Early Asbestos Awareness and Industry Suppression

Early Asbestos Awareness & Industry Suppression
style="padding:15px;" Key Time Period: 1900–1970 First Medical Alert: 1899 (Dr. H. Montague Murray) Critical Report: 1930 (Merewether & Price Study) Industry Cover-Up Peak: 1929–1960s (Johns-Manville & "Asbestos Pentagon") Game-Changing Publication: 1964 (Dr. Irving Selikoff, JAMA) First Federal Standard: 1971 (OSHA Asbestos Standards)
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Executive Summary

The history of asbestos in the twentieth century represents one of the most consequential instances of deliberate suppression of medical evidence in modern industrial history. Beginning with Dr. H. Montague Murray's 1899 clinical observations at Charing Cross Hospital in London, scientific evidence linking asbestos inhalation to severe lung disease accumulated steadily throughout the early 1900s. By 1930, the landmark Merewether and Price government study in the United Kingdom documented asbestos-related disease in 81 percent of workers with twenty or more years of exposure. Yet, rather than protecting workers, major manufacturers—led by Johns-Manville, Raybestos-Manhattan, Owens-Corning, Unarco, and Celotex (the "Asbestos Pentagon")—systematically suppressed, altered, and concealed medical findings for four decades. This deliberate campaign of denial persisted until Dr. Irving Selikoff's landmark 1964 publication in the Journal of the American Medical Association shifted public and regulatory attention irrevocably. The period from 1900 to 1970 reveals not a gap in knowledge, but a chasm between what industry knew and what it allowed the public to learn.

Key Facts: Early Asbestos Medical Recognition & Industry Suppression

Key Facts & Milestones

1899: Dr. H. Montague Murray documents pulmonary fibrosis in asbestos workers at Charing Cross Hospital, London—first clinical recognition of asbestos disease 1924: Dr. W.E. Cooke publishes case report in British Medical Journal titled "Fibrosis of the Lungs Due to Inhalation of Asbestos Dust" 1927: Term "asbestosis" officially coined following Nellie Kershaw case and medical inquiry 1930: Merewether & Price government study in the UK examines 363 asbestos workers; finds 25% overall disease prevalence, rising to 81% among those with 20+ years exposure 1931: UK enacts Asbestos Industry Regulations in direct response to Merewether & Price findings 1929–1935: Johns-Manville and Metropolitan Life Insurance conduct study; company alters findings before publication 1936–1946: Saranac Laboratory studies show 73% cancer incidence in mice exposed to asbestos; industry suppresses publication 1935: Sumner Simpson memo: "The less said about asbestos, the better off we are"—discovered in litigation 1977 1949: Johns-Manville Medical Director Dr. Kenneth Smith writes memo recommending non-disclosure of disease to workers 1964: Dr. Irving Selikoff publishes "Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia" in JAMA documenting 45 lung cancer deaths vs. 6.6 expected in 632 insulation workers 1964: New York Academy of Sciences conference "Biological Effects of Asbestos" shifts national conversation 1970: Asbestos Information Association formed as industry public relations response 1971: OSHA establishes first federal asbestos standard at 5 million particles per cubic foot (mppcf)

When Did Doctors First Link Asbestos to Lung Disease?

The medical recognition of asbestos-related disease did not emerge suddenly in the 1960s. Rather, clinicians and occupational health researchers began documenting the disease throughout the early decades of the twentieth century, with evidence building progressively despite industry silence.

The earliest documented clinical observation came from Dr. H. Montague Murray at Charing Cross Hospital in London in 1899. Murray's careful clinical examination of asbestos workers revealed a distinctive pattern of pulmonary fibrosis—scarring of the lungs—that he correctly attributed to inhalation of asbestos fibers. Though his observations were published and noted in medical circles, they received limited public attention and generated no regulatory response.

Twenty-five years later, Dr. W.E. Cooke of Croydon, England brought renewed attention to the disease through a landmark case report published in the British Medical Journal in 1924. Cooke's article, titled "Fibrosis of the Lungs Due to Inhalation of Asbestos Dust," presented detailed clinical and radiological findings in a 33-year-old woman who had worked in asbestos textile manufacturing. The article's scientific rigor and clear documentation drew professional attention and helped establish asbestos-related lung disease as a recognized occupational condition within the medical community.

The case of Nellie Kershaw, a young asbestos worker in the United Kingdom, became iconic in establishing legal and medical recognition of the disease. Born near Manchester in 1891, Kershaw began working in an asbestos textile factory at age twelve, inhaling asbestos dust for nearly two decades as she managed machines that twisted asbestos strands into thread. By 1920, she experienced constant fatigue and coughed up blood; within two years her lungs had deteriorated so severely that she was bedridden at age thirty-one. Kershaw died in 1924 at age thirty-three, nearly destitute after her employer, Turner Brothers Asbestos, and their insurer refused compensation. Her autopsy revealed scarred lung tissue that appeared grey or blue-black, and microscopic examination found fibers matching those from her factory. Following the Kershaw case and subsequent medical inquiry, in 1927, the term "asbestosis" was formally coined by the medical profession to describe the disease. By the late 1920s, therefore, medical science in Europe had clearly identified a new occupational disease and given it a name.

What Did the Merewether & Price Report Reveal in 1930?

The most important early epidemiological study came from the British government in 1930, conducted by H.E. Merewether and C.W. Price. This landmark study would become the watershed moment in asbestos disease recognition—and the turning point at which industry suppression intensified dramatically.

Per Mesothelioma Lawyer Center, Merewether and Price conducted a comprehensive health survey of 363 asbestos workers employed in the United Kingdom. Their findings were stark and undeniable: 25 percent of all asbestos workers showed clinical evidence of asbestos-related disease. As documented by Danziger & De Llano, more striking still, among workers with twenty or more years of exposure, the prevalence reached 81 percent. The study demonstrated dose-response relationships and provided quantitative evidence that asbestos exposure was not a minor occupational concern, but a significant health threat.

The British government responded promptly. According to Mesothelioma Lawyer Center's legal review, in 1931, the United Kingdom enacted the Asbestos Industry Regulations, establishing workplace standards, medical monitoring requirements, and worker notification protocols. The Merewether & Price study had catalyzed regulatory action. However, in the United States, no comparable federal response occurred. American manufacturers, alarmed by the British government's regulatory response, instead pursued a strategy of denial, suppression, and control of information.

⚠️ Critical Turning Point: The Merewether & Price report of 1930 proved scientifically what asbestos workers were suffering from—and provided the catalyst that transformed industry response from ignorance into deliberate suppression.

How Did the Asbestos Industry Suppress Medical Evidence?

The Johns-Manville Metropolitan Life Study (1929–1935)

Among the earliest and most consequential acts of evidence suppression involved a major health insurance and manufacturing partnership. Johns-Manville, the dominant asbestos manufacturer in the United States, partnered with Metropolitan Life Insurance Company to conduct a health study of asbestos workers. The study began in 1929, contemporaneous with and independent of the British government research, and continued through 1935.

Metropolitan Life assigned Dr. Anthony Lanza, an accomplished occupational health physician, to direct the study. Research by Danziger & De Llano shows that Lanza and his team examined asbestos workers and compiled medical findings. The data revealed evidence of asbestos-related disease consistent with the British findings. However, before the study could be published for peer review and public scrutiny, Johns-Manville exercised editorial control over the findings. Company officials altered, downplayed, and suppressed the most damaging conclusions. The published version bore little resemblance to the scientific reality Lanza had documented.

This pattern—genuine medical research conducted, damaging findings discovered, company-controlled alteration before publication—would repeat throughout the next several decades. It established a template for industry management of inconvenient truth.

The Saranac Laboratory Studies (1936–1946)

Dr. Leroy Gardner at Saranac Laboratory in upstate New York conducted a series of animal exposure studies during the 1930s and 1940s to investigate asbestos toxicity. Studies by Danziger & De Llano indicate that Gardner's research was rigorous and his findings unambiguous: when laboratory animals were exposed to asbestos dust, a remarkable 73 percent developed cancers. This carcinogenic effect provided mechanistic evidence that asbestos was not merely a lung-scarring agent, but an active carcinogen.

Gardner's research, which was funded in part by industry sources, was never published during his lifetime. The findings remained suppressed and unknown to the broader scientific and medical community. It was not until decades later, through litigation discovery processes, that Gardner's work came to public attention. The suppression of Gardner's carcinogenicity data proved particularly consequential because it deprived the scientific community of early evidence of asbestos cancer risk.

The Sumner Simpson Papers and "The Less Said, the Better Off We Are"

Among the most damning evidence of deliberate suppression emerged from internal company documents discovered during asbestos litigation in the 1970s. Approximately six thousand pages of internal memoranda, correspondence, and strategic planning documents from Sumner Simpson, a senior executive at Raybestos-Manhattan, were produced in discovery. These documents, spanning the 1930s through 1970s, revealed a sophisticated, sustained, and deliberate campaign to suppress, minimize, and conceal evidence of asbestos disease.

According to Danziger & De Llano, the most emblematic statement came in a 1935 Simpson memorandum: "The less said about asbestos, the better off we are." This phrase captured the strategic philosophy underlying industry conduct: to maximize profit by minimizing information flow about occupational hazards. The Simpson papers revealed coordination among manufacturers to control medical research, limit publication of adverse findings, and suppress worker notification.

Trade Magazine and Trade Association Control

Industry control extended into the professional publications that asbestos manufacturers and workers relied upon for information. As Danziger & De Llano notes, Trade magazines such as Asbestos Magazine, which reached workers, managers, and professionals in the industry, exercised editorial control to suppress articles and warnings about health hazards. Proposed articles documenting asbestos health effects were rejected from publication. Industry advertisements promoting asbestos products as safe dominated the trade press, while contrary medical evidence was systematically excluded.

In December 1970, as public and regulatory attention to asbestos hazards began to intensify, the industry established the Asbestos Information Association (AIA) to coordinate public relations efforts and manage the narrative about asbestos safety. As reported by Mesothelioma Lawyer Center, the AIA's mission was explicitly to counter emerging health concerns and maintain market demand for asbestos products.

"The systematic suppression of asbestos health evidence was not accidental or incidental to industry operations. It was central strategy. Companies invested in research, learned damaging truths, then mobilized resources to prevent those truths from reaching the workers, regulators, and public who most needed that information. This pattern of deliberate concealment is precisely why courts have found such conduct to constitute fraud, negligence, and, in appropriate cases, punitive wrongdoing."

— Rod De Llano, Founding Partner, Danziger & De Llano

What Did Johns-Manville's Own Doctors Know?

Dr. Kenneth Smith's Non-Disclosure Directive

By the mid-twentieth century, Johns-Manville, the largest and most dominant asbestos manufacturer in North America, employed its own medical director and occupational health staff. These company physicians possessed detailed knowledge of asbestos hazards derived from company-controlled studies, worker medical examinations, and industry communications. This internal knowledge made the company's continued public denials of asbestos danger particularly culpable.

In 1949, Johns-Manville's Medical Director, Dr. Kenneth Smith, wrote an internal memorandum regarding the company's policy on disclosure of asbestos disease to affected workers. Danziger & De Llano states that the memo stated: "As long as the man is not disabled, it is felt that he should not be told of his condition so that he can live and work in peace, and the company can benefit by his many years of experience."

This directive encapsulated the moral depravity underlying industry conduct. A worker found to have asbestos-related disease would be deliberately deceived about his condition. The company physician would remain silent, allowing the worker to continue exposure while disease progressed. The stated rationale was explicitly economic: the worker's labor value was deemed worth more than the worker's life, health, and right to informed decision-making. This was not a policy of uncertainty or disagreement about risk. It was a directive to conceal known harm for profit.

The Asbestos Pentagon

Johns-Manville did not suppress evidence in isolation. Rather, five major manufacturers—Johns-Manville, Raybestos-Manhattan, Owens-Corning, Unarco, and Celotex—coordinated suppression efforts. Danziger & De Llano's legal documentation shows that these companies became known in litigation as the "Asbestos Pentagon." Through trade associations, industry conferences, and direct correspondence, these manufacturers shared information about asbestos health effects while coordinating strategies to prevent public and regulatory awareness.

Court findings documented this coordination explicitly. Mesothelioma Attorney's research demonstrates that Judge James Price, in a landmark asbestos litigation ruling, found evidence of "a pattern of denial of disease and attempts at suppression of information" spanning decades and multiple manufacturers. The manufacturers' joint conduct transformed individual corporate wrongdoing into an industry-wide conspiracy to suppress medical truth.

⚠️ Pattern of Concealment: Company doctors knew. Company executives knew. Industry associations coordinated suppression. This was not a matter of disputed science or evolving understanding—it was deliberate concealment of known hazards for profit.

How Did Dr. Irving Selikoff Change Everything in 1964?

The status quo of suppression and industry denial persisted for decades, tolerated by regulators and accepted as business-as-usual. The transformation came not from government investigation, but from an independent epidemiologist who undertook rigorous research outside industry control.

Dr. Irving Selikoff was a physician and researcher at Mount Sinai Hospital in New York City who was not compromised by industry funding or relationships. Beginning in the late 1950s, Selikoff conducted an independent epidemiological study of asbestos insulation workers—men who had been among the most heavily exposed workers in the asbestos industry, and who had been deliberately excluded from earlier industry-controlled research studies.

In 1964, Selikoff published his landmark findings in the Journal of the American Medical Association under the title "Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia." The study examined 632 asbestos insulation workers. As Mesothelioma Lawyer Center explains, Selikoff documented 45 deaths from lung cancer in this cohort, compared to only 6.6 deaths that would be expected in a population of comparable age and demographics. This represented a lung cancer incidence rate 6.8 times higher than expected—a finding of extraordinary epidemiological significance. The study also documented cases of mesothelioma, the rare asbestos-specific cancer, confirming that asbestos exposure caused this previously obscure malignancy.

The findings were unambiguous and could not be explained away by industry arguments about causation, dose-response, or scientific uncertainty. Selikoff's study applied rigorous epidemiological methods, examined a large cohort of heavily exposed workers, documented multiple disease outcomes, and reported clear statistical associations.

The October 1964 New York Academy of Sciences Conference

Recognizing the significance of emerging evidence about asbestos hazards, the New York Academy of Sciences organized a major scientific conference in October 1964 titled "Biological Effects of Asbestos." The conference brought together researchers, clinicians, and public health officials to discuss the current state of knowledge about asbestos and health. Selikoff's research was presented alongside other emerging studies documenting asbestos carcinogenicity.

Research by Mesothelioma.net shows that the conference proceedings were published in 1965 in the Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Volume 132, establishing a comprehensive scientific record of asbestos hazards available to researchers, regulators, and medical professionals.

The Shift in Public Awareness

The publication of Selikoff's research and the convening of the Academy of Sciences conference in 1964 represented a critical inflection point. Prior to this moment, asbestos hazards had been documented and known to medical professionals in the occupational health field, but this knowledge had remained compartmentalized and suppressed. The industry had successfully prevented widespread awareness and regulatory action.

Selikoff's work made asbestos hazards impossible to ignore. The scientific quality of his research, the magnitude of his findings, and the publication in the nation's leading medical journal gave his work an authority that industry denialism could not easily overcome. News coverage of the Academy conference and Selikoff's research brought asbestos hazards to public attention for the first time.

Yet even in the face of Selikoff's evidence, industry resistance persisted. The Asbestos Information Association, formed in 1970, explicitly adopted the strategy of questioning Selikoff's methodologies and promoting contrary views from sympathetic researchers. The industry's response was no longer absolute denial of asbestos hazards (which had become untenable), but rather a pivot to disputing the degree of hazard and the appropriate level of regulation.

"Dr. Selikoff's research accomplished what decades of industry suppression had prevented: the elevation of asbestos disease from an occupational health 'fact' known to insiders but not discussed, to a public health crisis demanding regulatory action. His work demonstrated that truth, rigorously established and professionally disseminated, could overcome decades of corporate deception."

— Paul Danziger, Founding Partner, Danziger & De Llano

Why Did It Take Until 1971 for the First Federal Standard?

Despite the accumulation of medical evidence about asbestos hazards throughout the twentieth century, the United States government did not establish a comprehensive federal asbestos occupational standard until 1971. This gap between scientific knowledge and regulatory protection reflects the success of industry suppression strategies and the slow machinery of federal rulemaking.

Pre-OSHA Standards and Regulatory Fragmentation

Before the establishment of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in 1970, occupational health standards in the United States were fragmented across multiple agencies and were often voluntary or advisory in nature.

The American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), a professional organization, established a threshold limit value (TLV) for asbestos of 5 million particles per cubic foot (mppcf) in 1946. However, this was a recommended standard with no enforcement mechanism. Employers could ignore it with legal impunity. The standard was also questionable on its scientific merits—research even then suggested that 5 mppcf was not a safe exposure level, but rather a compromise figure reflecting economic and technical feasibility considerations rather than actual health protection.

Under the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, the federal government established minimal asbestos standards for contractors. In 1968, these standards were set at 12 fibers per cubic centimeter (f/cc), which was substantially less protective than the ACGIH recommendation of 5 mppcf. In May 1969, the Walsh-Healey standard was revised downward to align more closely with the ACGIH TLV, but even this remained merely advisory for non-contract employers.

State-Level Standard-Setting

Some states moved ahead of federal inaction. Per Mesothelioma Attorney, California, Oregon, Ohio, and Texas adopted occupational exposure standards for asbestos at the 5 mppcf level. However, the lack of uniform federal standards meant that asbestos workers in states without protective standards remained exposed without legal protection.

The OSHA Standard of 1971

When the Occupational Safety and Health Administration was established in 1970, one of its early acts was to promulgate comprehensive occupational safety and health standards. OSHA adopted an asbestos standard in 1971, establishing a permissible exposure limit (PEL) of 5 mppcf, with additional requirements for medical surveillance, worker notification, and engineering controls.

The 1971 OSHA standard represented the first comprehensive federal occupational standard for asbestos in the United States. Yet this standard emerged only after decades of documented hazard, only after industry suppression had caused hundreds of thousands of unnecessary exposures, and only after scientific evidence had accumulated to a point where regulatory inaction had become politically impossible. By 1971, an estimated three million American workers had already been exposed to asbestos in occupational settings, and countless others had been exposed through military service, use of asbestos-containing products, and environmental contamination.

⚠️ Regulatory Lag and Human Cost: The gap between scientific knowledge of asbestos hazards (clearly documented by 1930) and federal regulatory protection (1971) spanned four decades. This regulatory lag cost millions of workers their health and lives. This history demonstrates why industry suppression of medical evidence is not merely unethical—it is deadly.

Legacy and Legal Implications

The documented history of asbestos awareness and industry suppression from 1900 to 1970 establishes several critical legal principles relevant to asbestos injury litigation:

Knowledge Over Ignorance: The accumulation of medical evidence from 1899 through 1964 proves that asbestos manufacturers could not claim ignorance about asbestos hazards. Courts have repeatedly rejected industry arguments that hazards were unknown or uncertain. The evidence was known; it was suppressed.

Deliberate Concealment as Fraud: The internal documents, memoranda, and strategic communications of major manufacturers establish that suppression was deliberate. Dr. Smith's directive not to inform workers of asbestos disease, the Simpson papers' statement that "the less said, the better off we are," and the coordinated efforts of the Asbestos Pentagon prove intent to deceive. This conduct constitutes fraud and justifies punitive damages.

Regulatory Response as Validation: The British government's regulatory response to the Merewether & Price study in 1931, and the U.S. government's regulatory response to Selikoff's evidence through OSHA in 1971, validate that hazards were known and significant. Industry had no legal right to suppress information that government regulators deemed worthy of protection standards.

See also: U.S. Asbestos Ban History and Regulations, OSHA Asbestos Standards History, and How Regulations Prove Manufacturer Liability.