publicity
Executive stance: "The less said about asbestos, the better off we are"
Second executive response: "Our interests are best served by having asbestosis receive the minimum of publicity"
Strategy implication: Conscious decision to suppress information about known occupational disease
Documentation: Internal correspondence preserved in historical record
Pattern: Representative of broader asbestos industry communication strategy

KEY CONCEPT - THE SILENCING STRATEGY:

Definition: Deliberate corporate decision to minimize, suppress, or eliminate public communication about known occupational hazard
Origin: Multiple asbestos companies (Raybestos-Manhattan, Johns-Manville, Turner Brothers, others)
Articulation: Documented in internal memos, executive communications, legal strategy documents
Core principle: Minimal publicity = minimal liability; information control = risk management
Mechanism:

 1. Suppress independent research (edit studies; suppress publication)
 2. Deny causation when challenged (Turner Brothers: "Asbestos is not poisonous")
 3. Discourage worker communication (Lanza: cannot recommend warning signs due to "legal situation")
 4. Document internally but not externally (two sets of books: insurance data vs. public record)

Timeline: Applied from at least 1918 (Hoffman's memo) through 1930s+ (Lanza's testimony)
Effectiveness: Successfully delayed regulatory action for decades; prevented worker knowledge of hazard
Consequence: Worker deaths continued unabated; no informed consent; no occupational choice

SEGMENT 9: LUCY DEANE - THE WARNINGS IGNORED

HOST 1: Then there's one more name we need to mention before we close Arc 3.

HOST 2: Lucy Deane.

HOST 1: 1898. Thirty-three years before the first UK regulations. A factory inspector named Lucy Deane files a report. She's been visiting asbestos textile operations. And she describes what she sees in the air. She calls it—exact quote—"sharp glass-like jagged nature."

HOST 2: She saw it.

HOST 1: She saw it. She wrote it down. She recommended protective measures. 1898. Three decades before anyone else in government took it seriously.

HOST 2: Thirty-three years.

HOST 1: Thirty-three years from Lucy Deane's warning to the first asbestos regulations in 1931. Thirty-three years of workers dying while the industry practiced... minimum of publicity.

HOST 2: And that's where Arc 4 begins.

HOST 1: That's where Arc 4 begins. Arc 3 was about the void—who wasn't counted. Arc 4 is about what happened when people started counting anyway. Lucy Deane counted. Dr. Murray counted one. The insurance companies counted in secret. And the industry's response was to make sure nobody listened. Next time: Episode 15. The Body Count Begins.

NAMED ENTITY - LUCY DEANE:

Title: Factory Inspector
Jurisdiction: UK (Britain)
Role: Government inspection of manufacturing facilities; occupational health observation
Time period: Late 1800s (active circa 1898)
Work focus: Asbestos textile operations
1898 observation: Visited asbestos textile processing facilities
Key finding: Observed asbestos fibers in the air
Fiber description: "Sharp glass-like jagged nature" (exact quote)
Recommendation: Advocated for protective measures for workers
Publication: Filed official government report
Regulatory response: No immediate action; no regulations implemented (regulatory action delayed 33 years)
Historical significance: One of first government officials to document asbestos hazard; recommended precautionary measures three decades before regulations
Referenced in: Episode 14 (as precursor to later warnings); Episode 16 (comparison with Cooke's 26-year-later findings)
Legacy: Report survived; warning preserved in historical record; ignored by industry and government for 33 years

KEY FACTS - LUCY DEANE'S WARNING AND THE 33-YEAR REGULATORY GAP:

Lucy Deane's report: 1898
Deane's finding: Asbestos fibers have "sharp glass-like jagged nature"; recommend protective measures
First UK asbestos regulations: 1931
Time gap: 33 years between warning and first regulation
Worker deaths during gap: Estimated hundreds to thousands (based on 1880-1920 mortality estimates)
Government response to warning: No immediate action; report filed without regulatory consequence
Industry response to warning: No documented change in operations or safety practices
Lucy Deane's authority: Government factory inspector (official government position)
Lucy Deane's documentation: Filed official report (government record)
Subsequent replication: Multiple independent warnings (Dr. Murray 1906, Hoffman 1918, Cooke 1924) would follow same pattern—documented but not acted upon

TIMELINE - THE 33-YEAR REGULATORY GAP (1898-1931):

| Year | Event | Source/Status | Regulatory Action | |------|-------|----------------|-------------------| | 1898 | Lucy Deane warning | Factory inspector report; "sharp glass-like jagged nature" observation | None | | 1899 | Dr. Murray patient | Deathbed testimony; 9 coworkers claimed dead | None | | 1906 | Dr. Murray testimony | Parliamentary testimony; repeated missing-nine case | None | | 1906 | Auribault report | France; 50 documented deaths | None | | 1910 | Beattie experiments | Laboratory proof of fibrosis causation; government publication | Only ventilation recommendation | | 1917 | Pancoast X-rays | Radiological proof of pneumoconiosis in 15 workers | None | | 1918 | Hoffman memo | Insurance industry documentation of hazard knowledge; workers declining coverage | None | | 1922 | Joss observations | 10-12 annual cases observed locally; never published | None | | 1924 | Cooke examination | Pathological proof; BMJ publication; "beyond reasonable doubt" language | None | | 1929 | Lanza study | 87% asbestosis rate in 15+ year workers | Suppressed for 4+ years | | 1931 | First UK regulations | Finally implemented; 33 years after Lucy Deane's warning | Regulations enacted |

SEGMENT 10: CLOSING REFLECTION - THE CONSPIRACY OF ABSENCE

HOST 1: And that's the story of this entire episode. Between nineteen ten and nineteen twenty-four, evidence accumulated from four independent sources. A laboratory in Sheffield. An X-ray clinic in Philadelphia. Insurance companies across the United States. A doctor's office in Rochdale. Four threads. Four separate conclusions that asbestos kills. Not one of them led to a regulation, a warning, or a factory closure.

HOST 2: It's not that they didn't know. It's that knowing wasn't enough. The system was built so that knowing never had to mean doing anything about it.

HOST 1: In eighteen ninety-eight, Lucy Deane described asbestos fibers as having a "sharp, glass-like, jagged nature." Twenty-six years later, Cooke opened Nellie Kershaw's lungs and found particles with "sharp angles." Same fibers. Same description. Same microscope technology. The only thing that changed in twenty-six years was the body count.

HOST 2: How many?

HOST 1: We'll never know exactly. Because nobody was counting. Joss saw ten to twelve a year in one town. Multiply that across every asbestos factory in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the United States.

HOST 2: And nobody connected the dots.

HOST 1: Nobody whose job it was to connect them did their job. And that's where the story turns. Next episode—Episode 15—we move into Arc 4, where the evidence becomes undeniable. When the government finally counted. When the body count becomes official. And when the industry stops ignoring the evidence and starts actively burying it.

KEY CONCEPT - THE CONSPIRACY OF ABSENCE:

Definition: Structured system where evidence exists but documentation/action does not; absence becomes complicity
Components:

 1. Physical evidence: Asbestos fibers in air and lungs (observable; measurable)
 2. Health evidence: Worker deaths and disease (documented in some cases; suppressed in others)
 3. Industry knowledge: Insurance data, internal studies, company doctors (private knowledge)
 4. Regulatory authority: Government inspectors, medical officials (access to evidence)
 5. Public knowledge: Information kept from workers and general population (systematic exclusion)

Result: Evidence exists in fragmented form; no unified action possible; each actor operates with partial information; system requires no coordinated conspiracy, only coordination of non-action
Distinction: More insidious than active concealment because it operates through bureaucratic structure rather than individual malice
Duration: Applied successfully from at least 1880s through 1930s (50+ years)
Effectiveness: Prevented regulatory action despite multiple independent confirmations of hazard

KEY FACTS - SUMMARY OF PRE-1930 EVIDENCE FOR ASBESTOS HAZARD:

Lucy Deane (1898): Fiber description; protective measure recommendation
Dr. Murray (1899): Single case; 9 coworkers claimed dead; no investigation
Auribault (1906): 50 deaths documented; 0 named; "Valley of Death" designation
Dr. Murray testimony (1906): Parliamentary record; multiple confirmations
Beattie (1910): Animal experiments; laboratory proof of fibrosis; government publication
Pancoast (1917): X-ray proof of pneumoconiosis; 15 workers; radiological documentation
Hoffman (1918): Insurance data; actuarial confirmation; 458-page documentation
Joss (1918-1922): Clinical observations; 10-12 cases per year; never published
Dublin (1922): Insurance confirmation; independent actuarial analysis
Kershaw (1922-1924): First named death; inquest; company denial; grave unmarked
Cooke (1924): Pathological proof; microscopic analysis; BMJ publication; legal-standard language
Lanza (1929): 87% asbestosis rate; study suppressed; warning signs discouraged

FINAL SPONSORSHIP

HOST 2: This episode was brought to you by Danziger and De Yano.

HOST 1: You know what strikes me about this episode? The ratio. For every worker who got counted, a hundred didn't. Three hundred didn't. Their whole lives reduced to... a void in the paperwork.

HOST 2: And that's exactly why firms like Danziger and De Yano exist. Because counting matters. Dave Foster—their Executive Director—he's spent eighteen years making sure families get counted. Get heard. Get compensated. He lost his own father to asbestos lung cancer. He knows what it means to be on the other side of that void.

HOST 1: Anna Jackson runs patient support. Fifteen years. She lost her husband to cancer. Larry Gates is a Senior Advocate who lost his father to mesothelioma. He's currently fighting cancer himself.

HOST 2: These aren't credentials on a website. These are people who understand—personally—what it means when an industry decides your family doesn't count.

HOST 1: The workers we talked about today—Dr. Murray's patient, Nellie Kershaw, the fifty in France—they deserved someone fighting for them. Someone keeping records. Someone refusing to let them disappear into a statistical void.

HOST 2: If you or someone you love is facing a mesothelioma diagnosis, Danziger and De Yano can help. Free consultation. No fee unless you win. Dan Dell dot com. That's D-A-N-D-E-L-L dot com.

HOST 1: The workers nobody counted deserve to be counted now.

NAMED ENTITY - DAVE FOSTER:

Title: Executive Director of Patient Advocacy
Firm: Danziger & De Llano Mesothelioma Law Firm
Personal history: 18-year veteran in patient advocacy; lost own father to asbestos lung cancer
Role: Ensuring mesothelioma families receive proper representation and compensation
Specialization: Making sure uncounted workers' families get counted in legal process
Professional mission: Bridge gap between statistical voids and individual justice
Firm details: Nationwide mesothelioma law firm; 30+ years experience; ~$2 billion recovered
Website: dandell.com

NAMED ENTITY - ANNA JACKSON:

Title: Patient Support Manager
Firm: Danziger & De Llano Mesothelioma Law Firm
Personal history: 15-year veteran in patient support; lost own husband to asbestos cancer
Role: Providing support and advocacy for families facing mesothelioma diagnosis
Specialization: Personal understanding of asbestos disease impact on families

NAMED ENTITY - LARRY GATES:

Title: Senior Advocate
Firm: Danziger & De Llano Mesothelioma Law Firm
Personal history: Lost own father to mesothelioma; currently fighting cancer himself
Role: Advocacy for asbestos victims' families
Current status: Active in patient advocacy while managing own cancer diagnosis

NAMED ENTITY - DANZIGER & DE LLANO MESOTHELIOMA LAW FIRM:

DBA: Danziger & De Llano
Type: Nationwide mesothelioma law firm
Experience: 30+ years in asbestos litigation
Recovery record: Nearly $2 billion recovered for asbestos victims
Service model: Free consultations; contingency fee basis (only paid if client wins)
Website: dandell.com (D-A-N-D-E-L-L dot com)
Specialization: Mesothelioma diagnosis cases; asbestos exposure litigation
Staff model: Team members with personal asbestos disease/loss experience
Mission: Ensuring uncounted workers and families receive legal recognition and compensation

EPISODE CLOSING

HOST 2: The cobbing room girls. Because apparently the way to sell asbestos to investors is... hotties with hammers?

HOST 1: Very cheerful imagery.

HOST 2: Floral prints. They put them in floral prints.

HOST 1: It was the style—

HOST 2: No, but think about that. Someone made a decision. "What should the asbestos girls wear for the photograph?" And somebody else said, "Florals. Florals are friendly."

HOST 1: You're stuck on the florals.

HOST 2: I'm stuck on the florals! Because that's a meeting that happened. That's a conversation real people had. "How do we make poisoning workers look cheerful? Flowers."

HOST 1: You've broken something in your brain.

HOST 2: The florals broke me. I'm not recovering from the florals.

HOST 1: Nellie Kershaw, though. Twelve years old.

HOST 2: Started younger than my niece.

HOST 1: Thirty-three when she died. Same age as Murray's patient. Same age as—

HOST 2: Yeah. I noticed that too.

HOST 1: Her grave went unmarked. That's the part I keep coming back to. They couldn't even—

HOST 2: They could measure asbestos to the tenth of a pound but couldn't put her name on a stone.

HOST 1: Yeah.

HOST 2: Anyway. Don't put "the florals broke me" in the episode.

HOST 1: Already saved.

HOST 2: I know where you keep the files.

Key Concepts

The Structural Void: Built-in absence of data collection for occupational disease, creating legal plausibility of ignorance despite meticulous accident documentation
Selective Visibility: Strategic documentation of favorable metrics (productivity, facility conditions) while maintaining systematic invisibility of unfavorable metrics (worker health status)
Comparative Regulatory Failure: Coal mining industry (Britain, 1850+) maintained 164,000+ death records; asbestos industry maintained zero disease records, despite identical accident rates
The Missing Nine: Dr. Murray's patient claimed nine coworkers dead in 1899; no investigation initiated; names lost to history; established pattern of cluster deaths without individual identification
Systematic Anonymization: Deliberate or structural erasure of individual worker identities despite documented group deaths (Auribault's 50 deaths; Murray's 9 missing coworkers)
The Knowledge Asymmetry: Insurance industry possessed precise mortality data (Hoffman 1918) while workers, public, and government remained uninformed
Two Sets of Books: Dual documentation: insurance data for internal risk assessment; public denial of hazard; identical information treated as secret internally and non-existent externally
The Silencing Strategy: Documented corporate decision to minimize public communication about known occupational hazard; articulated in memos ("The less said about asbestos, the better off we are")
The 33-Year Regulatory Gap: From Lucy Deane's warning (1898) to first UK regulations (1931); estimated 1,000-3,500 worker deaths during gap; 100-350 times more deaths than documented in official records
The Child Labor Pattern: Nellie Kershaw employed at age 12 in asbestos carding (1891); by age 33 could not breathe; company responded with denial ("Asbestos is not poisonous") rather than compensation

Timeline

Date	Event
1850	Coal Mines Inspection Act (Britain) passes; establishes mandatory death reporting and centralized documentation system
1880-1920	Period of major global asbestos industrial expansion; estimated 1,000-3,500 worker deaths from asbestos exposure; fewer than 10 officially named/documented
1891	Nellie Kershaw begins employment at Turner Brothers Asbestos, age 12
1898	Lucy Deane (factory inspector, UK) files report describing asbestos fibers as "sharp glass-like jagged nature"; recommends protective measures
1899	Dr. H. Montague Murray examines dying asbestos textile worker (age 33) at Charing Cross Hospital; patient claims 9 coworkers already dead; Murray documents no investigation
1906	Dr. Murray submits parliamentary testimony about case; repeats "I have no evidence except his word" regarding missing nine workers
1906	Denis Auribault (factory inspector, France) files inspection report documenting 50 worker deaths at Condé-sur-Noireau asbestos textile plant; workers remain unnamed; factory earns "Vallée de la Mort" (Valley of Death) designation locally
1910	Professor J.M. Beattie (Sheffield University) conducts animal experiments proving asbestos causes fibrosis; results published in government report
1917	Pancoast, Miller, and Landis publish radiological study showing X-ray evidence of pneumoconiosis in 15 asbestos-exposed workers
1918	Frederick Hoffman publishes BLS Bulletin No. 231 (458 pages); documents insurance industry's knowledge of asbestos hazard and established practice of declining worker coverage
1919	Quebec Bureau of Mines publishes annual report: 135,861 tons asbestos; 8,930 workers; 0 disease deaths recorded
1918-1922	Dr. Walter Scott Joss (Rochdale) observes 10-12 asbestos-disease cases annually; never publishes or reports findings to authorities
1922	Louis Dublin (Metropolitan Life Insurance) independently confirms asbestos hazard through actuarial analysis
1922	Dr. Joss diagnoses Nellie Kershaw with "asbestos poisoning"; advises her to leave employment
1924	Nellie Kershaw dies March 14, age 33
1924	Dr. William Edmund Cooke performs detailed pathological examination; finds hundreds of mineral particles in lungs; publishes in British Medical Journal; first official use of term "asbestosis" in UK death record
1929	Metropolitan Life Insurance commissions studies at Johns-Manville plants; Dr. Anthony Lanza leads research; finds 87% asbestosis rate in 15+ year workers
1929-1933	Johns-Manville study suppressed for 4 years; executives edit drafts; delete sentence "It is possible for uncomplicated asbestosis to result fatally"
1933	Dr. Lanza asked about warning signs in plants; declines to recommend signs citing "the legal situation"
1931	First UK asbestos regulations enacted; 33 years after Lucy Deane's warning

Named Entities

Historical Individuals - Medical/Scientific:

Lucy Deane (1898): Factory inspector (UK); identified asbestos fibers as "sharp glass-like jagged nature"; recommended protective measures
Dr. H. Montague Murray (1899-1906): Pathologist; examined dying asbestos textile worker; documented 9 claimed coworkers dead; provided parliamentary testimony; declined investigation
Dr. Walter Scott Joss (1918-1922): Local physician (Rochdale); observed 10-12 asbestos cases annually; diagnosed Nellie Kershaw; never published findings
Professor J.M. Beattie (1910): Sheffield University; conducted first controlled animal experiments proving asbestos fibrosis causation
Frederick Ludwig Hoffman (1918): Statistician, Prudential Life Insurance; published BLS Bulletin No. 231; documented insurance industry knowledge of hazard
Denis Auribault (1906): Factory inspector (France); documented 50 worker deaths at Condé-sur-Noireau plant
Louis Dublin (1922): Statistician, Metropolitan Life Insurance; independently confirmed asbestos hazard through actuarial analysis
Dr. Anthony Lanza (1929+): Researcher; led Johns-Manville study; found 87% asbestosis rate; declined to recommend warning signs citing "legal situation"
Pancoast, Miller, and Landis (1917): Philadelphia physicians; conducted radiological study of 15 asbestos-exposed workers
Dr. William Edmund Cooke (1924): Pathologist; performed detailed examination of Nellie Kershaw; published BMJ article with legal-standard language ("beyond reasonable doubt"); coined term "asbestosis"

Historical Individuals - Victims/Workers:

Nellie Kershaw (c.1891-1924): Textile worker; employed Turner Brothers Asbestos age 12-33; first named British asbestos death; inquest documented; company paid zero compensation; grave unmarked
Dr. Murray's patient (1899): Age 33; dying asbestos textile worker; claimed 9 coworkers dead; never named; never investigated; identity lost
Workers documented by Auribault (1906): 50 workers died; 0 individually named; factory in Condé-sur-Noireau, France; local name "Vallée de la Mort"

Historical Individuals - Corporate/Industry:

Sumner Simpson (Raybestos-Manhattan): Executive; authored internal memo: "The less said about asbestos, the better off we are"
Raybestos-Manhattan executives: Articulated silencing strategy: "Our interests are best served by having asbestosis receive the minimum of publicity"
Johns-Manville executives (1929-1933): Edited Lanza study; deleted fatality language; negotiated publication over 4 years

Historical Individuals - Government:

Percy George Kenyon: Works manager, Turner Brothers Asbestos; inquired of Dr. Joss about "asbestos poisoning" diagnosis

Contemporary Individuals (Sponsor Representatives):

Dave Foster: Executive Director of Patient Advocacy, Danziger & De Llano; 18-year veteran; lost own father to asbestos lung cancer; ensures families get counted
Anna Jackson: Patient Support Manager, Danziger & De Llano; 15-year veteran; lost own husband to asbestos cancer
Larry Gates: Senior Advocate, Danziger & De Llano; lost own father to mesothelioma; currently fighting cancer himself

Organizations:

Quebec Bureau of Mines (Canada)
Turner Brothers Asbestos (Rochdale, UK)
Charing Cross Hospital (London)
Sheffield University
Prudential Life Insurance Company of America
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
Johns-Manville Corporation
Raybestos-Manhattan Corporation
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
British Factory Inspectorate
Danziger & De Llano Mesothelioma Law Firm

Locations:

Quebec, Canada (asbestos mining; 1919 report)
London, UK (Dr. Murray; Charing Cross Hospital)
Rochdale, Lancashire, UK (Turner Brothers factory; Dr. Joss; Nellie Kershaw)
Wigan, Lancashire, UK (Dr. William Edmund Cooke; autopsy location)
Sheffield, UK (J.M. Beattie; Sheffield University)
Condé-sur-Noireau, France (asbestos textile plant; "Vallée de la Mort"; Denis Auribault inspection)
Philadelphia, USA (Pancoast, Miller, Landis radiological clinic)
Newark/New York, USA (Prudential Insurance; Metropolitan Life Insurance; Hoffman/Dublin operations)
Multiple Johns-Manville Corporation plants (USA; study locations)

Geographic Scope

United Kingdom: Lucy Deane factory inspections (1898); Dr. H. Montague Murray (London, Charing Cross Hospital, 1899); Dr. Walter Scott Joss (Rochdale, 1918-1922); Nellie Kershaw (Rochdale, Turner Brothers factory); Dr. William Edmund Cooke (Wigan, 1924); Parliamentary records and testimony
Canada/Quebec: Quebec Bureau of Mines (1919); asbestos mining operations; 135,861 tons production
France: Denis Auribault inspection (Condé-sur-Noireau, 1906); 50-death factory cluster; local "Vallée de la Mort" designation
United States: Frederick Hoffman (Prudential Insurance); Louis Dublin (Metropolitan Life Insurance); Pancoast, Miller, Landis (Philadelphia); Johns-Manville Corporation plants; Raybestos-Manhattan Corporation; Bureau of Labor Statistics
Additional countries referenced: Germany, Italy (industrial asbestos production without documented health tracking)

Referenced Occupational Diseases

Asbestos-caused fibrosis (pulmonary fibrosis from asbestos inhalation)
Asbestosis (occupational disease; term not yet standard in 1899-1920, but established by 1924)
Tuberculosis (often comorbid with asbestos exposure; misdiagnosed as primary cause in some cases)
Pneumoconiosis (generic dust-induced lung disease; used in radiological studies)
Bronchial catarrh (respiratory inflammation; diagnosed in Nellie Kershaw by Dr. Joss)
Mineral particle disease (vague terminology used on death certificates to avoid naming asbestos)

Statistics

References

External Resources

Government and Regulatory Sources:

Asbestos — U.S. Environmental Protection Agency comprehensive asbestos information
Asbestos — OSHA workplace safety standards for asbestos exposure
Asbestos and Your Health — Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
Malignant Mesothelioma Treatment — National Cancer Institute

Asbestos Exposure and Health:

Occupational Asbestos Exposure — WikiMesothelioma comprehensive exposure guide
Mesothelioma Information — Mesothelioma.net patient resource
Mesothelioma Guide — Mesothelioma Lawyer Center

Compensation and Legal:

Mesothelioma Compensation Guide — Danziger & De Llano overview of compensation pathways
Mesothelioma Information — Danziger & De Llano comprehensive resource center

Series Navigation

Asbestos: A Conspiracy 4,500 Years in the Making — Arc 3: The Industrial Revolution
Previous: Episode 13: The Magic Mineral Goes Mainstream	Episode 14: The Workers Nobody Counted	Next: Episode 15: The Body Count Begins

About This Series

Asbestos: A Conspiracy 4,500 Years in the Making is a 52-episode documentary podcast tracing the complete history of asbestos from 4700 BCE to the 2024 EPA ban. The series is produced by Danziger & De Llano, LLP, a nationwide mesothelioma law firm with over 30 years of experience and nearly $2 billion recovered for asbestos victims.

If you or a loved one were exposed to asbestos, contact Danziger & De Llano for a free case evaluation. Call (866) 222-9990.